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Executive Summary 
Aims, background and history 
1.  The government’s policy of contracting out public services to 
nonprofit (or ‘third sector’) bodies raises the crucial issue of 
government control, and in particular how public expenditure is 
accounted for and audited, and how services are regulated to 
ensure that the delivery conforms to their core values. A key 
question is whether nonprofits are public or private bodies, as this 
determines the nature and scope of the government’s powers of 
intervention and regulation. The aims of the study were to review 
empirical of nonprofit performance and to examine how nonprofits 
are classified with respect to their regulation.  
2.  Nonprofits have had a role in English health care both before and 
after the creation of the NHS. Increased voluntary sector 
participation had been encouraged by successive governments at 
least since 1980. However, after 2000 exhortation was backed up 
by legal reforms abolishing the public sector’s monopoly and 
thereby increasing opportunities for nonprofit participation. Policy 
towards nonprofits has focused principally on reducing or 
eliminating barriers preventing third sector bodies from being able 
to provide public services.  
Approach and methods 
3.  The conceptual framework for the review is based on definitions of 
nonprofits and on hypotheses generated by the theoretical 
frameworks used in nonprofit performance studies. Because of 
definitional problems and the sector’s diversity, a range of 
theoretical frameworks has been adopted for its study and the 
associated hypotheses are consequently diverse.  
4.  It has proved extremely difficult to provide an analytic framework 
that encompasses this diversity. We have identified six main 
themes but there is inevitably substantial overlap. Our six analytic 
themes are as follows:   
• Funding and competition 
• Public purpose 
• Users and quality 
• Capital financing 
• Integration and planning  
• Governance and accountability 
5.  A number of systematic reviews of the performance of the nonprofit 
sector have already been conducted. These studies have noted 
methodological limitations, definitional problems and inconclusive 
findings in studies of nonprofit performance. They have also noted 
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that the literature is mainly drawn from the US health care system 
which means that it is of limited relevance to other health systems 
which are not market-based and are universal, as in the UK. 
6.  The literature reviewed in the present study was obtained from a 
variety of sources.  Twenty-six core sources (14 literature 
databases and 12 websites) were searched, using 9 different search 
terms. The databases extended beyond the medical literature to 
include social science and economic literature. The initial search 
yielded over 14,000 hits including duplicates. The database was 
sifted three times for relevance and a final total of 163 studies was 
identified. Most (126) of the papers concerned the health sector. 
Only a small proportion concerned social services. The papers 
reviewed were mainly based on quantitative studies. Only 33 were 
based on qualitative research.  
Review of the literature on nonprofit performance 
7.  Most (77%) of the empirical literature finally reviewed relates to 
the USA, where the main focus of concern has been the relative 
merits of nonprofit and for-profit providers, as policy has 
increasingly turned from a system based heavily on the former to 
one relying more on the latter. The value of this literature for UK 
policy-making is reduced by its very different historical context 
(there being virtually no public sector in US health care) and the 
difficulty of abstracting, for the purpose of drawing lessons for the 
UK, from the specifically US elements that govern the way 
nonprofits are conceptualised there. These limitations are 
compounded by widespread limitations in the scope of the studies 
that have been done, noted by several previous reviewers, and by 
methodological weaknesses (not confined to the US literature), also 
noted by earlier reviewers.  
8.  Methodological problems limit the usefulness of much of the 
literature that might otherwise be of interest for UK policy-making. 
The literature relating to cost and quality is a particularly 
unfortunate case in point. Cost and quality definitions are often 
problematic. It is rarely possible to isolate the causal effects of the 
variables studied from those of other variables, and in too many 
cases no attempt is even made to do so. Data from company 
financial reports and accounts tend to be treated uncritically. In 
particular, the segmentation of the US health care market makes it 
impossible to generalise usefully about the relative efficiency or 
other aspects of alternative types of provider in the USA.  
9.  A limitation of the US studies overall, however, was their focus on 
providers. Reflecting the complexity of US system, the studies 
covered a range of fragments of the healthcare market, attempting 
to identify impacts of cost control and reimbursement methods on 
providers. This literature rarely relates the performance of nonprofit 
agencies to the achievement of universal health goals, such as 
equal access to care by geographically-defined populations, which 
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are a high priority for the UK government. In fact, few studies paid 
direct attention to the regulatory regimes within which nonprofits 
providers operate.  
Nonprofit classification 
10. We reviewed the classification of nonprofits with respect to the 
regulatory regimes governing their operations in the UK. The 
classification systems in question are those of the system of 
national accounts and those of the European Union’s economic 
constitution.  The definitions used by these classification systems 
show the public or private character of nonprofit providers. The 
systems are subject to revision, through reviews by international 
standard-setters or through court judgements, precisely because of 
the growing importance of the use of ‘third sector’ bodies and the 
classificatory difficulties this creates.  
11. The system of national accounts does not incorporate a nonprofit 
sector and nonprofit bodies can be classed to either public or 
private sectors. This system allows two interpretations of ‘non-
governmental’ and the UK government’s use of this term leaves 
open the question of whether it intends that third sector policy 
constitutes privatisation in the sense of the substantial transfer of 
government and public control over services and assets to the 
private sector.  
12. While attempts are being been made at the international level to 
harmonise the classification of nonprofits, the approach adopted 
stipulates that nonprofits are private bodies, a policy which is not 
reflected in UK practice. The approach does not clarify the 
government powers it is intended shall be retained when nonprofits 
take over public health care services. 
13. A further classification problem being dealt with by international 
bodies concerns the question of how to determine whether public 
service contractors are part of the government sector. The decision 
depends crucially on whether payments include income guarantees 
from the public sector, in which case the contractor is deemed to 
be part of government. However it is often difficult to differentiate 
between payments that include income guarantees and those that 
do not. The classification of NHS trusts illustrates the problem. In 
2003 these nonprofits were reclassified to the government sector 
on the basis of an Office of National Statistics reassessment of the 
income guarantees in their payments. 
14. Our review of classification systems also draws attention to 
inconsistencies between the system of national accounts and 
government financial reporting with respect to the classification of 
nonprofit assets. The complexity of partnerships arrangements 
between nonprofit bodies and public agencies are such that is often 
difficult to judge where property ownership rests, as ownership is 
tied to the risks and rewards of providing a service, about which 
interpretations can differ. 
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15. Market bodies are subject to the European Union’s competition law. 
We examine the classification system used to determine when this 
law applies to nonprofits delivering public services. Competition 
rules do not apply to those activities which constitute the ‘exercise 
of official authority’ or which are non-economic in nature.  
Derogations from competition law can apply in the case of bodies 
which are economic in character but nevertheless provide a public 
service. The nonprofit status of an agency providing health services 
is not of itself a guarantee against European jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, the fact that a service is contracted out may lead, 
irrespective of the sectoral classification of the contractor, to that 
service coming under EU jurisdiction. This finding is illustrated with 
a case study. 
 Key lessons for the NHS  
 1. There is no evidence to support the government policy in England of 
using nonprofits to switch from an integrated, publicly-owned and 
provided system to a provider- or firm-based system where market 
incentives and principles apply. 
2.  The overwhelming preponderance of American nonprofit studies in 
the literature makes it difficult, indeed dangerous, for the UK 
government in particular to draw inferences internationally; the US 
is a non-universal, private, voluntary insurance health care system 
in which almost 50 million people are uninsured. 
3.  The historical literature from the UK shows that the pre-NHS 
hospital system failed to achieve any correspondence between 
provision and health needs. Research into contemporary health 
systems reveals a preoccupation with internal performance 
detached from and unrelated to needs-based planning and equity of 
funding and provision.  
4.  Evaluations of non profit forms are problematic even within a single 
country because it is not possible to control for complex 
interactions between land and asset base values, regulatory 
regimes, patient entitlement, patient groups, system level 
resources, and levels of service provision both internal and external 
to the nonprofit firm.   
 5.  There is no consistent evidence that nonprofits perform better than 
other ownership forms and there is little research of their impact on 
access to services. The evidence suggests that in a competitive 
environment nonprofit providers behave much like for-profit 
providers and this has a negative impact on quality of care and 
staffing levels.  
6.  The switch to commercial contracting with nonprofit providers will 
expose health service commissioners to European competition law, 
limiting their regulatory powers at national level. Under current 
case law, European competition law, from which nonprofit 
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organisations are not exempt, can be triggered by commercial 
contracting. 
7.   The NHS should revisit the benefits of integrating the system from 
the perspective of planning, equity and efficiency in provision. 
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The Report 
Introduction and approach to literature 
The current policy of contracting-out state-run public services to non-
governmental bodies such as nonprofits raises the crucial issue of 
government control, and in particular how public expenditure is 
accounted for and audited, and how services are regulated to ensure 
that the delivery conforms to the core values and goals of the services 
in question.  In the case of the NHS this includes ensuring universal 
access and equity of access.  These issues are of growing significance 
because government is increasingly using market mechanisms to vest 
responsibility for the provision of public services in a variety of new 
bodies outside direct ministerial control, including nonprofit 
organisations, for-profit commercial providers and hybrid public-private 
bodies.  
When public money is paid to for-profit and nonprofit private sector 
bodies for operating a contracted out service, the locus of public 
accountability becomes unclear (Sharman, 2001, p14). The 2001 
Sharman Report to the Treasury on audit and accountability 
arrangements in central government highlighted the weakening of 
public accountability where public money passes through chains of 
independent contractors.  
Public expenditure controls have implications not just for audit and 
accountability but also for macroeconomic policy and the determination 
of balance sheet treatment, all government accounting, and net public 
sector debt and expenditure. However, the recent emergence of 
nonprofits is problematic because as Salamon and Anheier (1997) and 
Kendall and Knapp (1996) note, the sector occupies a space with 
indeterminate boundaries between the governmental and the private 
for-profit spheres, making it unclear what the mechanisms are for public 
control and government oversight. This problem is compounded by the 
lack of definition of this sector, and the fact that nonprofits are so 
diffuse in form and function. It is often unclear whether nonprofits are 
private market actors or public bodies.  
The public-private divide is key, as it determines the nature and scope 
of the Government’s powers of intervention and regulation, either 
through public (non-legal) or  commercial (legal) contract forms at the 
level of both the UK and EU courts.  How does the public law apply to 
bodies that are independent of government but have public service 
functions (Grace, 2003; OECD, 2002; Freedland and Auby, 2006)?  As 
the Public Accounts Committee commented in 2001: ‘There is no firm or 
clear theoretical framework for British public administration that 
dictates which functions should rest directly under the control of elected 
politicians or quasi-autonomous bodies’ (Flinders, 2004).  
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The vexed question of political accountability and regulatory control is 
well illustrated in the case of health services, where the European 
economic constitution set out in the EC Treaty determines which health 
services come under EU competition law and which come under 
member state jurisdiction. The European Commission recognises that 
reliance on third sector providers raises fundamental questions about 
state control over redistributive welfare services because organisations 
that have some commercial characteristics, such as trading activity and 
competitive tendering, are regulated under European law.  Increasingly, 
where services move into the sphere of private contract law, 
commercial rules apply and the jurisdiction may change from national to 
regional courts.  Regional laws can reduce the sovereignty of the nation 
state by proscribing redistributive policies such as government subsidies 
and service monopolies, e.g. in postal services (European Economic and 
Social Committee, 2001).    
Thus the switch from integrated state provision of services, to a market 
delivery system together with the introduction of nonprofits has 
implications for the systems of administration and law.  The treatment 
of nonprofits raises constitutional issues because these bodies, despite 
providing government services, may under certain circumstances fall 
under the jurisdiction of the EU and its competition laws thus inhibiting 
the government’s power to regulate public services to meet the core 
principles of the NHS.     
For example, the NHS Plan in England contains in its preface a set of 
ten core principles:  
1.  The NHS will provide a universal service for all based on clinical 
need, not ability to pay. 
2.  The NHS will provide a comprehensive range of services. 
3.  The NHS will shape its services around the needs and preferences 
of individual patients, their families and their carers. 
4.  The NHS will respond to different needs of different populations. 
5.  The NHS will work continuously to improve quality services and to 
minimise errors. 
6.  The NHS will support and value its staff. 
7.  Public funds for health care will be devoted solely to NHS patients. 
8.  The NHS will work together with others to ensure a seamless 
service for patients. 
9.  The NHS will help keep people healthy and work to reduce health 
Inequalities. 
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10. The NHS will respect the confidentiality of individual patients and 
provide open access to information about services, treatment and 
performance (NHS Plan, 2000).1 
A key concern here is whether these principles are compromised as a 
result of current policy initiatives. 
During the course of designing the literature review it became apparent 
that we were faced with some major conceptual challenges in trying to 
classify nonprofits and conduct a review of their performance. The first 
challenge was the need to take account of the policy context within 
which nonprofit forms are emerging, namely the switch from integrated 
publicly owned public services to a market based system of competing 
providers. The second was to examine the theoretical rationale and 
evidence base underpinning the switch to government’s use of 
nonprofits in the NHS, and to consider this rationale in the context of 
the overarching goals of the NHS, namely universality, equity and public 
accountability. The third was the need to understand the regulatory and 
legal implications of bringing in nonprofits with respect to government 
controls over public expenditure and its right to regulate. This meant 
that we had to explore the literature and debates on how government 
itself classifies and treats nonprofits for public expenditure purposes, 
and how the European Union treats them for competition law purposes.   
As a result our review of the literature is in four parts. The first section 
gives a brief overview of the policy development and highlights some of 
the regulatory and constitutional implications. The second examines the 
theoretical justifications for government policy of using nonprofits to 
substitute for public provision, and is used to provide a framework and 
rationale for our approach to the analysis of performance literature.  
Third, the substantive literature review, reviews the nature of the 
evidence underpinning the ‘performance’ of nonprofits in the context of 
theory and of government policy towards the NHS. In our original 
proposal, we stated that we would review the historical literature on the 
performance of nonprofits in the pre-NHS era.  We have done this, but 
we have placed it in an appendix on the grounds that the historical 
literature on which we have drawn was derived from different sources 
to those used in the systematic literature review (though we believe it is 
comprehensive). Additionally, though this historical literature did not set 
out systematically to assess "performance" in the way that 
contemporary work does, we believe it sheds valuable light on current 
                                                 
 
1 As we went to press, the government published a revised set of principles in a new 
operating framework for the NHS in England. (NHS 2006) The NHS in England: operating 
framework 2007/8. London: NHS). The revised set of principles no longer require that public 
funds for health care will be devoted solely to NHS patients. 
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debates, not least because of the use by think tanks and government 
ministers of historical precedent.2 
Finally, we examine how nonprofits are classified in national accounts 
from the perspective of government control and contrast this system 
with the way in which the EU assigns public control over nonprofits. We 
consider the policy implications of our findings for government control 
over public expenditure and their right to regulate and make 
recommendations for further research.   
                                                 
 
2 Peter Hain (2002) 'The past in new Labour's future', Observer, 27 October 2002; Blears, 
Hazel, MP , 'Mutualism and the development of the National Health Service', in Stephen 
Hogan ed. Making health care mutual: a publicly funded, locally accountable NHS, Mutuo, 
London, 2002, p.11; David Green (ed, 1996) Reinventing civil society: the rediscovery of 
welfare without politics, (London: IEA), p. 130. 
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Section 1  Policy background 
 
In this section we examine the history of nonprofit policy in England 
both before and after the creation of the NHS, with special reference to 
the emergence after 1991 of a contracting system for providers of NHS 
services, first in the form of a ‘quasi’ or internal market and, from 2003, 
in the form of a true commercial market. 
1.1 The history of nonprofit policy 
1.1.1 Nonprofit providers pre-NHS  
Although a mixed (public-private) economy of health care existed in 
Britain for many years prior to 1948, this did not mean that there was 
an extensive network of contractual arrangements between the private 
and public sectors for the provision of health services. To the extent 
that this can be traced in hospital and local authority financial statistics, 
it seems that spending was concentrated on some specialist services 
(orthopaedic hospitals, tuberculosis sanatoria), which individual local 
authorities lacked the resources to provide (Mohan, 2006). However, 
once the wartime coalition government made its commitment to 
developing a national health service, with an announcement in 1941, 
the possibility that this might embody a purchaser-provider split was 
actively considered. Indeed, some have argued that the government’s 
1944 White Paper anticipated many of the subsequent features of the 
NHS reforms of 1989 (Powell, 1994).  
However, those wartime proposals foundered for two reasons (Mohan, 
2002, pp. 77-83). Firstly, it was known that the costs and efficiency of 
hospitals varied enormously, but no research had been done on the 
reasons for these variations, and there was considerable caution about 
embarking on a market-based reform of hospital services in those 
circumstances. The second and more fundamental reason was the 
reluctance of the nonprofit providers (the established voluntary 
hospitals, particularly the teaching hospitals) to accept that greater 
payment from public sources implied a greater degree of accountability 
for the use of public money. Various options for reimbursement were 
considered, and one of them was for centrally-determined standard 
payments for different levels of service; there was a clear implication 
that the ministry wished to avoid the transaction costs associated with 
what was termed a “network of separate bargains”. However, it proved 
impossible to agree a solution because of the intransigence of the 
voluntary hospitals, which were determined to protect their 
independence from what they saw as unjustifiable state regulation 
(Mohan, 2002, pp. 80-1). The solution finally agreed upon was one in 
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which hospitals were integrated into a regionally administered health 
care system and paid on the basis of annual retrospective 
reimbursement not prospectively on the basis of contracts.    
1.1.2 NHS policy towards nonprofits 1948-1991 
With the exception of long-term care, for which major divestiture to the 
private sector occurred throughout the 1980s, the post-1948 history of 
the NHS witnessed few efforts to revive the possibility of contractual 
arrangements between the public and private sectors, although such 
arrangements were developed in a small number of cases where 
hospitals had been “disclaimed”, that is, not nationalized when the NHS 
was established. The near-universal electoral popularity of the NHS 
meant that the Conservatives in the 1950s were disinclined to tinker 
with it, and the Labour governments of the 1960s and 1970s 
maintained a strong commitment to public provision. In terms of 
contestability it is also true to say that in these decades there were very 
few potential alternative providers of services: in the case of hospital 
provision there were no significant commercial providers and the 
existing nonprofit sector (a small number of rather undercapitalised 
institutions, such as those run by Nuffield hospitals and the religious 
sector) was not in a position to bid for contracts (see Griffith et al, 
1987; Mohan, 1984, 1985; Rayner, 1986; 1987; for further details). 
It was not until the return of the Conservative government in 1979 that 
initiatives were taken to reintroduce welfare pluralism. Health 
authorities were explicitly encouraged to take account of existing and 
likely future private provision of services when developing their plans 
for the future, and the concept of the NHS as a commissioner rather 
than a provider of care came on to the agenda (Davies, 1987). Health 
authorities were given more freedom in various respects: freedom to 
raise funds through charitable efforts, to expand private pay-bed 
provision, and to collaborate with the private and voluntary sectors.3 
However, for most of the 1980s, the Conservatives did not go so far as 
to create a contestable market in service provision. While there was 
much rhetorical support for the idea of public-private partnerships and a 
mixed economy of welfare, financial backing for developing new forms 
of service provision was not evident. Steps taken to expand choice were 
ill-considered and resulted in uneven growth of services, unrelated to 
needs, an obvious example being the mushroom growth of private 
nursing care for the elderly. GPs faced a more complicated structure of 
reimbursements and incentives but were not competing against other 
bidders for their practices (Moon and North, 2000, 26-8). There was 
some expansion of contracts with the private sector for the provision of 
                                                 
 
3 Teaching hospitals and special health authorities already enjoyed some freedoms in 
respect of their charitable endowments through the mechanism of special trustees: Mohan 
and Gorsky, 2001, 91-102. 
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acute surgery, although this was not systematically developed, since it 
depended largely on the existence of spare capacity in private hospitals.   
1.1.3 The 1991 reforms create health care firms 
While divestiture of mainstream clinical care to other sectors had hardly 
progressed at all during the Conservative administration of 1979-1990, 
a structural change was made in 1991 that fundamentally changed 
opportunities for privatisation. The internal market reforms organised 
hospitals and community health services into more than 400 trusts 
legally obliged to break even by selling their services to NHS purchasers 
(at that stage, health authorities). This switch to a corporatised system 
of providers brought with it a new accounting regime and purchasing 
system that could in principle be extended to nonprofit and for-profit 
providers.  
The New Labour government of 1997 abolished one aspect of the 1991 
reforms, GP fundholding, but it held firmly to the market orientation of 
the Conservatives structural reforms by retaining the purchaser-
provider split. However, until 2003 no administration had made an 
effort systematically to encourage nonprofits. Contracts were placed 
between the NHS and the private sector but they depended very much 
on ad hoc local circumstances, and the NHS Plan (2000) repeated 
exhortations first made in the early 1980s to use the nonprofit sector 
more widely. 
1.2 The evolution of nonprofit policy in 
England since 2000 
In 2000, the NHS Plan announced the government’s intention to 
develop partnerships with the voluntary sector for the provision of NHS 
services: 
‘The NHS will develop partnerships and co-operation at all levels of care 
– between patients, their carers and families and NHS staff; between 
the health and social care sector; between different Government 
departments; between the public sector, voluntary organisations and 
private providers in the provision of NHS services – to ensure a patient-
centred service’ (NHS, 2000, p5). 
Increased voluntary sector participation had been encouraged by 
successive governments at least for the previous twenty years, but on 
this occasion the announcement was backed up by subsequent 
initiatives designed to remove barriers to the entry of voluntary 
agencies and by legal reforms abolishing the public sector’s monopoly. 
This was the first time that exhortation had been linked to statutory 
change.  
Initiatives occurred at both government and NHS levels and will be 
discussed briefly in the following paragraphs.  
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1.2.1 Cross-government initiatives - reviews 
Following the NHS Plan, in 2002 the Treasury published an 
interdepartmental review of the role of the voluntary and community 
sector that recommended that policy-makers should give consideration 
to ‘the full range of options for [voluntary and community sector] 
involvement’, including service delivery (HM Treasury, 2002, p37). By 
2004 the government’s spending review included a report of an 
investigation into ‘the potential for greater third sector involvement in 
public service delivery’ (HM Treasury, 2004a). That investigation, led by 
chief secretary to the Treasury, Paul Boateng, reiterated calls for 
greater involvement of the sector in public service provision, including 
health and social care for older people. A further discussion was 
published in the same year by the UK Treasury that would ‘help clarify 
what the third sector is, […] describe the value which third sector 
organisations can bring to improving the quality and effectiveness of 
public services, and [identify] the challenges facing the Government and 
the sector in the years ahead if the full benefits of its involvement in 
public services are to be realised’ (HM Treasury, 2004b).  
High significance continued to be attached to the policy; in March 2006 
a further review of the third sector was announced as part of the 
Treasury's comprehensive spending review and a minister of the third 
sector was appointed to the cabinet office.  
1.2.2 Cross-government initiatives - legal reforms to 
allow diversion of NHS funds to nonprofit providers 
Meanwhile, new legal forms were introduced to facilitate commercial 
contracting with nonprofit bodies. First, the Health and Social Care 
(Community Health and Standards) Act, 2003, created the community 
benefit company as a legal basis for commercial contracting between 
foundation trusts and NHS commissioners of care. The Act included a 
new power permitting service commissioners to contract with any 
provider.  
Second, in 2005 the Companies Act was amended to include a new 
corporate form called the ‘community interest company’. This form was 
designed for use by ‘social enterprises’ wishing to contract for public 
services (social enterprise is a generic term which the Treasury views as 
synonymous with ‘nonprofit’).   
1.2.3 New guidance 
In March 2006 the Treasury published guidance to funders choosing to 
purchase from the social enterprise sector. The guidance, which 
provided advice on ‘best practice’ and ‘effective and efficient use of 
public funds in a way that is consistent with the principles of public 
accountability’, called for a flexible approach to accounting rules  so as 
to lower barriers to third sector involvement (HM Treasury, 2006, p10).  
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1.2.4 Other measures 
A “Third Sector Commissioning Task Force” was created in 2005 to 
lower barriers to entry and to place third sector organisations on a level 
playing field (third sector is another term the Treasury uses as a 
synonym for ‘nonprofit’). A post of ‘compact commissioner’, responsible 
for compacts between the voluntary sector and public agencies, to be 
funded by the Home Office, was planned for September 2006, and a 
special body known as the Social Enterprise Unit was created in 
government to promote the policy (‘compact’ is a term the government 
uses to refer to a framework of principles underpinning relationships 
between the voluntary and community sector and the public sector). 
1.3 The evolution of nonprofit policy in the 
NHS since 2003 
1.3.1 Nonprofit opportunities in the new primary care 
market 
In 2003 the GPs’ monopoly over the provision of primary care to the 
NHS was abolished with the enactment of the Health and Social Care 
(Community Health and Standards) Act of that year. This for the first 
time allowed PCTs to commission care from ‘anyone who can secure a 
contract’ (NHS Primary Care Contracting, 2006). Then in 2004 the GMS 
contract between GPs and the Secretary of State was replaced, 
resulting in contracts between practices and PCTs with very different 
provisions from its forerunner.  
At the heart of the new system was a transformation in GPs’ contractual 
relationships. The old GMS contract was backed by provisions of the 
Red Book, an extensive set of guidelines and regulations covering 
service range and quality, staffing and premises. The new system 
provides for four main categories of contract:  
• revised nationally-negotiated GMS contracts for essential 
services only, 
• primary care trust medical services contracts (PCTMS) which 
enable PCTs to employ GPs directly on salary,  
• personal medical services (PMS) contracts, negotiated locally, 
which allow PCTs to contract with practices or with individual 
GPs to provide a variety of different mixes of primary care 
services,  
• alternative provider of medical services (APMS) contracts which 
allow commercial firms to provide any combination of primary 
and secondary care services (Department of Health, 2003). 
GPs can enter these various contractual relationships as sole 
practitioners; as part of a practice partnership; as employees, directors, 
or shareholders of commercial companies; as sub-contractors to 
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whatever entity holds the primary contract; or as salaried PCT 
employees. Nonprofits, including according to Treasury usage 
community interest companies, are included among the corporate 
bodies that can contract for primary care services on a commercial 
basis.  
1.3.2 The primary care White Paper and the NHS operating 
framework 
Third sector policy for the NHS is set out in the 2006 White Paper Our 
health, our care, our say (paragraph 7.93.). The White Paper followed 
the commitment in Commissioning a Patient Led NHS (DH 2005) to a 
‘competitive, contestable marketplace’ for the supply of all NHS 
services, with the NHS as ‘a commissioning-driven service’. The White 
Paper gave PCTs a central role in driving the policy and required them 
to become by 2008 ‘patient-led and community-led organisations’ 
rather than providers of services. It included a set of policies ‘to 
promote better use of health and social care “third-sector” providers’ 
(‘third sector providers’ in this context follows Treasury definitions and 
includes ‘organisations from the voluntary and community sector, as 
well as other forms of value-driven organisations such as co-
operatives’). All providers that pre-qualify to quality standards during 
the tendering process will be put on an accredited list of primary care 
suppliers to ensure faster procurement of GP services in the future (pp 
67-8). Furthermore, from April 2007 the Department of Health will 
establish a fund to provide advice to social entrepreneurs who want to 
develop new models to deliver health and social care services (pp 175-
6). 
The 2006 NHS operating framework identified capital investment as one 
of the key barriers to participation by nonprofits: ‘Where a new service 
would require significant capital investment’, it said, ‘the PCT could seek 
to lower the barriers for new providers by considering a variety of 
different ownership and service delivery models which reflect the range 
of services provided and the different funding sources available’ 
(Department of Health, 2006, p14).  
In July 2006 a follow-up document, Our Health, our care, our 
community: investing in the future of community hospitals and services, 
built on its predecessor and the operating framework by including third 
sector providers as possible members of a new capital investment 
model known as ‘community ventures’ which allow for joint ventures 
between a PCT and a partner (potentially either a third sector or a 
private organisation). This joint venture company would be given 
capital. Then, in November 2006, a White Paper implementation plan, 
Our health, our care, our say: making it happen, proposed new funding 
arrangements, institutional arrangements and an independent regulator 
for social and community care, signalling the development of a system 
of care parallel to but separate from the NHS in which nonprofits are 
scheduled to play a role.  
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Nonprofit policy has therefore been an important element in the 
evolution of commercial contracting and the shift away from public 
provision of NHS services.  
In the next section we set out the conceptual framework for the review 
of nonprofit performance. 
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Section 2  The conceptual framework: 
definitions, hypotheses and theory 
2.1 Definitions  
There is no agreement on the meaning of the term ‘nonprofit’. What 
counts as a nonprofit organisation varies from country to country and 
here we examine briefly the efforts of various commentators and 
analysts to find a generally accepted definition. In this account it will 
become clear that the debate is fundamentally influenced by different 
perceptions of the relationship between nonprofits, the state and the 
market.  
According to Kendall and Knapp the nonprofit sector “contains within it 
such a bewildering array of organisational forms, activities, 
personalities, ideologies, constraints, expectations and fears, that for 
many purposes of policy, research and discussion it would be a 
misrepresentation [of the sector] […] and an unhelpful constraint” to 
base analysis on a single factor, such as ownership (Kendall and Knapp, 
1996).   
Salamon and Anheier (1997) illustrate the problem in their break down 
of the nonprofit sector into the charitable, independent, voluntary and 
tax-exempt sectors, non-governmental organisations, the économie 
sociale, and what the UK government refers to as ‘value-driven’ 
organisations or ‘social enterprises’. Although each of these terms 
captures a different aspect of nonprofits, none on its own describes a 
distinctive sector or function. Not all nonprofits are charitable (in most 
countries charitable income is a small part of total revenues), and while 
the term ‘independent sector’ defines nonprofits in terms of autonomy 
from government, that autonomy varies from state to state and may be 
compromised by the receipt of funds from government contracts and by 
the terms on which such contracts are placed. Since all organisations 
are driven by values of one kind or another, the UK government’s use of 
the term ‘value driven’ suggests a political rather than social purpose 
(HM Treasury 2006). Since ‘social enterprises’ generate most of their 
income from competing in markets, even if they are notionally ‘non-
market’, they cannot avoid competitive behaviour. Indeed, according to 
UN’s systems of national accounts, nonprofit organisations which 
receive the majority of their income from fees and commercial contracts 
will be classified as part of the market sector, regardless of their legal 
status, ethos, social purpose or function (see below, section 4).  
Arriving at an agreed definition of nonprofits is therefore almost 
impossible. The situation is further complicated because nonprofits can 
also take several possible legal forms. Nevertheless, UK government 
policy and political rhetoric all too often employs a simple contrast 
between public, private, and voluntary sectors, even though the UK 
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Cabinet Office’s own strategy unit has emphasised the diversity of the 
sector. Referring to social enterprises, for example, a study for the 
Cabinet Office stated that ‘Social enterprises take an enormous number 
of different ownership and governance structures, and have a very wide 
range of objectives.’ This study found 17 different types of social 
enterprise organisation but did not analyse the legal implications of this 
(Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, 2002).  
We have adopted as a working definition for the literature review the 
definition of a nonprofit organisation used by the European System of 
Accounts (see section 4.1.1): ‘a legal or social entity created for the 
purpose of producing goods and services whose status does not permit 
them to be a source of income, profit or other financial gains for the 
units that establish, control or finance them. In practice, their 
productive activities are bound to generate either surpluses or deficits 
but any surpluses they happen to make cannot be appropriated by 
other institutional units.’ (ESA, 1996) (This qualification is known as the 
non-distribution constraint and will be discussed in more detail in 
section 2.2.5).  
Government departments acknowledge that the plethora of nonprofit 
forms have implications for both structure and performance because of 
their potentially different effects on viability, social purpose, locus of 
control and interaction with the environment (Cabinet Office Strategy 
Unit, 2002; HM Treasury, 2002).  
In the classification and regulation section we will examine whether and 
to what extent these definitional vagaries are resolved in official 
classification systems. We will identify where nongovernmental 
nonprofits fit into the institutional and sectoral classification system; 
discuss recent attempts to refine the basis of the public/private 
boundary; and describe certain conflicts in the way national and 
government accountants classify nonprofit organisations and assets. We 
will also examine the jurisdictional question of whether nonprofits are 
subject to European economic law or regulation. To examine this we will 
explore the scope of the European Union’s economic constitution and 
the basis upon which nonprofit organisations are deemed to be 
providers of public or market services (see section 4.3.1).   
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2.2 Theories and hypotheses 
2.2.1 Competition hypotheses 
Nonprofit participation in the provision of public health services is 
facilitated by contracting-out. However, the economic literature supplies 
no theoretical accounts of nonprofits or their objectives under 
competitive conditions, nor any strong theoretical prediction that 
ownership dictates differences in cost performance in a market 
(Needleman, 2001; Shen et al, 2005). Instead market benefits are 
related at the theoretical level to the process of contracting-out rather 
than to nonprofits per se (Domberger and Jensen, 1997). According to 
economic theory, competition is the crucial determinant of performance 
(Shen et al, 2005). In comparisons of nonprofits with for-profits, any 
attempt to isolate the effect of ownership must take this into account. 
We will therefore examine, first, whether the performance literature 
includes controls for competitive pressures on nonprofits, and second 
what the literature has to say about the differential effects of 
contracting and reimbursement systems on nonprofit performance. We 
will then examine in the classification section the role played by 
competition in the designation of nonprofits as market actors. 
2.2.2 Competition and contestability 
Theories of competitive bidding (the essence of contracting-out) predict 
a reduction in cost compared with the cost prevailing before 
competition, assuming more or less perfect competition, with a large 
number of bidders ensuring that none can individually affect the offered 
price. However, given that public service efficiency requires consumers 
and services to be bundled together, an alternative theory of 
‘contestability’ has been employed for public service contracting-out. As 
currently used by the UK government for NHS policy (Reid, 2005; 
Department of Health, 2005), the theory involves claims about the 
significance of the costs of entry and exit. A contestable market is 
defined as one in which entry and exit costs are minimal and in which 
there are no legal restrictions on market entry or exit (Baumol et al, 
1982). Barriers to entry can include differential costs of capital 
investment, and regulatory requirements, such as the requirement on 
US nonprofits to provide community benefits like uncompensated care 
that do not apply to all potential contractors.  
Several studies look at the extent to which community benefits are 
actually provided by nonprofits and we examine these findings. We also 
scrutinize the findings of studies concerned to measure the effects of 
market entry and exit on patient access to care.  In section 4 we 
consider whether the nonprofit sector is clearly defined with a 
determinate set of regulatory requirements distinct from other sectors. 
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Neither competitive bidding hypotheses, nor contestability theory 
predict that advantages will accrue from contracting with nonprofit 
rather than for-profit providers. On the contrary, contestability makes a 
case for treating nonprofits and for-profits equally. Nor does either 
theory provide an explanation of the different kinds of accounting entity 
among which competition takes place. However, competition can have 
implications for risk pools; competitive bidding may lower levels of 
funding aggregation at provider level, making funding recipients more 
vulnerable to random variations in patient needs and limiting the 
opportunities for risk-pooling (Heald, 2003). While appreciation of this 
has led to the inclusion of case mix adjustment techniques in empirical 
studies of relative cost performance in the USA, the question of the link 
between competition and the ability of hospitals to cross-subsidize free 
care for the poor remains under-theorised and is the focus of fierce 
debates over nonprofits’ tax exempt status (Federal Trade Commission 
and Department of Justice, 2004). In the literature review we assess 
whether studies have included appropriate control variables, such as 
case mix adjustment, when they examined the responses of different 
ownership forms to the pressures of competition. 
2.2.3 Property rights theory 
Property rights theory, an economic analysis of ownership, predicts 
efficiency benefits from private ownership of a trading body’s surplus. 
But the main prediction, that private ownership of productive surpluses 
improves efficiency, provides an argument against nonprofits as well as 
against public ownership (Domberger and Jensen, 1997). We will 
examine findings about the relative cost efficiency of the nonprofit 
sector. However, a key consideration here is that cost results are 
uninterpretable without comparable data on the effects of cost efficiency 
on the quality of care.  
Two economic frameworks predict differential effects on quality of 
nonprofit and for-profit organisation. The first is the theory of 
asymmetric information and the second is the principle of non-
distribution. 
2.2.4 Asymmetric information and incomplete 
contracts 
Attenuation of property rights through the establishment of nonprofits 
can solve some specific problems of market failure. The argument is 
that nonprofit organisations face in principle no financial incentive to 
compromise the quality of care they provide. In contrast, for-profits 
have a direct pecuniary incentive to do this.  
Economists such as Kenneth Arrow (1963) and Burton Weisbrod (1975) 
argue that in certain circumstances producers of services will always 
have more information at their disposal than consumers. As a 
consequence, as in the case of health care, consumers are unable to 
evaluate fully the likely consequences of different courses of treatment 
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and so can never be certain that they have chosen the best provider of 
the service, or that the outcome of treatment is optimal. Unlike articles 
of individual consumption, the adequacy of services provided in such 
areas as health, childcare and nursing is hard to evaluate, particularly 
when the purchaser or his or her relative cannot be present. In this 
situation contracts are deemed to be ‘incomplete’, in the sense that not 
all possible eventualities can be written into a contract, and managers 
of for-profit organisations have an incentive, which experience shows is 
not always resisted, to exploit this situation and maximize profits by 
reducing service quality.  This furnishes one theoretical reason to favour 
nonprofits for the provision of public services, where quality is at a 
premium.   
2.2.5 The non-distribution constraint  
The nonprofit form of organisation, which limits property rights to 
earnings, is said to overcome such problems; in Hansmann's (1980) 
formulation, nonprofits have one key defining characteristic: the non-
distribution constraint. While they may make surpluses, or profits, they 
cannot distribute them to shareholders, or to trustees, but are required 
to reinvest them and use them for the purposes for which the 
organisation has been established. The ‘contract’ between a nonprofit 
and a consumer therefore offers greater reassurance to potential users 
of a service where information is asymmetric. Thus when the consumer 
cannot measure output it makes sense to adopt incentive structures 
that reward behaviour that is less easily monitored by the user, that is, 
quality issues about which users can have little information. The 
nonprofit form is efficient to the extent that the increase in valuable 
behaviours offsets other responses which may be at the expense of 
social welfare. (Sloan et al 2001, 3). As a general rule, the larger the 
potential adverse effects of cost-cutting on service quality, the stronger 
the argument for direct public or nonprofit provision of services. Hence 
empirical studies frequently examine the cost/quality/access trade-off 
and test the prediction that it should have less influence among 
nonprofits. An important part of the literature review will involve 
examining whether studies motivated by these theoretical predictions 
have paid as much attention to variation in regulation by the public 
sector as they have paid to variation in market regulation.  
It is argued that the non-distribution constraint influences behaviour in 
several ways, and we can infer from this that there ought to be 
identifiable differences of behaviour between nonprofits and for-profits. 
For example, Hansmann (1980, 1987) identifies potential effects on 
goals (e.g. nonprofits would be expected to be more concerned with 
maximising the quality or quantity of a service to be delivered, rather 
than purely maximising profits); on efficiency (the absence of ownership 
claims to residual earnings is said to imply that managers have little 
incentive to minimise costs, although on the other hand other aspects of 
the nonprofit form, such as greater support from volunteers, might 
affect the cost structure); on the ability to respond flexibly to changes 
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in demand (because they are constrained in terms of access to capital); 
and on the extent to which they are able to cross-subsidise 
‘unprofitable’ services.  
We will examine the findings of studies that combine assessment of cost 
efficiency with assessment of quality and also findings with respect to 
variation in nonprofit ‘community benefit’ performance. We will 
investigate findings with respect to nonprofit mergers, their conversion 
to for-profit status, and the protection of nonprofit assets. We will also 
examine findings with respect to public trust in nonprofits as well as 
staff commitment and satisfaction.   
Notwithstanding the non-distribution constraint, the term ‘nonprofit’ 
does not mean that nonprofit organisations cannot make surpluses – 
they can and usually must, but surpluses may only be used for the 
purposes for which the organisation exists; they cannot be appropriated 
by staff or board members. From this perspective it is wrong to claim 
that nonprofits do not pursue surpluses in exactly the same way as for-
profits (Thorpe et al, 2001). Surpluses have traditionally been used by 
for-profits and nonprofits alike to pursue social goals such as funding 
care for the uninsured. In this context, the question is whether, in the 
pursuit of surpluses, nonprofits are regulated sufficiently differently 
from for-profits to influence their operations, and in particular the scale 
and nature of the cost and quality trade-offs often associated with 
surplus generation. This question is explored in the section on 
classification and EU regulation (section 4.2). 
2.2.6 Investment  
Since they cannot distribute profits, nonprofits may be unable to attract 
equity capital for investment. This suggests that their finance structure 
may differ from that of for-profit enterprises (United Nations, 2003). 
The significance of this prediction is that the government links third 
sector policy with privately financed public service infrastructure (see 
section 1). We explore the evidence from the literature about the 
implications of capital investment arrangements for the organisation 
and delivery of services by nonprofits. 
2.2.7 Public administration  
Theoretical arguments drawn from the literature on the non-distribution 
constraint suggest reasons for thinking that nonprofits are a desirable 
form of organisation, particularly for the provision of welfare services, 
but James (1990) argues that there are three questions which remain 
unresolved and may cast some doubt on this conclusion. First, the 
theories are based on the American experience, and while they may 
provide reasons for having services provided by nonprofits rather than 
by government, several of the hypotheses derived from the same 
theories appear to give reasons to prefer direct public provision, such as 
exists in many countries, as much as nonprofit providers.  Second, the 
theories do not explain why in many societies government and 
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nonprofits apparently compete, or at the very least operate to provide 
the same services. Finally, theories which highlight the social purposes 
which can be served by nonprofits do not explain the diversity of forms 
in the nonprofit sector (James, 1990, 22-3).   
Theories of public administration can be contrasted with organisational 
economics in the emphasis given to system-level rather than firm-level 
analysis. At the system level public administration predicts that market 
fragmentation will impair mechanisms for ensuring integrated, equitable 
treatment for geographic populations. We will examine what the 
literature has to say about co-operation between nonprofits and other 
organisations, and about the role of geographic or locality planning in 
connection with nonprofit provision. 
2.2.8 Social and political theories 
Other theorists argue in favour of nonprofit provision on the grounds 
that it can advance social or political goals, rather than for technical, 
economic reasons. And in practice nonprofits frequently appear as the 
only feasible option as a result of historical and political circumstances. 
But, as we shall see, in these accounts it is almost always assumed that 
nonprofits are private corporations not public sector bodies. The 
accuracy of this assumption is examined in the classification and 
regulation section. 
Much contemporary writing on the desirability of nonprofits implicitly or 
explicitly seeks to create or re-create a sense of involvement and 
participation. Those who advocate the return of public services from 
public provision to control by voluntary organisations often rely on the 
proposition that this will enhance participation and community control, 
and will restore a better balance between the interests of consumers 
and producers. Paul Hirst (1994) and Brian Turner (2000) were 
impatient with defenders of the centralised Keynesian welfare state, 
arguing that consumer interests were repressed by its bureaucratic 
mode of service delivery, dominated by professionals. They felt that 
most people were competent enough to be given choice in the public 
services, and challenged critics to show that individuals would not be 
able to find and to evaluate appropriate guidance. Central to this 
argument is a conception of the role of nonprofits in providing vehicles 
for community control and participation. David Green (1996) sees 
nonprofits and volunteerism as ways of reinventing forms of collective 
social action which do not have a political dimension, and as an 
essential means of fostering civic virtues rather than relying on what he 
terms ‘socialist materialism’. On his view they generate greater 
participation and ‘active citizenship’, which in turn promotes trust and 
perhaps, the formation of social capital.   
A characteristic claim of conservative commentators such as David 
Green and Arthur Seldon (1980) is that state provision of welfare 
services stifled a huge wave of localist and voluntary effort, and 
therefore prevented the development of ‘more spontaneous, organic, a 
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local, voluntary and sensitive services […][ that would have] better 
reflected consumer preferences’ (Seldon, 1980, p5) than what Whelan 
terms an ‘overstuffed, underperforming state’ (1993, p18).  
Responsiveness, they hold, will be promoted by welfare systems which 
give individuals, rather than governments, the greatest degree of choice 
of welfare providers. Similar arguments are advanced by writers such as 
Bosanquet (1999) who argue for ‘managed pluralism’ as a means of 
promoting access to services and increasing patient choice. Bosanquet 
believes the NHS would do better if it ‘did less and encouraged 
substantial new sources of funding and supply’ (ibid, p8). Ham (1995) 
has likewise argued for more flexible and participatory approaches to 
service delivery as being desirable in themselves. Not all are so 
sanguine about the benefits of nonprofits, however. Bruce (1995) 
implies that there are several structural reasons why nonprofits cannot 
automatically be presumed to ‘value and respect their consumers’, not 
least because of the numbers of stakeholders and the complexity of 
their governance arrangements, and we will seek to identify the ways in 
which responsiveness to consumers is assessed in the literature. 
In the light of these contrasting predictions we will examine findings 
with regard to the adequacy of basic accountability mechanisms in the 
nonprofit sector, namely, boards of governance and financial reporting.  
Predictions from these theories also generate hypotheses about the 
experience of patients and staff, for example, in respect of 
responsiveness to consumers and staffing policy. We examine measures 
in the literature of user satisfaction. In Section 4 we examine the 
definitions of public control over corporate policy that lie behind the 
assignment of nonprofits to government, public or private sectors.    
2.3 Analytic framework 
It has proved extremely difficult to provide an analytic framework that 
encompasses this diversity. We have identified six main themes but 
there is inevitably substantial overlap and some of the concepts are 
found in studies with very different aims. For example, while there is a 
small number of studies that attempt to measure the effect on 
performance of the competitive situation of nonprofit organisations, 
competitive pressure is also frequently referred to in studies that do not 
directly examine it.  
Our six analytic themes are as follows:   
• Funding and competition 
• Public purpose 
• Users and quality 
• Capital financing 
• Integration and planning  
• Governance and accountability 
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Section 3  Systematic review of literature on 
nonprofit performance  
In this section we give an account of the systematic literature review of 
nonprofit performance in health and social care.  The section begins by 
describing the findings of previous reviews and their implications. We 
then describe the methodology we employed to identify relevant 
studies. This is followed by an outline of the key characteristics of the 
studies included, and a more detailed discussion relating to the six 
themes which guide this review. Finally, the main results are discussed. 
3.1 Findings of previous literature reviews 
A number of systematic reviews of the performance of the nonprofit 
sector have been conducted. While we cannot give a full account of all 
of them, we have sought to identify their main findings. 
3.1.1 Methodological limitations  
Previous reviewers have noted a number of methodological limitations 
in the studies evaluated. For example Sheaff et al (2003) criticised ‘the 
weak methodologies underpinning many of the studies’, ‘uncertainty 
about the generalisability of the results’, and ‘the lack of clear 
conceptual and theoretical frameworks to guide the analysis and 
interpretation of the evidence’ (Sheaff et al, 2003: 7)   
Two systematic reviews comparing nonprofit and for-profit hospitals 
noted the absence of any randomised controlled trials and the potential 
for confounding variables as their two main problems. ‘Ideally, studies 
would have adjusted for, or considered as explanatory factors, other 
variables for which data were not available’ (Devereux et al 2002, 
1404). And Eggleston et al (2006) pointed out that conventional 
methods of meta-analytic synthesis should be applied with great 
caution, given the fact that the same hospitals were frequently included 
in several different studies.  
3.1.2 Definitional and measurement problems 
relating to key variables 
A particularly serious shortcoming, closely related to the methodological 
limitations which previous reviews have highlighted, is the failure to 
define key terms and establish valid measures of key variables (Sheaff 
et al, 2003). This problem is particularly serious for empirical studies 
which attempt to detect effects of ownership type. As Currie et al 
(2003) pointed out, cost comparisons have been difficult to undertake 
on the basis of available data:  
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Empirical studies attempting to detect differences by ownership type are 
plagued with difficulties in ensuring comparability of financial data, and 
in accounting adequately for case-mix, diversity of services offered, 
degree of competition, regulatory factors and quality (Currie et al, 2003, 10).   
Devereux et al (2002) complain that studies have done little to adjust 
for the proportion of Medicare patients versus privately insured patients 
in the various health institutions included in the analyses. In addition, 
large administrative databases afford limited ability to adjust for factors 
such as disease severity of patients admitted to different hospitals.  
3.1.3 Inconclusiveness of studies and the impact on 
results of neglected contextual factors  
Previous literature reviews have shown that the for-profit versus 
nonprofit literature is far from conclusive on the issue of whether one 
ownership form is superior to another. There has so far been no good 
study design comparing nonprofits and for- profits. The New York 
Academy of Medicine, for example, reviewed studies comparing access, 
costs, quality of care, education and research in for-profit and nonprofit 
hospitals, managed care organisations, and nursing homes, and 
reached the general conclusion that the studies evaluated provided no 
clear indication as to the superiority of either hospital system regarding 
the quality of care and health outcomes (Division of Health and Science 
Policy, New York Academy of Medicine, 1999). 
Similarly, Shen et al (2005) concluded in their meta-analysis of cost 
efficiency studies that there was little evidence of ownership differences. 
According to them this is little surprising since 
theory [does not] suggest that any ownership differences will swamp 
other factors strongly predicted to shape behaviour, such as market 
concentration or payment incentives. Rather, one of the strongest 
predictions of economic theory is that providers react to their market 
environment. (Shen et al, 2005, 5). 
The authors moreover found that the diversity of results in the literature 
on hospital ownership could be explained largely by differences in 
researchers’ underlying theoretical frameworks, assumptions about the 
functional form of the dependent variables, and model specifications 
with weaker methods and functional forms tending to predict larger 
differences in financial performance between nonprofits and for-profits 
(Shen et al, 2005). Similarly, Eggleston et al (2006) claim that 
differences in results appear to arise predominantly from differences 
between studies’ analytic methods.  
Currie et al (2003) reviewed numerous studies which in their opinion 
show that the degree of competition in the marketplace significantly 
affects the responsiveness to financial incentives of nonprofits and for-
profits; that the behaviour of the two sectors tends to converge as 
competitive pressures increase; and that the behaviour of for-profit and 
nonprofit providers is far more alike than different. On cost, the 
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majority of the 27 studies they analysed found no evidence that type of 
ownership made any difference to hospital costs or that for-profits were 
more expensive (Currie et al 2003: 4). However, they regarded this as 
difficult to interpret for two reasons: first, reimbursement mechanisms 
(e.g. cost-based reimbursement) influence the results – a rational 
response in such an environment would be to seek higher profits by 
charging more, rather than reducing costs, since the fact that all 
reasonable expenses were reimbursed meant that inter-hospital 
competition was based on quality, amenities, and availability of 
technology (what Currie et al called ‘a medical arms race’). Secondly, 
information on cost differences cannot be meaningfully interpreted in 
the absence of information on service quality. For instance, the 
apparent low efficiency of nonprofits might indicate that they provide a 
high-quality service; conversely low administrative costs might indicate 
that less attention is actually given to monitoring service quality. 
Comparisons may also be difficult because of the problem of self-
selection – on the face of it, nonprofits might appear less efficient than 
for-profits, but this could be because nonprofits were operating in less 
favourable locations, pursuing a goal of providing access to care, 
whereas for-profits were choosing to operate in areas most likely to 
generate a good return on investment.  
Overall, the literature contains a few studies which favour for-profits 
hospitals, some which favour not-for-profits and a majority of studies 
which suggest that there is no significant difference (Currie et al, 2003, 
13).   
In their summary of the current state of public policy debate in the USA 
on the question of nonprofits versus for-profit organisation Schlesinger 
and Gray (2006) also emphasised the importance of the study context. 
Although – in contrast to a number of studies – Schlesinger and Gray 
claimed that there are consistent ownership-related differences, they 
also pointed out that ownership matters differently depending on the 
outcome under consideration and that the context under which 
nonprofits operate matters greatly. Some studies compare hospitals 
operating under relatively benign market conditions with others 
operating in rather harsher contexts. For example, comparisons of 
hospitals before and after conversion from nonprofit to for-profits status 
show few differences because the hospitals that converted were 
typically struggling and changed status in order to achieve certain 
strategic goals, while the underlying characteristics remained largely 
the same (Schlesinger and Gray, 2006). 
3.1.4 The US dominance of the literature  
A final important point which previous literature reviews have made is 
that the empirical literature comparing for profit and nonprofit hospitals 
is mainly drawn from the US health care system which, as Currie et al 
(2003) pointed out, is of limited relevance to other health systems 
which are not market-based and are universal, as in the UK. In the US 
the comparison is between the nonprofit sector, which was historically 
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dominant in providing health and social care, and the increasingly 
important for-profit sector, whereas the move in the UK is one from a 
public health system to a mixed economy, including providers from the 
private for profit and the nonprofit sectors. In the US, the public sector 
only plays a minor role, though, and most studies exclude it from their 
analyses.  
3.1.5 The pooling of studies within systematic 
reviews 
A problem of systematic reviews themselves is the fact that they seek 
to reach some overall evaluation by combining in a single review studies 
of very diverse character and quality. Sometimes this takes the form of 
simply counting studies purporting to show that one ownership form is 
superior to another (or, more likely, that no difference was detected 
between them); sometimes reviewers undertake more elaborate forms 
of statistical analysis, for example assigning a weight to each study 
according to the number of cases it covers. 
But as we have already noted, studies vary greatly in terms of their 
purposes, methodological soundness, definitions of terms, 
measurement of variables, underlying theoretical frameworks, regard 
paid to context, etc; and as these factors all impact on the results it is 
questionable whether any synthesis of studies in pure numerical form is 
of any help.  
3.1.6 Implications for our approach to the systematic 
literature review 
Given the heterogeneity of studies on the performance of the nonprofit 
sector and the problems revealed by previous systematic literature 
reviews, we do not consider it fruitful to analyse the studies by 
producing tables which purport to show how far, if at all,  one 
ownership form is superior to another. Instead, we decided to pursue a 
more descriptive approach in which we give information about the 
background of the studies under evaluation. Appendix 2 gives a detailed 
overview of all the studies we reviewed. The information includes the 
studies’ setting, the performance measures used, the methodology and 
the main results, and some other information, such as the limitations of 
the studies. In the main text itself we try to summarise the studies in 
tables according to country, setting, methodology and themes, in order 
to demonstrate the heterogeneity and complexity of the literature. 
Before presenting the results in sub-section 3 we describe how the 
relevant literature on the performance of the not-for-profit sector was 
identified. 
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3.2 Search Methodology 
3.2.1. Sources 
The literature reviewed was obtained from a variety of sources. Online 
bibliographic databases were the primary sources. Also included were 
reviews of reference lists from papers obtained in the study, 
publications referred to by other researchers working in the area, and 
official reports and grey literature identified through internet searches. 
The applied search methodology was guided by our conceptual 
framework, with iterative refinements made as a result of taking expert 
advice. 
Twenty-six core sources (14 literature databases and 12 websites) were 
searched between June and August 2006, using 9 different search terms 
(see next subsection). The databases included extended beyond the 
medical literature to include social science and economic literature. 
Structured internet searches were conducted, with the help of Google 
Scholar, of official websites of national departments of health, 
international organisations such as the WHO, and third sector 
institutions (see table 1). The search terms consisted of various 
synonyms of nonprofit forms.  
3.2.2. Search terms 
Trial searches were conducted by combining a single not-for-profit form 
with outcomes or financial variables. Following initial searches, it was 
decided to search under not-for-profit forms only to maximise yield. The 
different synonyms of ‘not for profit’ were: 
• Not for profit 
• Non profit 
• Social enterprise 
• Co-operative  
• Foundation trusts 
• Community owned  
• Independent sector 
• Voluntary sector 
• Third sector  
Only studies of the health service sector (including long term care) and 
social care were of interest in this review. The first stage searches 
therefore combined the nine different terms for ‘non profit’ with ‘health’ 
and/or ‘social care’, or the nearest and most viable version possible 
within each database (i.e. 18 keyword searches).  Where Booleans etc. 
vary this was recorded in the search histories. A tenth term, namely 
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‘mutual’, was dropped following five data base searches because it 
produced hundreds (and sometimes thousands) of results from each 
search. The vast majority of these related to other meanings of ‘mutual’ 
than nonprofit. Searches were limited to publications from 2001 to 
2006, and to titles in English. See Appendix 1 for a detailed overview of 
the search algorithm. 
3.2.3. Exclusion and inclusion criteria 
The initial search yielded over 14,000 hits including duplicates or rather 
‘multiplicates’. A first sift of this first comprehensive list eliminated all 
literature which was irrelevant at first sight, i.e. by title, subtitle or the 
first lines of the article. For internet searches, e.g. via Google Scholar, a 
degree of sifting took place during the initial search due to more 
information being available at the outset, and due to the large number 
of hits. A cut-off point was chosen once the hits were becoming 
repetitive of earlier hits or clearly non-relevant to the subject matter. 
This still left us with more than 1,800 articles to sift through (see Table 
1).  
A second sift eliminated all titles which did not fulfil any of the above 
inclusion criteria by studying the abstracts and, if in doubt, skim-
reading the articles. This yielded 730 items (Table 1). Where full papers 
were not available, attempts were made to obtain as many as possible 
through interlibrary loans. The third and final sift eliminated all 
duplicates and those articles which provided only background 
information or proved not to be relevant when the full texts became 
available through interlibrary loans and were read in detail, yielding a 
final total of 163 items. Multiple reviewers independently decided 
whether to include a study according to our agreed criteria, but if in 
doubt, consulted with other colleagues. 
Since this review is concerned with empirical findings, the main criterion 
for inclusion of a study was that it should be based on empirical data. 
Therefore we excluded short commentaries, editorials or similar formats 
of publications as well as all ungrounded policy studies which did not 
contain any empirical data. We also limited our literature review to 
original research, thus disregarded the number of previous literature 
reviews at this point of our systematic analysis. Although we attempted 
to include grey literature by searching various websites, in fact these 
did not yield any relevant material.  
We included studies of organisations from both the public and private 
sector. This is necessary because national classification systems can 
involve different judgments about formally similar organisations. For 
example NHS hospital trusts were reclassified as government bodies in 
2003 having been classified as public corporations in 1991. We initially 
used additional inclusion criteria for outcome studies. The inclusion 
criterion for clinical and cost effectiveness performance studies was the 
presence of a valid comparator. The inclusion criterion for impact on 
users and carers was the presence of qualitative data about the process 
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of care. In practice, these criteria were relaxed during the search and 
sifting processes, as they proved overly restrictive, given the studies 
available.  
 
Table 1: Database search hits  
Database/source Initial 
search 
First 
sift 
Secton 
sift 
THIRD 
SIFT* 
ABI/INFORM 203 93 32 - 
ASSIA 106 29 10 - 
BIOETHICSLINE 6 4 4 - 
COCHRANE/NHS EED 66 13 3 - 
EconLit 196 67 50 - 
IBSS/GLOBAL HEALTH 278 47 9 - 
INGENTA 77 25 8 - 
JSTOR 405 72 36 - 
MEDLINE/CINAHL/EMBASE 3151 269 158 - 
PubMed 735 109 65 - 
Science Direct 732 129 45 - 
Social Services Abstracts 371 123 62 - 
Web of Science 1006 201 70 - 
Zetoc 314 69 45 - 
EU Observatory on Health 
Systems  
1209 25 0 - 
EU 180 0 0 - 
Google Scholar 1041 126 126 - 
IMF 178 0 0 - 
OECD 146 0 0 - 
PSSRU 489 323 7 - 
World Bank 229 0 0 - 
DH Australia 156 22 0 - 
Health Canada 1779 27 0 - 
Ministry of Health New Zealand 9 9 0 - 
DH UK 258 42 0 - 
US Health & Human Services 13 0 0 - 
Totals 14066 1824 730 163 
* Database source was not identifiable any more at this stage. 
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The search was complemented by looking at the citations within the 
relevant articles. This checking for cross-references by and large 
confirmed that most relevant studies had been identified by our 
systematic literature database search. However, if a study with a 
relevant title was cited that did not appear in our database search 
because it was published in a journal that was not included in any of the 
various databases it was added to our final list. Similarly, seminal works 
which were frequently referred to in the literature and had high 
relevance for the research topic but were excluded by our systematic 
search because they were published slightly before our inclusion year of 
2001 were also included. The inclusion of such additional studies was 
always taken on the basis of the relevance of a study to our analytical 
themes and never on its empirical outcome. Once final exclusions had 
been made, the included studies were then systematically reviewed by 
the six authors of this report. 
The following table gives an illustrative overview of our research 
strategy as just described: 
 
   Table 2: Research Protocol and search strategy 
Task Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
Define 
research 
question 
and key 
themes 
Review of 
theoretical 
literature on 
nonprofit 
performance  
Arrival at 
six key 
themes for 
later 
analysis 
  
Identify 
search 
terms 
Synonyms of 
“nonprofit” in 
different 
spellings (10 
terms) 
Trial 
search 
using five 
databases 
Refinement 
of search 
terms: 9 
search 
terms 
(combined 
with either 
health care 
or social 
care) 
 
Search Initial search 
of 26 sources 
with specified 
search terms, 
confined to 
publications 
since 2001 in 
English 
language  
first sifting 
by  
scanning 
of titles, 
subtitles  
 
 
Second 
sifting by 
scanning of 
abstracts/ 
first 
paragraphs) 
 
checking for 
cross-references 
to identify 
further relevant 
studies which 
were not 
captured by 
electronic 
search; third 
sifting for 
articles which 
were yielded by 
different 
sources (thus 
duplicated) 
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3.3 Results of the systematic literature review  
3.3.1. Papers by country of origin 
This systematic review of the literature on nonprofits in health and 
social care identified 163 papers from the six years 2001-2006.  The 
vast majority of these papers were from the United States, with 125 
papers (see Table 3). The remaining 38 were from a variety of 
countries.  The second largest number came from the UK, with 13 
papers, followed by Canada with 9. The remaining 16 papers were 
distributed between 5 countries plus 4 international or cross-national 
studies. 
 
Table 3:  Country of origin of papers 
Country of origin  Number  
US  124 
US (several states or national level) 82 
US single state  42 
UK 13 
Canada 9 
Israel  5 
New Zealand  4 
Switzerland  2 
France  1 
Germany  1 
International  4 
Total  163 
 
3.3.2. Characteristics of the health systems identified 
in the review 
Table 3 identifies two key characteristics of the health systems of each 
of the countries identified by the literature review which are 
fundamental in determining the way health care is organised and 
delivered. Universal health care is a system in which all residents of a 
geographic or political entity have their health care paid for, regardless 
of medical condition or financial status. Universal systems vary in the 
range of services covered, and the extent of coverage. For example, 
although the health service in the UK is universal, this does not include 
long-term care for older people. By contrast Israel is one of the few 
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countries in the world where long term care for older people is 
mandated by law (Schmid, 2005).   
Health care systems can also be multi- or single-payer. Single-payer 
systems involve one body, typically a government-run organisation, 
acting as the administrator to collect health care fees, and pay health 
care costs.  In multi-payer systems health care is financed by a variety 
of public and private contributions.  
These two features have considerable influence on health care for 
national populations, and therefore should be taken into account in 
comparing health systems. The topics identified in the literature are 
influenced by them.   
 
   Table 4:  Health systems 
Health service Universality Payment system 
US  Non universal  Multipayer 
UK  Universal  Single payer 
Canada Universal  Single payer 
New Zealand Universal  Multipayer 
Israel  Universal  Single payer 
Switzerland Non universal Multipayer 
Germany Universal  Multipayer 
France  Universal  Multipayer 
3.3.3. Subjects and methodology of papers 
Most of the papers identified in our literature review concerned the 
health sector, with 126 of 163 papers. Only a small proportion 
concerned social services. It was notable that there were more papers 
on long term care of older people than on social services, (20 compared 
to 17). Of the six countries with more than one paper, all but New 
Zealand included at least one paper on long term care, reflecting 
international concerns about this topic. A further complicating factor 
relates to the organisation of the US health care system.  As well as 
health provider organisations (i.e. hospitals and hospices), insurance 
providers (Health Maintenance Organisations, HMOs) can also be 
publicly or privately owned, which increases the complexity of a 
comparison between nonprofits and for-profits.  
 
   Table 5:  Subject of papers 
Subject  Number 
Health  126 
Social services  17 
Long term care  20 
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The papers reviewed were mainly based on quantitative studies. Only 
33 of 163 studies were based on qualitative research. It is notable that 
a greater proportion of the UK studies (11 out of 13) were based on 
qualitative research compared with the US.  
 
Table 6: Methodology of papers 
Methodology Number 
Qualitative  33 
Quantitative  130 
 
3.3.4. Predominant themes in the literature 
Six key themes defined our concerns and were applied to the literature 
review, as outlined in Table 7. These themes, as outlined in our 
theoretical framework, were based on principles relevant to NHS policy 
objectives. In practice, in reviewing the literature, a number of sub-
themes emerged, again reflecting the heterogeneity of the papers 
included, and the US dominance of the literature.  For example, the 
emphasis of the papers on cost and quality (under themes 2 and 6), 
reflects key US concerns.  Additionally, several of the sub-themes 
relating to public purpose of nonprofits relate to US papers, including 
community benefits, uncompensated care and conversions.   
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Table 7:  Themes in the performance literature  
Key themes for the performance 
review (number of relevant 
papers)* 
Sub-themes identified from the literature  
1. Funding sources and competition 
(29)  
Access to capital/investment  
 
2. Public purpose, organisational 
behaviour and asset protection (125) 
Cost/efficiency  
Access to care/Service availability 
Community Benefits/Uncompensated care  
Conversions  
Public trust in/perceptions of NFP 
Staff commitment/satisfaction 
Impact of operational environment 
Asset protection  
3. Users and quality (72) Funding mechanisms  
Reimbursement 
4. Capital financing (7) Partnership/co-operation between agencies  
Locality or geographical planning 
5. Integration and planning (11)  Boards of governance 
Financial reporting 
Cost, quality and public purpose 
6. Governance and accountability 
(23) 
Quality – outcomes/outputs/inputs 
User satisfaction 
User involvement  
Staff ratios 
* The total number of papers in listed in all the categories in the table exceeds the 
total number of papers included in the review, since many were relevant to more 
than one theme.    
We next give a more detailed account of the content of the papers 
reviewed, according to the themes in Table 7. We will describe the 
emphases of the literature under each theme, and provide illustrative 
examples. Not all included studies are thus discussed in detail in the 
following summary. Please see Appendix 2 for information on all 
reviewed studies. Given the range and complexity of the literature, we 
propose to concentrate on the most predominant themes. The 
references given in square brackets are the reference IDs of the 
respective papers. These are unique specifiers by which each article can 
be located, generated automatically by Reference Manager software. 
These specifiers are not consecutively numbered, because once a 
specifier is allocated by the software, the numbers remain static 
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regardless of subsequent additions to or subtractions from the 
database.  
3.3.4. Funding sources and competition 
The revenues of providers of NHS-funded health care will come from 
contracts with NHS commissioners. Providers in this context are 
required to compete with one another, with organisational survival 
dependent on successful bids. The literature on funding sources from 
various countries in this review investigated how the contracting 
environment impacted on organisational behaviour. With regard to 
payment mechanisms, the new national tariff system in the UK, 
financial flows, requires providers to charge centrally-determined prices 
for individual episodes of care. The imposition in the UK of a payment-
by-results system on independent organisations that are required to 
make cash surpluses has parallels in the USA, where much of the 
literature focuses on funding sources and reimbursement mechanisms, 
and how associated changes impact on both competition and the 
behaviour of providers.    
Several studies were concerned with how contracting arrangements 
impacted on the functioning of providers. Literature on this topic came 
mainly from studies based in Canada, the UK and Israel, reflecting 
current changes in contractual frameworks in these countries. Some 
studies sought to identify whether ownership status conferred 
advantages on providers. One Canadian study [182] suggested that the 
contracting environment gives for-profits an advantage. Because they 
are already used to operating in a profit-motivated and competitive 
manner, rigorous contracting regimes will impact negatively on the 
ability of nonprofits to build community capacities.  This may not always 
be the case, however; another Canadian paper [166] sought to 
establish to how best to promote relations between the government and 
not-for-profit sector so as to support the latter, focusing on the 
development of a shared mission rather than the government being 
simply a funder. 
Contractual arrangements were the focus of two UK studies [346, 355] 
on the position and motivations of independent sector (nonprofit and 
for-profit) providers in the home care market. These papers viewed the 
voluntary sector as having some advantages over the private for-profit 
sector in that public purchasers in some cases were said to favour the 
voluntary sector. The voluntary sector was also found to charge higher 
price, although the authors noted that differences in clientele might 
have some bearing on this. Among organisations which were both 
registered charities and limited companies there was less variability.   
Other papers argued that the real issue is isomorphism, promoted when 
both for-profits and nonprofits draw their funds primarily from one 
major source, i.e. the government. For example two Israeli studies 
[167, 283] argued that contractual arrangements with the public sector 
lead to conformist behaviour, with the focus on securing contracts. 
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Another Canadian study identified that contrasts between providers are 
illusory when the same level of government funding is offered to all 
operators [202]. Others contend that there are significant differences 
because for-profits seek opportunities to cut corners on cost and 
quality, particularly in the nursing home sector [12, 56]. Alternatively, a 
Canadian study suggested that apparent differences between sectors 
may reflect differences in payer mix between types of hospital. This 
might provide opportunities for hospitals to differentially exploit 
reimbursement disparities between payers [125].   
Reimbursement was the focus of many studies from the US, with 
attention paid to how payments mechanisms impacted on cost, quality 
and access. Most of these studies focused on changes in the 
reimbursement system, with particular emphasis on the impact of 
managed care, and the more competitive environment engendered by a 
change from a retrospective to a prepayment system. These changes 
increased competition in the US health sector dramatically. Therefore, 
various studies looked at the effect of hospital competition (measured 
by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, HHI) or HMO penetration on 
uncompensated care [122, 295], quality of care [291], inefficiency 
[101, 305, 321] and in relation to mergers. These effects of competition 
will be discussed in the relevant subsections. 
Some studies were concerned to identify ownership differences in 
relation to services for recipients of Medicaid and Medicare. One study 
[9] measured the impact of prospective payment by Medicare for 
nursing homes. This study found that mean inefficiency was highest for 
for-profit hospitals and lowest for nonprofit hospitals, with government 
hospitals falling in the middle. However, this study did not control for 
quality. Although another study of long term care [298] suggested a 
greater emphasis on quality of care by nonprofits, it also identified 
heterogeneity within the nonprofit sector, with reimbursement 
influencing quality of care.   
In the long term care literature, three studies considering 
reimbursement identified that not for profits were not necessarily 
serving those with less access to services [71, 116, 298], as those with 
private funds tended to choose nonprofit nursing homes.  Because 
Medicaid funding is low and NFP facilities heterogeneous, Medicaid 
residents are sorted into for-profit and lower quality NFP facilities. 
Choice of provider was therefore dependent on means to pay. One of 
these studies [116] concluded that public sector providers played an 
important role as a safety net in these circumstances.   
Studies on the impact of capitation on performance also focused 
variously on cost, quality and access. Although one study found that 
capitation resulted in more cost-effective treatments, the outcomes for 
patients were not clear [100]. Other studies found that capitation led to 
reductions in services in hospices, which are largely funded by Medicare 
[306] and reduced numbers of psychiatric emergencies treated [299]. 
Other studies examining reimbursement trends paid more attention to 
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market shares in the health sector in question. These studies concluded 
that for-profits which cut costs affect reimbursement for the whole area, 
changing the behaviour of nonprofits too [78], and that nonprofits 
actively compete with for-profits when for-profits have a dominant 
market share [103]. A further study set out to test the competition 
hypothesis [344], finding that behavioural incentives are not greatly 
influenced by the level of concentration of the market. All in all this 
shows the complexity of the effect of reimbursement mechanisms. 
Most notably, several studies were concerned to assess the impact of 
managed care on performance in the health sector [34, 81, 140, 154, 
263, 280, 328]. Some of these [34, 81, 328] did not find significant 
differences according to ownership. While [140] identified differences 
between types of HMO, it concluded that capitated managed care was 
particularly unsatisfactory as a mechanism for delivering sexual health 
services. One study of the impact of managed care identified 
convergence in behaviour [280], while another, national, study [263] 
found that managed care had a leveling effect on performance. Overall, 
these studies tended to indicate that reimbursement methods, including 
managed care, may generate spillover effects by increasing competition 
in the marketplace, and influencing the behaviour of nonprofits by 
reducing the surplus available for community benefits.  
Public purpose, organisational behaviour and asset protection 
The issue of public purpose was one of the key themes of the review.  
Theoretical work on nonprofits has argued that the distinguishing 
feature of nonprofit organisations is that they operate under a ‘non-
distribution constraint’, i.e. any surpluses may not be distributed to 
shareholders but must be applied to the activities for which the 
organisation is constituted. 
 We explore the evidence from the literature on the extent to which 
nonprofits meet public purposes and protect public assets.  The theme 
of public purpose revealed the greatest diversity of papers in the 
literature, as indicated by the sub-themes in Table 7.  This section will 
address each of these in turn.   
Cost/efficiency 
The cost and efficiency of health service provision are, as we have 
noted, key concerns of US health policy.  Given the weight of US 
literature in our review, this issue was a very prevalent theme in papers 
comparing effects of ownership.  One of the many difficulties, already 
noted, in interpreting research results on cost and profit differences is 
that the quality of care, the range of services, and access to care are so 
difficult to control for; limited efforts to control for case mix and 
simplistic attempts to control for quality signally fail to meet the case. 
But without adequate information on quality, range of services and 
access to health care, the information on cost differences cannot be 
meaningfully interpreted.   
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Similarly, while cost data are meaningless without controlling for 
variations in quality, any assumption of a direct relationship between 
cost and quality is misleading. Costs can increase because of a more 
severely-ill patient case mix and less selection of patients. Only a few 
studies of costs [1, 128, 130, 358] included variables to control for 
quality or for patient selection [78]. Studies variously covered 
reimbursement methods/payment mechanisms [17, 77, 95, 125, 235, 
291, 299], regulation [89, 120, 235, 291], prevalence of social 
deprivation [235], size [256, 120, 265, 323], activity mix [125, 281], 
range of services, the extent of long term care (a major factor in rural 
hospitals which are usually nonprofit [125]), urban versus rural location 
[323], etc.. While most studies attempted to control for at least some of 
these factors, since none could control for them all (particularly when 
they employed large US country-wide samples), it is difficult if not 
impossible to know whether any observed differences in performance 
between ownership types is due to ownership status or other factors.  
Access to care  
A particular concern of this review, with regard to NHS policy priorities, 
was to identify whether and how, access to services was examined in 
the literature. The dominance of the US literature raises specific issues: 
in particular, the non-universality of the US health system leads to 
research being focused on providers not populations, which raises 
serious methodological problems in making adjustments for the 
different populations served by different providers. Further, when the 
focus is on providers, studies generally fail to take into account the level 
of provision for the whole population of an area. We reviewed the 
literature with the objective of determining how access to services was 
measured, and whether attempts were made to account for access at 
the geographical population level. It should be noted that the 
comparability of studies from the US is further compromised by the 
paucity of socioeconomic data in US public health surveillance systems. 
Although efforts have been made to use geo-coding and area-based 
socioeconomic measures to overcome these shortcomings, no 
consensus exists as to which measures should be used or at which 
geographic level (Kreiger et al, 2002).  
The ease with which providers can enter and exit the health care 
market has implications for population access.  Studies found that for-
profits have higher exit and entry rates and are more sensitive to 
demand shifts than nonprofit and public hospitals [90; 359]. Less 
efficient hospitals were more likely to exit when ownership was for-
profit or nonprofit as opposed to public, while community need also had 
a significant effect on exit – nonprofits were less likely to exit if 
community need was a significant factor [358]. 
One of the concerns of the US literature relevant to the question of 
access is whether patient selection is affected by ownership, with 
various conclusions drawn. One national study [315] found that 
nonprofits were more likely to serve more severely disabled people, 
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while another [1] found no significant differences. Some studies of 
access took market forces into consideration in assessing how 
ownership impacted on patient selection, usually finding that external 
pressures were at least as important as ownership differences in 
determining whether patient selection was evident [103, 306, 283]. A 
study comparing the three sectors [329] found that publicly-owned 
hospitals were most likely to admit poorer transfer patients.  
Studies by Crampton and colleagues in New Zealand [46, 49,268, 330] 
focused on questions of access to primary care. The community-
controlled services included in this research were formed to fill gaps in 
primary care provision in rural areas, particularly following the 
introduction of a fee-for-service system. As a consequence these 
organisations serve poorer and sicker populations compared with the 
patients served by for-profits they also reduce financial and cultural 
barriers to access, since they charge lower fees and serve larger 
numbers of the Maori population.   
Although there were a few exceptions, the literature usually does not, 
and in most cases cannot, account for variations in access under the 
different provider schemes and different entitlements of populations.    
Community benefits/uncompensated care 
Due to their tax-exempt status nonprofits have to satisfy the regulatory 
authorities and the Revenue that they are doing work that benefits the 
community. Although relevant activities and requirements are set out 
by the state, there is considerable variation in this. The provision of 
‘uncompensated’ care is the community benefit most often identified by 
both hospitals and studies, as it is relatively easy to measure. The 
provision of community benefits is of particular relevance in the US, 
where health care provision is not universal and gaps exist in provision. 
Conversely a further limitation of these US studies from a UK point of 
view is their lack of attention to public provision; an exception is a 
recent GAO (2005) study which found that government hospitals 
devoted a substantially greater share of activities as uncompensated 
care than both the other two ownership types. However, community 
benefits are a key determinant of the value attributed to non profits, 
and therefore merit attention.   
Definitional problems were acknowledged by several studies of 
community benefits, e.g. [72, 138]. The question of whether profits or 
community benefits are prioritised was a key concern of many papers 
comparing ownership types, often producing inconclusive results [81]. 
Horwitz [26, 281] found a strong correlation between ownership and 
provision of services, and, consistent with the GAO study, that 
government hospitals were most likely to offer unprofitable services 
that are generally needed by poor, underinsured patients. Studies of the 
range of services provided found nonprofits were more likely to provide 
a list of identified high-cost services [65, 137], or greater range of 
services [370] while [255] demonstrated that in circumstances where a 
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single hospital serves a community nonprofits and for-profits were 
identical with respect to high-cost service provision. A further study on 
provision of compassionate care services (including long term care and 
domiciliary care) [312] found that although Catholic hospitals had 
provided more services of this type, over time the gap between public 
hospitals and other nonprofit hospitals had closed, suggesting 
isomorphism in response to market forces.   
Nonprofits must provide a certain amount of uncompensated care for 
those without insurance, including care for those who present at A&E. 
The amount of uncompensated care is important since it impacts on 
both revenue and costs. While the amount of uncompensated care is 
reported to the regulatory authorities, it is difficult if not impossible to 
calculate the amount of care provided from the databases generally 
used in the research studies reviewed. They do not distinguish between 
the provision of charity care for the indigent, which is a type of 
community benefit, and bad debt, which is not necessarily a community 
benefit (Congressional Budget Office, 2006).  While there were studies 
[295, 351] which attempted to measure how much uncompensated care 
hospitals provided, it was not necessarily clear how this was taken 
account of.  
The extent of uncompensated care also depends to some degree on the 
capacity of the hospital to provide it (e.g. via cross subsidisation from 
other more profitable treatments and patients) and on the demand for 
it. To take cross-subsidisation first, the surplus earned by hospitals on 
at least some of the Medicare/Medicaid reimbursement categories were, 
until these were revised in the early 1990s, generous, and therefore 
covered some uncompensated care. The progressive reduction in 
reimbursement levels across all categories, particularly after the 1997 
Balanced Budget Act, reduced the amount of uncompensated care that 
is possible without adversely affecting the hospitals’ financial 
performance. But while cross-subsidisation has become more difficult, 
the demand for uncompensated care has increased [295]. There has 
recently been a reduction in the number of workers who have employee 
benefits, leading to an increase in the number of uninsured people. 
There are, however, various ways of maximising reimbursements, such 
as upcoding or DRG drift [95], or the employment of extra staff to help 
patients fill in the requisite forms [281].   
Some studies found that nonprofits provided more uncompensated care 
[304, 351] than for-profits.  However, studies which took external 
pressures into account more often found either inconclusive or 
converging results.  In common with many other areas of this literature 
review, the impact of managed care was the focus for several studies. 
Currie et al [122] found little evidence that hospitals respond to HMO 
penetration by turning away uninsured and Medicaid patients, while 
another study [15] found that higher HMO penetration is associated 
with lower total margins.  Reduced margins may decrease the ability of 
hospitals to cross-subsidize charitable activities and are associated with 
lower levels of uncompensated care. Similarly, while [138] found 
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nonprofits provided more community service than for-profits, there was 
convergence over time under the impact of external pressures.   
Conversions from nonprofits to for-profits 
There has been a growing tendency in recent years on the part of US 
hospitals and health plans to forego nonprofit status and its 
corresponding tax benefits and engage in for-profit health care. The 
reasons are varied and may include weak financial performance, a 
desire to increase market power, or the need for capital (HCFO 2003).  
Key concerns about conversions rest on the effect on health care 
delivery, and particularly the nonprofit charitable mission.  Conversions 
to for-profit status typically involve transfer of assets to a charitable 
foundation, to continue the good works of the nonprofit provider, 
although there is movement toward alternative conversion structures 
(HCFO 2003).   
Nineteen studies in this review focused on the impact on performance of 
conversion or merger. Most papers concerned conversions of nonprofit 
to for-profit status, though there were other variations, some involving 
public hospitals [252, 324, 328, 336, 361]. Most relevant papers were 
concerned with the predominant themes of the review overall, that is 
the cost and quality implications, and impact on other aspects of public 
purpose. The studies used a variety of measures reflecting 
revenues/inputs, costs, profits and outcomes, and present a mixed 
picture.  
While two studies recorded no significant change in cost or quality [70, 
88] two studies [252, 324] found that quality declined as a result of 
conversion to for-profit and [357] found reduced resources provided to 
the community. On the other hand, [287] found that costs were 
reduced without reductions in quality or access. The latter study also 
found that nonprofits mimicked for-profits in raising income by 
exploiting reimbursement loopholes at the expense of the taxpayer. One 
study [265] found neither conversion nor ownership status to be 
significant factors in determining profitability compared with other 
variables, while [336] reported increased profit margins following 
conversions, but with different bases for the source of profits according 
to which type of ownership conversion was involved. Some authors 
were forced to go beyond their data to interpret their findings. For 
example [89] observed quality outcomes that were favourable after the 
nonprofits converted to for-profit status, and attributed this to the fact 
that the hospitals had been under financial stress for some time prior to 
conversion and that this had an adverse impact on quality. Two papers 
on public purpose concerns [59, 241] related to a failed conversion to 
for-profit status, where the relevant Commissioner had concluded there 
was insufficient attention to the mission to provide coverage at 
minimum cost and expense.   
While most of the work reviewed here related to conversions, there 
were also a few studies of mergers, another recent trend since the 
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Federal Trade Commission relaxed its anti-trust policy in 1993 in order 
to encourage hospital mergers. The assumption was that mergers would 
generate cost savings that would be passed on to consumers. This was 
the focus of three relevant papers [99, 107, 361], all of which found 
price increases following the mergers. In the last of these papers the 
authors hypothesised that the nature of hospital competition had 
changed over time and that a merger between two significant 
competitors in the same market will lead to price increases regardless 
of type of ownership.   
Public trust in/perceptions of nonprofits 
Studies of ownership differences in relation to public perceptions of and 
trust in health providers were all based in the US. Much of the work on 
trust has been conducted by Schlesinger et al [60, 152, 153], who 
found that for-profits were seen as less trustworthy. This work found a 
disjuncture between public perceptions and what economic theory 
would predict. For example, the public generally believed that nonprofits 
were cheaper, whereas economic theory would predict otherwise 
because of the supposedly greater efficiency of for-profits. These 
studies established that there was little public understanding of the 
different forms of ownership and organisation [60], although the 
evidence suggests that among the best-informed respondents, 
nonprofits are significantly better regarded than for-profits [152]. Other 
work [153] found that physicians expect for-profit health care providers 
to be more likely to mislead the public through deceptive advertising, 
cut back on dimensions of quality, and engage in practices that could 
exploit more vulnerable patients. Work by Ginn [5] in the US also found 
a lack of understanding of nonprofits among the public, tending to 
undermine their legitimacy. There are limits to the relevance of this 
literature to the UK, however, given the lack of inclusion of public 
providers.  
The issue of public trust was also a concern of the literature on long 
term care in the US. Arrow (1963) was the first to hypothesize that 
nonprofits exist in health care markets to provide quality assurance to 
poorly-informed consumers. The nonprofits’ non-distribution constraint 
softens the incentive to cut costs, leading nonprofit firms to provide a 
better quality of service. When customers cannot compare, producers 
may be free to misrepresent quality (Hansmann 1980). The issue is of 
particular relevance to nursing homes, as it is difficult to access 
information on quality, and residents may have limited capacity to 
assess their own circumstances. Theoretically, when information 
asymmetry exists, nonprofit organisations provide better quality of 
service. But it is very difficult to attribute the supposed pro-market 
preferences of consumers to just one factor such as ownership.  
Studies [71, 75, 116, 298, 318] tended to support predictions based on 
asymmetric information theory. Consistent with the findings of other 
studies in this review, study [75] found that an increase in nonprofit 
market share improves for-profit and overall nursing home quality. One 
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study [318] concerned with the impact of family involvement and 
information asymmetry in relation to quality, found that for-profits had 
more incentive to compromise on quality of care but that compromises 
of this type were difficult to detect.     
Study [116] concluded that ownership effects exist, with consumers 
indicating the greatest preference for nonprofit homes and the least for 
government homes, although the latter may still play a social role as a 
safety-net for those lacking private funds who may find it difficult to be 
admitted elsewhere.  An important point indicated here is that 
nonprofits do not necessarily serve those with less access to services.  
In fact, private self-payers are more likely to seek out nonprofits.  This 
was confirmed by other studies [71, 298], which found that people with 
the means to pay were more likely to choose nonprofits.  Facilities with 
waiting lists can choose to accept private pay residents in preference to 
Medicaid residents. Because Medicaid funding is low and nonprofit 
facilities are heterogeneous, Medicaid residents tend to be relegated to 
for-profit and lower quality nonprofit facilities. The overall effect of 
nonprofits for Medicaid residents may be ambiguous.   
Staff commitment/satisfaction 
Theoretical arguments for the expansion of nonprofit and voluntary 
sector provision often rely on the proposition that nonprofits generate 
community attachment and support, and that this support will be 
manifest in the unpaid contribution made by employees to the 
organisation, as well as in higher levels of motivation and commitment 
[114]. If this is the case, then employees in nonprofit firms should 
enjoy a higher job satisfaction. This directs attention to studies which 
explore the work experiences, motivation, and job satisfaction of 
employees in nonprofits. There were eight relevant studies.  
Benz’s study [114] generally confirms the hypothesis that employees in 
nonprofits are more satisfied with their jobs than those in for-profits, 
and that this result cannot be attributed to differences in financial 
rewards. However, no comparisons were drawn with the extent of job 
satisfaction among government employees. One study of social service 
employees did compare across the three sectors [207], finding a 
continuum, with workers from public organisations reporting less 
commitment to both the profession and their employer, and those from 
nonprofits reporting most. However, there was little attention paid to 
the factors influencing levels of satisfaction, including differences in the 
work undertaken.    
Two examples from the Canadian literature [204, 272] considered the 
impact of market segmentation and competition on employee 
commitment; both found that these factors led to staff concerns and 
insecurities; segmentation in particular, resulted in the majority of staff 
leaving the sector. In contrast to these studies, one other study [352] 
found that commercialisation had a positive impact on an organisation’s 
self-sufficiency, reputation, and ability to attract and retain staff. 
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In the UK literature, there were two studies which considered employee 
motivation. One considered nurses’ perception of the working 
environment in the voluntary sector only [270], concluding that the 
environment was seen as characterised by relatively high levels of 
support, cohesion and managerial control, and slightly lower levels of 
autonomy, than the public sector. Another study [150] compared 
human resource management in the nonprofit and public sectors, 
finding that different factors operating in each sector affected staff 
retention.   
Asset protection 
One of the concerns of the review has been to assess the extent to 
which nonprofits can protect public assets. Many of the preceding 
sections under the theme of public purpose have identified strategies 
employed by the nonprofit sector to protect their assets, including 
changes to the services provided, changes in funding arrangements, 
mergers and conversions. A few studies considered asset protection 
specifically, including one study [222] of the impact of ‘carve-outs’ in 
mental health services in the US (carve-out is a managed care term for 
a program that separates certain types of services or patient groups-
most commonly in the areas of mental health and substance abuse).  In 
the latter case, ownership type was not found to be significant. The 
authors argued that public and nonprofit entities, like for-profit firms, 
will reduce costs of care when they are placed at risk. 
Responsiveness to users and quality of care  
This section looks at what the literature suggests about the outcomes 
of, and satisfaction with, services provided by nonprofits, and about the 
extent to which they are responsive to consumers. Bruce (1995, 77) 
implies that there are several structural reasons why nonprofits cannot 
automatically be presumed to ‘value and respect their consumers’, 
especially because of the numbers of stakeholders involved, and the 
complexity of their governance arrangements. 
Quality of care  
Most studies in this literature review were concerned to measure one or 
more aspects of quality, using a range of variables, often focusing on 
inputs rather than on observable measures of service quality.  The 
comparisons are often unfavourable to for-profits, as demonstrated by 
the concluding section below, on staff ratios. Quality of care is 
notoriously difficult to measure. Currie et al (2003) note that apparent 
success on one measure of performance may mean that less attention 
is given to monitoring service quality. Output measures, such as 
mortality differentials, may be difficult to interpret because the result 
depends on the timeframe under consideration. The same authors 
argue that while there is some evidence that for-profit hospitals have 
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higher mortality rates than nonprofits among elderly patients with heart 
disease, differences were associated more with the location of these 
hospitals than ownership per se, and small average differences in 
mortality masked enormous heterogeneity within ownership types.   
User satisfaction/involvement  
Very few studies focused on either user satisfaction and/or user 
involvement in health and social care services.  Three out of five studies 
on user involvement were based in the UK [158, 356, 364]. Given 
current policy emphasis in the UK on the role of nonprofits in improving 
the responsiveness of services, it is worth noting the content of these 
studies.  The UK studies question the extent to which voluntary services 
can maintain their responsiveness and/or involvement of users in face 
of institutionalisation and professionalisation, and dependence on 
government for core funding.    
Overall the literature suggests that nonprofits may in practice reduce 
responsiveness and choice, but this is not an effect of ownership so 
much as an effect of the process of contracting for services.  In order to 
win contracts organisations must specialise, but this reduces the range 
of services they can offer [204] The literature questions how far 
voluntary action, arguably a defining characteristic of civil society, can 
define nonprofit behaviour in circumstances where government sets the 
rules of the game in which nonprofits simply play their assigned role, 
delivering homogenised and subsistence-level services. One study [182] 
suggests that user choice and control is a “fantasy” – that levelling the 
playing field between the different sectors actually reduces consumer 
participation and restricts choice.  
Six studies focused on user satisfaction with services.  In contrast with 
the involvement/choice literature, with one exception [16], these 
studies [27, 80, 203, 317, 325] consistently found nonprofits to be 
more positively associated with user satisfaction than for-profits.  
Staff ratios/intensities  
Staff ratios and intensities were the focus of several studies on health 
and particularly long term care. This reflects the fact that while the 
salaries of health care staff represent one of the major costs of health 
care provision, staff ratios are also significantly associated with quality 
of health care.  Staff ratios were a particular concern of studies in the 
nursing home literature, with international concerns evident about 
quality of care in the sector (see also the discussion of information 
asymmetry and incomplete contracts in section 2.2.4). 
Five studies from Canada and the US [12, 56, 166, 202, 296] produced 
consistent results, finding staffing levels to be lower in for-profit nursing 
homes. Study [296] noted, that while it was difficult to weigh the 
variables, it was possible to conclude that nursing homes that meet 
staffing standards, meet minimum quality measures, are nonprofit and 
smaller, will experience fewer lawsuits. While one study [202] found 
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government-run facilities had the best staffing ratios, another [166], 
excluded public facilities because ‘they are much larger and have more 
dependent residents’.   
In other parts of the health sector, findings were less uniform. While 
one study from New Zealand [268] found that staff ratios in primary 
care teams were largest (and the staff most heterogeneous) in 
community-governed nonprofit practices, the findings of a US study 
[64] were inconclusive. Another study focusing on chain affiliation [115] 
found that staff changes were similar in the largest for-profit and 
nonprofit chains, suggesting that market forces are more important 
than institutional form.  
Cost effectiveness was the focus of four studies on staffing. While study 
[294] hypothesised that mid-level practitioners represented a more 
cost-effective option for group medical practices, it found that 
nonprofits were less likely to employ them. Other studies found 
variously that there were no significant differences in efficiency across 
ownership types [125], that efficiency outcomes between different 
ownership forms converged over time [138], and that an increase in 
nursing staff led to a statistically significant increase in operating 
expenses but no significant decrease in profits [367]. 
Capital financing 
UK government policy is to have investment by nonprofits, as with 
public sector providers, privately financed. We therefore set out to 
explore the evidence from the literature about the implications of capital 
investment arrangements for the organisation and delivery of services.  
The review included studies which draw attention to the differential 
ability of nonprofits and for-profits to adapt to external conditions. Thus 
[202] maintains that regulatory conditions favour for-profits whereas 
small, individually-owned nonprofit cannot adapt so easily to these 
conditions. This echoes developments in the British health sector, e.g. 
when commercial (particularly American) organisations began to invest 
in private acute hospital capacity in the late 1970s, squeezing the 
remaining nonprofits.  
One study [292] compared the financing methods of the largest hospital 
chains in the US by ownership. Significant differences were identified 
between nonprofits and for-profits, including the fact that nonprofits 
had more variable interest-rate financing, which could be a problem 
when interest rates rise. For-profits had tiny levels of cash or reserves 
(equivalent to 2% of their debt) while nonprofits had cash or reserves 
equivalent to 98.6% of debt, because they must accumulate cash to 
fund investment and get little for investment from charity. Another 
study [66] found that nonprofits used operational and investment gains 
to build and retain a stronger capital position than for-profits. 
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Integration and planning 
Not-for-profits raise important issues about vertical integration in the 
NHS and therefore about implementation of centrally-determined plans. 
A key question here concerns the extent to which nonprofits can be 
persuaded to act in the public interest and to coordinate their activities 
with other providers of public health care. A few studies were concerned 
with this question.   
Partnership/cooperation between agencies 
Two studies from the US found results largely favourable to the 
nonprofit sector.  Nonprofit HMOs in New York State were found to be 
far more likely to participate in state-sponsored safety-net programmes 
than the for-profit managed care organisations [264]. A second study 
found that nonprofit insurance plans appeared significantly more likely 
to engage in alliances with public health agencies than national for-
profit plans [37].   
The UK literature on the voluntary sector included several studies 
concerned with the New Labour policy context of partnership working 
[53, 19, 23, 158, 363]. While some studies emphasised the voluntary 
sector’s relatively weak position compared to the statutory sector [53, 
19], there was also concern that more formal partnership could lead to 
the erosion of flexibility and responsiveness associated with the 
expansion of the voluntary sector [356]. Very similar concerns were 
also expressed by voluntary sector managers in a study of a merger 
[363]. Drivers to cooperate included governmental pressure, public 
expenditure constraints, the need to identify a niche and increased 
lobbying power through merger.   
Locality or geographic planning 
There were very few papers which considered health service planning 
and/or provision at the level of the locality, or on the basis of 
geographic area.  Studies by Crampton and colleagues in New Zealand 
[46, 49] focused on questions of access to primary care. This work 
included consideration of locality planning and questions of access, 
identifying whether services targeted high-need populations. Nonprofits 
were more likely to carry out locality service planning and assessment 
of community needs.  Practices differed in the extent to which they 
served minority ethnic groups, were located in deprived areas, or used 
population approaches to the organisation and delivery of services.  
There were few studies of locality planning in the US literature. A study 
of Blue Cross plan conversions [70] reported that following conversion 
to for-profit status, pressure from the regulator to provide state-wide 
coverage may weaken, resulting in gaps in rural markets. On balance, 
however, the authors found no evidence of substantial negative impact 
on geographic availability: ‘Culling specialised products and focusing 
market efforts geographically are widespread practices, even in 
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nonprofit plans, as is the normal give-and-take in provider 
negotiations”’(Hall and Conover 2003, 529 [70]).         
One UK study on voluntary sector provision in Glasgow, including 
health-related services, was based on a geographic perspective. This 
study [356] has some relevance to questions of locality planning, in that 
it identified factors which promoted or inhibited the development of 
voluntary sector provision in the city, including access to funding, the 
availability or premises in certain areas, and access to local and central 
government.   
Governance and accountability 
The regulatory context has a crucial bearing on public purpose. 
Questions here include the representative element in arrangements for 
governance, and the limits of accountability.  We have seen that 
government policy with respect to the regulation of non-state providers 
of NHS services is inconsistent, so that different regulatory regimes may 
apply, depending on the form of incorporation. This has implications for 
public audit and accountability, raising questions about relations 
between the state, the citizen and new contracting parties. In our 
review of performance literature we looked at the extent to which 
studies have incorporated these issues in their design.  Performance 
measurement should have regard to differences among providers with 
respect to their legal and regulatory controls.  
Boards of governance  
Reflecting wider concerns in the literature, several studies focused 
specifically on the role of boards or governance in ensuring effective 
and efficient delivery by service providers. Concerns of these studies 
included the impact of the external environment and/or organisational 
features on characteristics of board structure and functioning. Board 
structure and composition were concerns of several US studies, which 
found that public- and investor-owned hospitals were more likely than 
nonprofits to have become answerable to larger, system-affiliated, 
urban organisations during the 1990s [277], and that poor 
performance, high administrative costs, and high uncompensated care 
led to higher CEO turnover [345].  The findings of [357] were consistent 
with resource dependence theory, suggesting that a CEO's strategic 
engagement with an organisation's board depends in part on the nature 
and concentration of the organisation's resources. Other US studies of 
governance in relation to source of funding and board involvement in 
decision-making [350], and the quantity and quality of information 
supplied to boards [371], have limited value because they were based 
on relatively small samples.   
A study from New Zealand represented one of very few international 
studies identified by this review, and the only international comparison 
to focus explicitly on regulation [286]. Seeking to identify what lessons 
on governance might be usefully applied to England, the study 
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suggested that governance arrangements for nonprofits are important 
because medical staff may seek to gain the balance of power; not just 
to directly influence the board, but also to orchestrating participation of 
the membership to influence decisions taken by residents and patient 
representatives on the governing bodies. The authors therefore argue 
that governing bodies should comprise only patients.   
 Financial reporting  
In the USA health care nonprofits are defined as charitable 
organisations in terms of their tax exempt status for federal corporate 
income tax, and have to satisfy the Internal Revenue that their net 
profit-to-income ratio is below a certain level. This means that 
nonprofits have to show low profits to satisfy the tax and regulatory 
authorities as well as their donors. It also means that if nonprofits’ costs 
are higher than those of for-profits, this may be an artefact of 
accounting, Many papers used financial data derived from hospital, 
health care provider or HMO annual accounts. While annual audited 
accounts are important sources of information, they are not 
unproblematic to use in this way. There is a considerable amount of 
latitude in how income and costs and hence accounting profits may be 
reported.  One study [47] of the management of earnings found that 
nonprofits used discretionary accruals (e.g. adjustments to the third-
party-allowance, and allowance for doubtful accounts) to meet earnings 
objectives. This means that evidence seeming to show that nonprofits 
exhibit less variation in income may at least partly be explained as an 
accounting phenomenon.  They deliberately manage profits 
(downwards) to satisfy the regulatory authorities (to show ‘community 
benefits’), the Internal Revenue (tax-exempt status), and donors and 
the public (legitimation). Other studies found that nonprofit hospitals 
maximised tax exemptions by borrowing, rather than spend their 
endowments [251], and that nonprofit managers faced with declining 
profitability are under pressure to alter their behaviour to enhance 
profitability to avoid merger or takeover by for profits [235], a policy 
constrained by Internal Revenue rules on their profitability. This has 
implications for their charitable mission, the full provision of services, 
and ultimately for public access to health care.   
Cost, quality and public purpose   
Regulatory concerns were infrequently taken into account in assessing 
performance based on cost and quality indicators. A study of Swiss 
nursing homes [256] found no difference in performance by ownership 
or regulatory regime. A study of long term care in the US [206] selected 
five states to represent each of two categories of regulatory regime – 
either ‘limited’ or ‘extensive’ oversight of hospital boards and care 
facilities. This study found significant quality differences, with for-profit 
facilities rated lower.   
Other studies were more broadly concerned with the public purpose of 
nonprofits. One paper on Ontario [194] adopted the North American 
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convention of categorising nonprofits as private self-regulating bodies.  
However, the study was unusual in that the author recognised a wider 
public duty of accountability, and identified a set of pre-requisites for 
effective accountability.  Two studies questioned the implications of 
competition for regulation, including one [99] on the impact of mergers, 
and another [182] on the impact of competition in a rural setting, both 
finding that the external benefits of nonprofits could not easily be 
maintained in a competitive environment. A further study of Blue Cross 
conversions [70] also gave attention to regulation, assessing the 
pressures to make profits resulting from conversions, identifying this as 
one clear effect of conversion. However, the conclusions were otherwise 
indeterminate, largely due to the complexity of the issues and 
limitations in available data.   
A few UK studies referred to requirements for accountability in the 
voluntary sector.  Two studies identified tensions between advantages 
associated with the voluntary sector and increased requirements for 
accountability associated with formal contracts [19], and the 
implications for partnership working when organisations focus on core 
business and audit [53]. A further study of the independent evaluation 
of practice in fostering agencies [23] found it to be practically 
nonexistent. Some exceptions did exist in the voluntary sector, but the 
authors speculated that this was motivated by the need to demonstrate 
effectiveness in a competitive market.    
3.4 Discussion and Analysis 
3.4.1 Predominant themes in the literature  
We will now briefly review the predominant themes in the literature, 
before commenting on the conclusions to be drawn from it. Several 
themes centred on aspects of the funding and financing of health care; 
capital investment arrangements, funding sources and payment 
mechanisms. Relevant studies under these themes were largely 
American, and reflected conditions in that country. In particular, there 
was a strong focus on reimbursement of health care costs.   
The most common theme identified was public purpose, which also 
produced the greatest diversity of sub-themes. This is not surprising, 
given that the objective of so many of the papers was to identify 
whether and how the nonprofit sector distinguishes itself from the for-
profit and/or public sector, with a wide range of variables employed to 
test this. As anticipated, cost and quality were the two most prevalent 
themes in the literature.  
Some of the other sub-themes identified under ‘public purpose’ 
reflected primarily US concerns, while others attracted more 
international attention. US concerns relevant to the public purpose of 
nonprofits centred on the extent to which they provide community 
benefits, including the provision of unprofitable or marginal services, 
but particularly uncompensated care for the uninsured. There were also 
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numerous conversion studies, which reflected the trend in recent years 
in the US for hospitals and health plans to forego nonprofit status and 
the corresponding tax benefits to engage in providing for-profit health 
care. These studies generally employed performance measures of cost 
and quality. Other sub-themes under public purpose attracted more 
international attention in relation to mission, including studies on 
whether the public attribute certain values to nonprofits, and whether 
staff are more committed to them than for-profits.    
In reviewing these themes a pattern emerged in the results and 
conclusions. Consistent with previous literature reviews, particularly 
that of Currie et al (2003), studies which focused on ownership form 
tended to produce inconclusive results. There were exceptions, such as 
the sub-theme of staff ratios, where studies of staffing in long term care 
consistently found higher levels in nonprofits. However, this was a 
relatively small sample of five studies. Another fairly clear conclusion 
was found in studies focusing on external factors in addition to 
ownership, such as competition or market share; they tended to find 
convergence or isomorphism between different ownership forms. While 
there may be limitations to the relevance of some of the studies where 
they focused on specific US concerns, such as aspects of insurance 
plans, evidence on how the competitive environment impacts on the 
behaviour of providers has relevance for the UK in relation to the 
contracting out of health services.  
But our review also set out to identify the shortcomings and gaps in the 
literature, to which we now turn.   
3.4.2 Methodological limitations 
The literature on the performance of the nonprofit sector displayed 
several methodological problems. The overwhelming majority of the 
studies included in the systematic literature review were quantitative 
and most of the methodological problems faced by these studies are 
well-known, such as small sample sizes, non-representativeness of the 
samples, omitted variables, the use of highly aggregated data, selection 
bias, etc.  
A typical weakness in the quantitative research was the omitted variable 
problem, i.e. that other unmeasured factors not included in the studies 
may have confounded the results. Crucial in the context of studies 
evaluating the performance of nonprofits sector compared for-profits or 
public providers was that often no adjustments were made for case mix 
– i.e. controlling for crucial patient characteristics such as their health 
status. However, any comparison of hospital efficiency is meaningless, if 
it does not control for quality.  
Other common methodological problems were related to the samples. 
First, in many studies sample sizes were rather small with as little as 20 
cases of one type represented [61]; (see also [169, 348]). 
Consequently the cells of some specific subgroups of interest had low 
frequencies, limiting the inferences that can be drawn from statistical 
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tests. Nevertheless, most of the studies used quantitative regression 
techniques, although a significantly large number of cases is a 
precondition for these. Second, the samples in some studies were non-
randomly selected, resulting in likely selection bias. Even when a 
random sample survey was used, selection bias was a severe problem 
in some cases. For example, one study of patient satisfaction [27] was 
based on computer owners; thus it did not represent a true cross-
section of the US population, but was a cross-section of middle- and 
upper middle-class Americans. Although these problems were usually 
acknowledged by the authors of the studies and it was not purported to 
be representative for the whole of the country, this is nevertheless a 
limitation for the generalisability of the findings. In another case [325], 
a study of health plans, only those plans were included which consented 
to the public release of their HEDIS results. Not surprisingly, other 
studies have found that such ‘public reporters’ perform better on nearly 
all HEDIS performance measures than those which do not consent to 
public reporting of their results.  
Many studies relied on secondary data sets such as the American 
Hospital Association (AHA) annual survey. Since such surveys are not 
created for the particular purposes of the studies in question, some of 
the measures do not have a high degree of sensitivity and specificity. 
Moreover, such highly aggregated data are not as adequate as data 
based on individual hospitals as they do not allow for tight control of 
potentially confounding variables.  
If, by contrast, tailor-made questionnaires were developed for the study 
purpose, the studies often struggled with low response rates and/or 
some significant selection biases. A number of studies relied on self-
reporting, which is open to respondent bias and the data have yet to be 
fully validated against other sources.  
At the other end of the spectrum there were studies which used 
qualitative study designs, often with a relatively small number of 
respondents. These studies varied enormously in terms of depth and 
quality. For example, not all the qualitative studies described their 
methods in detail or the nature of the questions they asked in their 
interviews. 
As Table 3 showed, the bulk of the literature reviewed referred to the 
USA. Many studies referring to only a single US state, rendering general 
conclusions, even for the whole of the US, difficult. For example, the 
authors of a study on hospital transfers in California [329] pointed out 
that their findings were not generalisable to other states with less 
managed care and/or fewer publicly owned hospitals. Similarly, a study 
of the effect of capitation which was introduced in Colorado in 1995 
[299], acknowledges that the results may not be generalisable as 
Colorado seemed to have implemented capitation better than other 
states and may have reimbursed capitated providers more generously 
than elsewhere. Studies which included health institutions from the 
whole of the US, on the other hand, face the problem that they cannot 
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take into account the influence of the differing contexts in each of the 
states, e.g. differences in legislation or in the composition of the 
hospital market. Quite often, too, studies were limited to metropolitan 
areas only, or had other exclusion criteria that limited their 
generalisabilty, with implications for policy makers concerned with 
whole populations, as in the UK. 
Some countries were represented by only a single article, or very few 
articles, identified by our systematic search (see Table 3, p. 42). In 
such cases it is difficult to generalise from their findings, given the lack 
of supporting studies done there, and the very different context of their 
nonprofit sectors from that in the UK (or the US). 
In sum, the papers varied greatly in terms of methodological 
approaches, data sources, and analytical techniques. We therefore have 
a number of reservations about the quality of much of the research in 
this area, and in this respect our work echoes previous reviews such as 
those by Currie, Donaldson and Lu (2003). Much of the qualitative work 
is a description of the activities of nonprofits, sometimes accompanied 
by comments on the extent of external pressures on their activities, or 
the impacts on their staff of organisational changes, but given the scale 
or scope of these studies they are unable to detect significant 
differences in, for example, the performance of nonprofits and for-
profits. In fact they were simply not designed to do so.   
Of the quantitative studies we have reviewed, analytical techniques also 
varied. Some studies were simply attempts to detect differences in 
sample means - this can certainly established differences between 
organisational types (for example, in respect of the nature of the 
clientele they serve) or rather unsophisticated multiple regressions, 
often without a great deal of statistical detail being reported. Such 
analyses could nevertheless establish, as did [14 and 49] in some work 
on New Zealand, that nonprofits did indeed serve a distinctive sub-
group of the population and were located in less-prosperous areas (this 
is not, however, a startling finding since the organisations they were 
steady were set up precisely to serve this purpose). Sometimes these 
studies were extended, e.g. by performing logistic regression analyses 
to control for a greater range of factors. More complex techniques were 
also used such as data envelopment analysis (DEA), the aim of which is 
to determine how close the performance of an organisation is to what 
would reasonably be regarded as an efficiency frontier when allowance 
is made for its organisational characteristics and the context it is 
operating in. The use of such complicated data analysis techniques, 
however, cannot conceal that the quality of care, the range of services, 
case mix and access to care are so difficult to control for. With regard to 
efficiency studies, in particular, the ways in which the mission or public 
purpose of a particular health institution – mainly in the case of 
nonprofits and the public sector – influence any measures of cost 
efficiency must be taken into account. Future research needs to 
consider what a change in one is likely to do to the other. A similar 
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conclusion may be drawn for the relationship between quality and 
efficiency.  
It is crucial that future studies attempt to measure quality and case-mix 
when evaluating performance. The existing studies which attempt to 
measure the quality of services, albeit by very crude indicators, also 
tend to neglect the question of access to services.  We need measures 
with which to compare the different populations within a non-universal 
health system. For example, the population characteristics of members 
of a for-profit health plan compared with the members of a nonprofit 
health plan need to be taken into account. The provider focus of almost 
all the existing literature overlooks the need to take account of 
population characteristics if we want to arrive at a meaningful measure 
of performance. And at least some fundamental requirements need to 
be met, such as standardisation of data. Instead of drawing on large 
databases for quantitative modelling purposes it seems advisable to 
attempt some small-scale studies, even though the level of 
generalisability is much lower with the latter. A positive example is 
study [107], an ex post event study within a particular area of 
California, where diverse potentially confounding factors and differences 
in regulation were controlled for. 
We finally comment on how two themes of particular policy significance 
for the UK NHS, namely regulation and access, were covered in the 
literature reviewed.   
3.4.3 Regulation and access 
Our work on the classification of nonprofits (see section 4) highlights 
the current inconsistency in the regulation of non-state providers of 
NHS services, raising questions about audit, accountability and access 
to health – all crucial to the public interest. The review of the literature 
on performance therefore sought to assess whether studies identify and 
adjust for differences in regulatory and legal frameworks, and whether 
the perspective of geographic coverage and population access to care is 
evident.  Apart from a few valuable studies, most notably [70], 
regulatory issues and the interests and needs of geographic populations 
were not dealt with. However, some studies controlled for differences in 
the regulatory framework by studying a single national sub-unit only, 
e.g. [120]. 
It is important to bear in mind the context of US studies of relative 
performance, where for decades nonprofits have dominated health care 
provision and where comparison between for-profits and nonprofits 
dominate the literature. Because of the large numbers of uninsured 
people, and spiralling costs, the US nonprofit literature is heavily 
focused on the analysis of health care affordability and the impact of 
ownership on costs. Changes of the reimbursement system are 
therefore central in the US literature. This explains why so many US 
studies deal with issues such as differences in quality of care and the 
extent of uncompensated care by the different providers. The literature 
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on uncompensated care itself constitutes one of the few attempts to 
come to grips with variation in regulatory standards, although attempts 
to describe regulatory mechanisms in this context were limited.  
Other sub-themes relevant to questions of governance and 
accountability included financial reporting and boards of governance. 
There were a few studies of boards of governance from the US and New 
Zealand, of some potential interest and relevance to board structure 
and composition, particularly one study drawing lessons for England 
from reforms in New Zealand [286]. There were a few studies of 
financial reporting with some potential relevance for regulation, though 
again beset by methodological problems. There were also a few 
occasions where regulatory concerns were taken into account in 
assessing performance using cost and quality indicators, and public 
purpose. However, when taken together these studies, again, produced 
indeterminate conclusions, and in one national US case [70] the authors 
acknowledged that data limitations and the complexity of the issues 
made clear conclusions impossible.   
The question of access was a key concern of our review. A few studies 
considered the ease with which providers in the US able to enter and 
exit the health care market, and they gave some consideration to 
provision at the level of population. Studies of uncompensated care 
again have some relevance here, since they concerned health care 
provision for the uninsured. A limitation of these studies overall, 
however, was their focus on providers. Reflecting the complexity of US 
system, the studies covered a range of fragments of the health care 
market, attempting to identify impacts of cost control and 
reimbursement methods on providers.  Their main concern was to 
identify behavioural changes on the part of hospitals, hospices, nursing 
homes or insurance plans.  What they did not do was start from the 
basis of the population covered.  There was therefore little sense of the 
impacts on patients, or of the implications for access to care.  Studies 
from New Zealand [46, 49] on nonprofit provision for marginal and 
minority populations were among the very few which considered 
population coverage. With few exceptions the literature does not, and in 
most cases cannot, account for variations in access to the different 
provider schemes and in the entitlements of whole populations.    
Overall, there was no strong, consistent evidence from the US literature 
that nonprofits perform better than for-profit providers. Across a range 
of themes, the evidence tended to suggest that when studies took 
external factors into account, in a competitive environment nonprofit 
providers behave increasingly like for-profit providers. Furthermore, 
evidence from the UK and other countries has shown that under 
increased regulation and mainstreaming the voluntary sector loses its 
innovative and niche character and becomes more bureaucratic [158, 
167, 182, 157, 204, 283, 356, 364].  This has relevance to current 
policy focus in the UK, where emphasis is on moving from largely 
peripheral provision of services by nonprofits to mainstream NHS 
provision. 
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Section 4  Classification of nonprofits 
Many governments are proposing a greater use of nonprofit 
organisations in the delivery of public services as an alternative to direct 
provision. The UK government is no exception. However, we have found 
that economic theory’s justification for the policy is weak and there is 
little research evidence to support their use. In this section we turn to a 
further dimension of the policy, namely the implications of nonprofit 
participation in public service provision for government control and 
regulation with respect to public expenditure. 
All governments are under an international obligation to adopt standard 
rules for determining when services are public and regulated by 
governments and when they are private and regulated by markets. The 
switch from public service providers to nonprofit providers introduces a 
new layer of complexity with which national accountants are struggling 
to deal. The distinction between government and market control is 
particularly problematic. EU competition rules add to this complexity. 
The application of these rules depends on additional criteria for 
designating services as public and under government control. 
These classification questions have already received attention at 
international and European levels. The United Nations has highlighted 
‘ambiguities [in the national accounts system] with respect to the 
borders between [nonprofit institutions] and both corporations and 
governments’ (United Nations, 2003, p.17), and the European 
Commission recognises substantial uncertainty in the classification of 
nonprofits under competition law, that is, in determining whether they 
may be regulated like any other private provider or whether they may 
be regulated like non-commercial, public sector providers.  
First, we examine the basis on which nonprofits are assigned to the 
public or private sectors in the system of national accounts and we 
consider the evolution of that system in the face of the growing practice 
of contracting-out public services to nonprofit providers. Second, we 
consider European Union Treaty provisions as they relate to the 
nonprofit sector and specifically under what circumstances national 
governments lose rights to regulate nonprofits providing public services. 
4.1 National accounts 
National accounts record aggregate economic activity in an economy by 
providing measures of national income and output, and changes in 
stocks and flows of capital. The system involves classifying 
organisations to government, public or private sectors in order that 
government and public spending can be calculated and compared with 
spending in other sectors. It provides the data for government debt and 
deficit calculation in Europe and for the UK government’s fiscal targets. 
It provides a basis for defining public spending and for assigning rights 
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of government intervention, public accountability and the identification 
of public agencies subject to public law. Our primary concern is to 
determine the extent to which nonprofit status is a factor in this 
system.  
National accounts are compiled in the UK by the Office of National 
Statistics (ONS) and are harmonised in the European Union (EU) 
through the European System of Accounts (ESA). The current 
conceptual framework which is legally binding for EU member states is 
‘ESA 95’ (the European System of National and Regional Accounts). ESA 
95 is fully consistent with the international guidance on national 
accounts known as the System of National Accounts (‘SNA93’). SNA93 
is the joint responsibility of the United Nations, the IMF, the European 
commission, the OECD and the World Bank. (HM Treasury, 2000a).  
ESA 95 contributes to European policy-making by providing numeric, 
comparative data on the total economy or parts of it. The accounts are 
used to calculate and compare public spending and changes in 
government debt and are used for estimating the contribution of 
different sectors to economic development and for informing sectoral 
policy making (European Commission, 2004). The EU uses the data for 
monitoring and guiding European monetary policy and for granting 
regional aid.  
4.1.1 The absence of a nonprofit sector 
The ESA divides the economy into various sectors or classes. The main 
classes are public and private sectors and market and non-market 
activities. Three sub-sectors make up the public sector: ‘central 
government’, ‘local government’ and ‘public corporations’. ‘Central 
government’ plus ‘local government’ comprise ‘general government’, 
and the general government sector plus public corporations comprise 
the public sector (HM Treasury, 2005).   
An organisation is classified as public if it is controlled by government, 
as a corporation if it relies on income from sales, and as a public 
corporation if it relies on income from sales and is controlled by 
government (ONS, 2003).   
Government control is defined as the government’s ability to determine 
general corporate policy and is secured ‘by [the government] owning 
more than half the voting shares or otherwise controlling more than half 
the shareholders' voting power or as a result of special legislation (ESA, 
1996, paragraph 2.26). Assignment to the market sector is based on 
source of income; an organisation is defined as market sector ‘if more 
than 50 % of the production costs are covered by sales’ (ESA, 1996, 
paragraph 3.32) where ‘sales’ also include ‘all payments made by 
general government or the institutions of the European Union’ (ONS, 
2003, p.290).   
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There is no nonprofit sector in this system (other than the group of 
institutions largely funded from voluntary contributions); but nonprofits 
are defined as:  
a legal or social entity created for the purpose of producing goods and 
services whose status does not permit them to be a source of income, 
profit or other financial gains for the units that establish, control or 
finance them. In practice, their productive activities are bound to 
generate either surpluses or deficits but any surpluses they happen to 
make cannot be appropriated by other institutional units. (ESA, 1996, 
paragraphs 2.87 and 3.31) 
4.1.2 How are nonprofits classified? 
All non-market nonprofit institutions (NPIs) are classified as ‘general 
government’ when they are ‘recognized as independent legal entities 
which are other non-market producers and which are controlled and 
mainly financed by general government’ (ESA, 1996, paragraph 2.29). 
They are classified as public corporations when they are market bodies 
controlled by government, and as private corporations when they are 
market bodies not controlled by government (ESA, 1996, paragraph 
2.30). 
For example, NHS foundation trusts are currently classed as non-market 
government bodies because their corporate policy is controlled by 
government and because although their income comes from sales they 
also receive public money designed to guarantee continuity of supply. 
On the other hand, NHS trusts were formerly classed as public 
corporations because their income was from sales, and therefore in the 
market, but were also controlled by government. Other examples of 
NPIs in the public corporation sector are the BBC and the Post Office. By 
contrast, it is possible for new third sector bodies serving the NHS to be 
classed as private, commercial bodies. An example might be community 
interest companies or other nonprofits undertaking APMS contracts in 
the primary care market.     
The position with regard to market NPIs can be summarised as follows:  
 
A public producer is a producer that is controlled by the general 
government. In case of NPIs, a public producer is an NPI that is 
controlled and mainly financed by the general government. All other 
producers are private producers’ (ESA, 1996, paragraph 3.28).  
Control is understood as ‘the ability to determine the general 
(corporate) policy’ (ESA, 1996, ibid).  
In general, therefore, the ESA classification allows for two possible 
interpretations of ‘non-governmental’. First, a non-governmental 
organisation can be a public corporation, that is, part of general 
government as a market body that is controlled by government, but not 
part of central or local government. Second, it can be a market body 
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not controlled by government, in which case it is a private corporation. 
Therefore the UK government’s use of the term ‘nongovernmental’ 
leaves open the question of whether it intends that third sector policy 
constitutes privatisation in the sense of the substantial transfer of 
control and responsibility over services and assets to the private sector.  
We turn next to other difficulties with the application of SNA to 
nonprofits.  
4.1.3 Attempts to harmonise national accounts 
nonprofit classification on the US model  
The transfer of public functions to nonprofits has introduced new 
complexity to the classificatory process because they are bodies in 
which private and public sector characteristics coexist. National 
accountants have for some time tried to improve classificatory criteria in 
the UN system of national accounts (SNA, see above) to deal with this. 
Here we examine the attempt in 2003 to define a nonprofit sector 
through the publication of a special handbook and we show that the 
approach assumes nonprofits are private sector bodies outside 
government control.    
In 2003 the United Nations published a handbook on nonprofit 
classification intended to address ‘some ambiguities […] with respect to 
the borders between NPIs and both corporations and governments’ 
(United Nations, 2003, p.17). In seeking to provide a coherent account 
of organisations that are ‘neither market firms nor state agencies’  the 
handbook draws heavily on the work of the Centre for Civil Society, 
Johns Hopkins University, and the structural-operational definition of 
nonprofits developed by Anheier and Salamon (Salamon et al, 2000; 
Salamon and Toepler, 2000) (see section 2).  
Its significance for our present purposes is that it is intended to provide 
the basis for a reform of the SNA system and closely resembles the 
definitional approach adopted in guidance provided by the UK Treasury 
(2006). For example, like the Treasury the authors of the handbook 
refer to nonprofits as synonymous with “voluntary”, “civil society” or 
“non-governmental” organisations, and also to “third”, “voluntary”, 
“nonprofit” or “independent” sectors (United Nations, 2003, p.3).  
The handbook contains ‘satellite accounts’ consolidating the data on 
NPIs found in the various SNA institutional sectors. The satellite 
accounts follow the structural-operational definition discussed in our 
theory section (section 2 above). According to this definition, the 
nonprofit sector includes all entities that ‘are: (a) organisations; that 
(sic) (b) are not-for-profit and, by law or custom, do not distribute any 
surplus they may generate to those who own or control them; (c) are 
institutionally separate from government; (d) are self-governing; and 
(e) are non-compulsory’ (United Nations, 2003). 
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Notwithstanding the fact that under current SNA usage NPIs can be 
‘substantially controlled by Government’ (United Nations, 2003, p14), 
the authors stipulate that for SNA purposes an NPI shall be defined as 
‘self-governing’ or ‘able to control its own activities and […] not under 
the effective control of any other entity.’ Furthermore, the distinctive 
feature of NPIs is that they are ‘private institutions serving public 
purposes’ that can be used to ‘reduce the size of the state’ (United 
Nations, 2003, p4), although no account is given of the ways in which 
nonprofits roll back the state in this way.  
Although this approach may reflect US traditions respecting nonprofit 
provision it does not reflect the current practice in the UK of classifying 
nonprofits either to the public or to the private sectors. However, 
because HM Treasury and SNA both subsume nonprofits within a much 
larger category of providers, including the ‘third sector’ and ‘civil 
society’, the approach raises questions about what government powers  
should be retained when nonprofits take over public health care 
services.     
4.1.4 Attempts to define the public/private boundary 
by refining economic classificatory criteria 
When public services are delivered through nonprofits, SNA accountants 
have difficulties determining which bodies are operating in a market and 
which are controlled by government. Much of the Eurostat manual, 
which is concerned with interpreting SNA guidance, is devoted to 
developing clarifications in this area (The Task Force on the 
Harmonization of Public Sector Accounting, 2005). 
In 2005, a United Nations Task Force on the Harmonization of Public 
Sector Accounting was set up to harmonise public sector accounting. It 
considered that to meet this requirement more guidance was required 
to determine a) when an organisation is a market body; b) when 
market bodies are controlled by government, and c) when non-market 
bodies are controlled by government (The Task Force on the 
Harmonization of Public Sector Accounting, 2005). 
In order to improve the distinction between market and non-market 
bodies, the Task Force elaborated on the concept ‘income from sales’, 
the defining feature of corporations, by utilising the concept of 
‘economically significant prices’. Economically significant prices are 
defined in this context as ‘prices that have a significant influence on the 
amounts the producers are willing to supply and on the amounts 
purchasers wish to buy’. Such prices are characteristic of the private 
sector because they occur when a producer has an incentive to ‘adjust 
supply either with the goal of making a profit in the long run or, at a 
minimum, covering capital and other costs’ (The Task Force on the 
Harmonization of Public Sector Accounting, 2005, p7). 
Identification of ‘economically significant prices’ provides a way of 
incorporating payment characteristics of this type in the classification 
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criteria. The point of this refinement is that public service providers can 
be funded in different ways. For example, the public sector can take on 
demand risk by providing income guarantees to ensure continuity of 
supply. Such arrangements have been adopted in the UK for foundation 
trusts and independent treatment centres. The Task Force 
recommended a definition of market producers as ‘producers that sell 
most or all of their output at prices that are economically significant.’ 
Conversely, non-market producers ‘are producers that provide most of 
their output to others free or at prices that are not economically 
significant’ (The Task Force on the Harmonization of Public Sector 
Accounting, 2005, p7).  
Notwithstanding these refinements, the Task Force recognised that a 
difficulty remains in determining whether public bodies use economically 
significant prices. Under public ownership, it said, it is sometimes 
difficult to determine whether prices are economically significant: ‘Units 
that do not use economically significant prices are working in an 
environment where supply and demand are controlled by other factors 
usually because of the interjection of government policy into economic 
behaviour’ (The Task Force on the Harmonization of Public Sector 
Accounting, 2005, p24). The difficulty is illustrated in the following case 
study of the classification of a public nonprofit organisation, foundation 
trusts, in 2003. 
 4.1.5 UK case study: the application of economic 
criteria in the ONS classification of NHS trusts and 
foundation trusts 
When NHS trusts were set up in 1991 they were classified by the ONS 
as public corporations because they were seen as public trading bodies 
or ‘market units controlled by government’ (ONS, 2003, p3). This 
classification was made on the basis of the then current guidance, the 
United Kingdom National Accounts Sources and Methods, third edition 
(Mrs Shanks, Head of Classification, Public Sector Accounts: Personal 
communication to author September 2006). It was not amended when 
ESA95 came into force.  
In 1999, Eurostat issued new rules for measuring government debt. 
These rules, based on a survey of public hospitals and homes for the 
elderly, established a taxonomy of payment types by the government to 
public hospitals. Four payment methods were identified: 
i)  according to their costs; 
ii)  according to a negotiation (global budget) between general 
government and each hospital; 
iii)  according to a system of pricing applied only to public hospitals; 
iv) according to a system of pricing applied to both public and private 
hospitals. (ONS, 2003, p3) 
Only payments made under (iv) were classified as sales. Since health 
authorities could purchase from private or public hospitals, trusts were 
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deemed to be in the market sector and therefore remained public 
corporations. 
With the creation of foundation trusts in 2003, the ONS reviewed NHS 
trust classification for a third time and reclassified them to the 
government sector. On this occasion, the classifying committee adduced 
evidence from ESA 95 that public service providers in several European 
countries were assigned to the government sector rather than the 
corporate sector, even where a single system of pricing applied to both 
public and private sectors. Its reasoning was as follows. The 
classification committee (the ‘PSCC’) reasoned that, pending the full 
introduction of the national tariff, the system of pricing applied to the 
trusts did not qualify as sales under international classification rules. 
These rules define as sales a common system of pricing for public and 
private sectors. The classification committee decided that unlike private 
sector suppliers, foundation trusts are paid for availability as well as 
individual treatments and that therefore the pricing systems are 
different: 
In the UK the purchasing authorities have several types of contracts 
with health providers. The predominant contract with NHS Trusts is a 
“block contract”, where “service availability” access is purchased rather 
than particular treatments. There are also “cost and volume” contracts, 
which contain a mixture of charging for access up to a certain limit, 
topped up with additional charges according to volume of patients 
treated. Contracts with private sector providers are more prescriptive 
and relate to purchases of specific treatments (ONS, 2003, p4).  
The committee also decided that the predominant type of NHS payment 
to trusts was a block grant ‘where “service availability” access is 
purchased rather than particular treatments’ (ONS, 2003, p3). 
Concluding that these payments could not be considered as ‘sales’ 
under the Government deficit and debt rules, the committee therefore 
reclassified NHS trusts as non-market bodies within central 
government.  
The significance of this analysis is that it demonstrates the connection 
between classification and system of funding. If third sector policy 
indeed equates nonprofits with private commercial bodies, funding 
provision will reflect this as funding for continuity of supply is phased 
out. This raises questions about alternative mechanisms for ensuring 
continuity of supply among private providers.  
Foundation trusts were classified at the same time and to the same 
(central government) sector. In making this decision the committee 
considered that foundation trusts were controlled by government 
through legislation, regulation and contracts in virtue of: 
· their borrowing limits; 
· their terms of authorisation and legal duties on co-operation; 
· their contractual arrangements combined with the restriction on 
private income; 
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·  the regulator’s approval being needed to amend their constitutions. 
 
Community control was not considered to confer a public character on 
them because their governance arrangements did not secure public 
control over key committees or a veto of the board. Foundation trusts 
were thus also assigned to the non-market sector. However when the 
national tariff system is fully operational, payments will be classified as 
sales and foundation trusts will be reclassified as public corporations. 
This example shows that interpretations of the market/non-market 
divide are subject to change independently of changes in guidance.  
4.1.6 Inconsistencies in the classification of 
nonprofits: differences between government financial 
reporting and the system of national accounts 
In section 4.1.1-4.1.5 we showed that nonprofits can be classified to 
either side of the public/private divide and to the market or non-market 
sectors. In this section we turn our attention to inconsistencies in their 
classification, and in particular to differences in the classification of 
nonprofit organisations and assets under the systems of government 
financial reporting and national accounts.  
Government guidance on financial reporting, set out in the manual 
‘Government Accounting’ (GA), covers the proper handling and 
reporting of the income, expenditure, assets and liabilities of public 
entities. This guidance is based on the UK’s private sector accounting 
standards known collectively as Generally Accepted Accounting Practice 
(GAAP). The guidance, which consists of mandatory controls and advice, 
covers three main categories: parliamentary requirements, Treasury 
administrative controls, and best practice. Parliamentary requirements 
may by statutory, customary, or set out in specific agreements between 
Parliament and the Treasury. Treasury administrative controls deal with 
propriety, value for money, and accountability in public spending, and 
are also concerned with regulating public spending. Best practice refers 
to the promotion of procedures contributing to “good administration” 
(HM Treasury 2000b, paragraph 1.2).  
National accounting and government accounting overlap. National and 
government financial accounts are both derived from the individual 
financial accounts of public sector entities. However, government 
accounts, which the Office of National Statistics takes as input data, are 
prepared under government guidance on financial reporting and audited 
by the National Audit Office that can allow for different interpretations 
of the rules of classification. We show below that this situation has 
resulted in at least one nonprofit organisation (Network Rail) being 
classified to different sectors by the Office of National Statistics and the 
National Audit Office. Nonprofit assets are also treated inconsistently 
under rules drawn up for public private partnerships.  
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4.1.7 Case study of inconsistent classification: 
Network Rail 
GAAP accounting standards can affect the sectoral classification of 
nonprofit organisations as well as their assets. In 2002, the National 
Audit Office (the body responsible for auditing government accounts) 
and the ONS (the body responsible for national statistics) reached 
different views about the classification of Network Rail, the then newly 
formed nonprofit body created to take over the rail infrastructure. In 
the classification of Network Rail, the ONS argued that national 
accounts prepared in accordance with ESA95 and SNA93 classified 
Network Rail as a private corporation since it was not controlled by 
government. Under the national system of accounts guidance, 
ownership is classified “according to whom exercises control over ability 
to determine general corporate policy” (Office of National Statistics, 
2002, p5). This guidance led therefore to the ONS classifying Network 
Rail’s debt as private sector debt, even though the debt was guaranteed 
by the government – via the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) - in the 
national accounts. The National Audit Office on the other hand, judged 
that under UK GAAP Network Rail should be classified as a subsidiary of 
the SRA that is, as part of the public sector, because its finances were 
dependent upon the state. A joint statement defended the two 
classifications as "fundamentally different activities undertaken for 
distinct purposes and using different criteria" (NAO/ONS, 2002, p3).   
4.1.8 The rules for assigning nonprofit asset 
ownership 
Assets as well as organisations are subject to inconsistent classification 
or their classification is difficult to predict. Allocation of ownership is 
important because it determines who is responsible for capital assets 
and who bears the financial risk of ownership and is therefore under an 
incentive to adjust supply to cover capital costs.  
Asset ownership is determined with reference to the type of lease at the 
centre of a public private partnership (PPP is understood here to be a 
long term, investment-based contract between a public agency and a 
provider). There are two relevant types of lease in PPP arrangements. 
The first is a finance lease, which is method of buying an asset by 
paying rent over its expected life time. The second is an operating 
lease, which is a method of renting property or paying for services that 
does not include acquiring an asset. Ownership is allocated differently 
according to the type of lease involved.  
Both the government’s financial reporting regime and the system of 
national accounts are concerned with the question of whether a public 
private partnership (PPP) is a financing arrangement for the 
procurement of public sector infrastructure (a financing lease), in which 
case the asset and the liability are public; or whether the PPP primarily 
represents the procurement of infrastructure-based services (an 
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operating lease), in which case the asset and liability are not public 
(though not necessarily private either – see below).  
Accounting Standards Board guidance deals with distinctions between 
lease types. It requires that ownership is allocated according to the test 
of which party to a PPP bears the risks and enjoys rewards of 
ownership. This is the test of  ‘economic ownership’, a concept different 
from and not affected by legal ownership of the underlying asset.  
However, international accounting guidance has been published by the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). The IASB adopts an 
alternative approach, which national regulators will have to consider, 
that assigns economic ownership not on an analysis of risk and reward 
but on an analysis of control. Control in this context means the right to 
control the use of the public service infrastructure created by the PPP.  
In practice the complexity of the PPP contract makes it very difficult to 
judge where risks and rewards lie, as those that relate to the property 
are often bound up with the risks and rewards of providing the service 
(Cearns, 1998), thus giving rise to uncertainty about the accounting 
treatment that will be adopted. Furthermore, auditors acting for the 
private partner in a PFI deal may assess the risks and rewards 
differently from the public sector’s auditors. As a result, PPP assets can 
appear in both public and private sectors simultaneously (on-on balance 
sheet treatment, as in the case of roads) or in no sector at all (off-off 
balance sheet treatment, as in the case of most hospitals) (Edwards et 
al, 2004).4   
These matters of judgement are crucial for third sector policy because 
economic ownership of assets (formally known as ‘balance sheet 
treatment’) has significant implications for the cost base of 
organisations. Assets that are on the public balance sheet are subject to 
different rules from private assets. They are required by the 
government’s financial regime to show a return of a prescribed amount, 
to show an annual cost of depreciation at a rate determined by the 
Treasury, and to be revalued at intervals determined by the Treasury. 
All these arrangements affect the cost of capital and therefore the unit 
costs of services. This may be a significant issue under conditions where 
there is a common pricing regime but not a common capital financing 
regime, and where there is competition between NHS entities and 
between the NHS and the private sector, including the nonprofit sector.  
                                                 
 
4 A full treatment of the evolution of guidance in this area is reserved to appendix 3. 
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4.2 The classification of nonprofits in 
European regulation 
This sub-section links the analysis of classification with that of 
regulation to show the constraints placed upon national government 
when decisions are taken to move away from integrated public systems 
to market provision which includes the use of nonprofit organisations. 
A series of landmark judgements by the European Court has established 
that national health systems involving private or ‘market’ providers are 
not necessarily immune from Community law (Hervey, 2000, p.30). The 
Commission recognises, however, that there is substantial uncertainty 
with respect to social services: ‘a growing proportion of social services 
in the European Union, until now managed directly by the public 
authorities, now come under the Community rules on the internal 
market and competition… [This] new situation for those concerned has 
meant that the conditions for the application of certain Community rules 
need to be clarified’ (European Commission, 2006, p.2).  
The Commission published a green paper in 2003, and a communication 
in 2006, dealing with how far the rules of the internal market and of 
open competition should apply to public services.  
4.2.1 Competition policy and the economic 
constitution 
The European economic constitution set out in the EC Treaty, to which 
all members of the European Union are signatories, includes rules that 
limit state control over commercial firms with the ultimate aim of 
ensuring competition within the EU.  These competition provisions are 
designed to check anticompetitive behaviour.  For example, Articles 81 
and 82 of the EC Treaty prevent cartels or the exercise of monopoly 
power by private companies, while Articles 86 and 87 prevent national 
governments from giving special subsidies or granting special or 
exclusive rights to individual providers.   
The EC Treaty nevertheless contains countervailing measures to protect 
member states’ autonomy. Article 86 does recognise the rights of 
member states, in certain circumstances, to breach the rules on 
competition in order to provide essential services. The general term 
used to denote such services is ‘services of general interest’.    
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4.2.2 What are services of general interest and how 
are they defined? 
‘Services of general interest’ can be both non-economic and ‘economic’ 
activities. The EU has no business with services of general interest that 
are not economic and therefore such services do not require 
derogations from competition law. Services in this category are those 
which are provided as ‘acts of official authority’ or which are of a purely 
social character. Acts of official authority include matters of vital 
national interest which are the prerogatives of the state, such as 
security, justice, diplomacy or the registry of births deaths and 
marriages, but also public services such as compulsory education and 
social security (European Commission, 1996). Activities of a purely 
social character are those that exhibit an element of social solidarity 
(European Court, 1999).  
Services of general economic interest, on the other hand, have a 
different status under the Treaty. They fall under Community law, but 
are allowed a derogation from competition rules because of their public 
interest character. However, services of general economic interest are 
not defined in the Treaty but by the European Court. The Court judges 
that a service is ‘economic’ if it involves ‘any activity consisting of 
offering goods and services on a given market’ (European Commission, 
2003, p14).   
The European Commission acknowledges that for an increasing number 
of services, the important distinction between economic and non-
economic ‘has become blurred’. (European Commission, 2003, p.2). 
One reason for this is that the European Court takes contracting-out 
into consideration when determining whether services are of a purely 
social character or commercial. The Court has determined that an 
organisation with a commercial or industrial character is one which 
“operates in normal market conditions, aims at making a profit and 
bears the losses associated with the exercise of its activity’ (Lane, 2005, 
p502). Lane points out that while this seems to exclude charitable 
bodies and nonprofit institutions, the test is not exhaustive. Lane refers 
to one case concerning a nonprofit making body responsible for 
organising trade fairs that the court defined as commercial. The 
organisation ‘was held to meet a need in the general interest, but 
nonetheless was ultimately held [to have a] commercial and industrial 
character’ because its contractual arrangements put it at risk of 
commercial failure. (Lane, 2005, p502). The pursuit of profit or surplus, 
according to the European Court, creates an incentive to trade off 
quality against cost when financial risk is devolved to the contracting 
organisation, and such a service is economic. The BetterCare judgement 
(see case study below) exemplifies this point. 
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4.2.3 What rules can national governments invoke to 
protect services from EU competition policy when 
they are services of general economic interest?    
While the European Court decides which services are economic and 
which are not, European member states are free to decide when an 
economic service is also a service of general economic interest. This 
designation triggers rules that allow derogations from competition law 
so that states can grant special or exclusive rights, regulate activities 
and also fund the services. (European Commission, 2003, paragraph 
31). However, EU rules control the basis on which member states can 
designate an economic service as of general interest and therefore 
eligible for derogations.  
To qualify as a provider of a ‘service of general economic interest’ an 
entity must have been given a specific task by the state, that is, it must 
have a clearly defined and explicit public service mission such as might 
be set out in a statute or a contract (European Commission, 2000). So 
far as this test is concerned, it is irrelevant whether the undertaking is 
publicly or privately owned; a task will normally be regarded as a 
service of general economic interest if it is designed to provide a service 
meeting essential needs of all consumers throughout a defined territory 
under affordable conditions (Blum and Logue, 1998, p18, 22-23).  
Therefore while the regulatory capacity of the European Commission 
under Article 86 is only triggered for those services which are of an 
economic nature, it can be seen that the precise method by which 
member states organise their welfare systems is critically important.  
The nonprofit status of an agency providing health services is not of 
itself a guarantee against European jurisdiction; the fact that a service 
is contracted may lead, irrespective of the sectoral classification of the 
contractor, to that service coming under EU jurisdiction. That this is not 
a theoretical question was sharply illustrated by the BetterCare decision 
in 2001. 
4.2.4 Case study: the BetterCare judgement 
In November 2000, the BetterCare Group attempted to use the UK’s 
competition law to challenge the price of its contract with North & West 
Belfast Health and Social Services Trust for private nursing home beds. 
BetterCare alleged that the contract price was set too low and that the 
trust was abusing its dominant market position, a violation of 
competition rules. The Director of Fair Trading originally rejected the 
complaint, ruling that North & West was not carrying out an economic 
activity and therefore competition rules did not apply. BetterCare 
appealed against this ruling on the ground that European jurisprudence 
defines purchasing care as an economic, not welfare, state activity. The 
appeal was heard by a tribunal of the UK’s Competition Commission. 
The tribunal reversed the ruling on the ground that commercial 
contracting is an inherently commercial activity, even when undertaken 
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by a public body, and must therefore conform to the rules of 
competition (Competition Commission Appeal Tribunal, 2002). 
Under the Competition Act, 1998, the UK's Competition Commission is 
required to settle competition issues in line with European Community 
law. In the BetterCare case a tribunal had to decide whether publicly-
funded but privately-provided nursing and social care is covered by 
European competition law, an area of law on which the European Court 
had not yet ruled. The crucial question was whether the trust was 
engaging in economic activity.  
On the face of it, health and social services trusts bear the hallmarks of 
traditional public services. They were established in Northern Ireland to 
carry out the statutory duties of the Department of Health, Social 
Services and Personal Safety. They are provided with a block grant for 
this purpose and they redistribute resources by wholly or partly funding 
those who are eligible for help and would not otherwise be able to 
afford nursing and residential care.  
However, trusts are also the product of market-oriented reforms to 
health and social services. They were constructed as part of an internal 
market of competing public providers and on the basis of the 1989 
white paper, People First: Community Care in Northern Ireland for the 
1990s, have been encouraged to use independent providers so far as 
possible. (Working for Patients was the equivalent white paper in 
England and Wales). By March 2002 North & West had got rid of most 
of its own beds. Of 1019 residential and nursing home beds in the North 
& West trust area only 189 were owned and managed by the trust. The 
remaining 830 were managed by private and voluntary organisations, 
and of these the trust purchased care in 604 to fulfil its delegated duties 
towards the elderly population.  
In determining whether trust contracting is covered by competition law 
the tribunal had to assess its status in three categories of exemption: 
Are trusts sovereign powers exercising official authority? Are they 
undertakings, that is, are their activities economic? And if they are, 
would the application of competition law obstruct the provision of 
essential services?  
The tribunal rejected the suggestion that the trust was a sovereign 
power exercising official authority and therefore exempt. It said that 
this was not a case of ‘exercising … sovereign powers in the regulatory 
and administrative sphere" (Competition Commission Appeal Tribunal, 
2002, p62), which was normally classified by the European Court as ‘the 
exercise of official authority’ (Competition Commission Appeal Tribunal, 
2002, p63). Thus provision of social services was not an exercise of 
official authority. Furthermore, the fact that the trust was financed 
through taxation was not a ground for exemption because case law had 
established that the determining factor was economic activity, 
regardless of legal status or method of financing (Competition 
Commission Appeal Tribunal, 2002, p74): ‘neither public service 
obligations nor state financing can prevent an operator’s activities from 
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being classified as economic activities (Competition Commission Appeal 
Tribunal, 2002, p75). Therefore the question was whether or not the 
trust was engaging in economic activity.  
According to European case law ‘economic activity’ involves offering 
goods on the market. The tribunal decided that this definition was not 
sufficient to capture contracting out so they sought to arrive at their 
own definition of “the essence” of economic activity: ‘the essence of 
many, if not most, “economic” activities is the making of commercial 
contracts […] In making such contracts, it seems to us that North & 
West is necessarily engaged in transactions of an economic character’ 
(Competition Commission Appeal Tribunal, 2002, p66). Thus with 
questionable logic the tribunal held that since economic activity involves 
contracting, contracting is an economic activity. 
What of the social purposes behind trust activity? The tribunal found 
that the Trust’s activities had two dimensions, a ‘social dimension’ and a 
‘business dimension’: ‘although the funding which North & West 
provides has a social purpose, the way in which North & West carries 
out or delivers its functions is by using business methods’ (Competition 
Commission Appeal Tribunal, 2002, p77, emphasis in original) This 
interpolates a new analysis not present in European case law, reflecting 
perhaps the tribunal’s unshakeable conviction that contracting must be 
a commercial activity whatever cause it is put to. On the strength of this 
the tribunal concluded that partnership with the private sector is an 
economic not a social partnership, (Competition Commission Appeal 
Tribunal, 2002, p78) a judgement of considerable national significance 
in the context of public service reform.  
On the question of whether competition would damage the financial 
viability of a solidaristic (that is, redistributive) system, the tribunal 
declared:  
The argument presupposes that private residential care could not be 
provided – even in theory – from the resources of a resident with only a 
state pension, perhaps with further support from the family concerned 
or charitable bodies (Competition Commission Appeal Tribunal, 2002, 
p82)  
But ‘in theory’ this form of financial bailing-out is always a possibility, so 
that in effect the judgement renders the solidarity exemption unusable. 
Furthermore, the tribunal was persuaded that redistribution through 
tax-funded subsidies was not the same as the solidarity among 
members of an insurance scheme. Insurance scheme members spread 
risks and costs among themselves, whereas an external commercial 
contractor could not be a party to risk-sharing; therefore the type of 
redistribution involved in tax-funded eligibility payments could not 
provide a ground for exemption: ‘Such solidarity is not, in our view, to 
be imposed externally on external trading parties such as independent 
providers (Competition Commission Appeal Tribunal, 2002, p78, original 
emphasis). Here the tribunal points to the potential for risk and cost 
pooling to be dismantled under contracting-out arrangements, a logic it 
Structure and performance of not-for-profit health care organisations  
© NCCSDO 2008  76 
has in common with the report of the Federal Trade Commission and 
Department of Justice (2004) report on health care efficiency. The 
approach favours income support instead of redistribution through 
services in kind or services provided at less than market price.  
The tribunal’s general view was that ‘once the decision has been taken 
to rely on private sector transactions for the “delivery” of the services in 
question, it is logical to expect the rules applicable to private sector 
transactions to come into play’ (Competition Commission Appeal 
Tribunal, 2002, p83). In their minds this had more force given that 
trusts were established ‘in order to facilitate efficient management and 
a more market orientated approach’ (Competition Commission Appeal 
Tribunal, 2002, p64). In these circumstances it would be paradoxical to 
exclude trusts from competition law since they had been constituted to 
be disciplined by markets.  
The tribunal therefore overruled the Director of Fair Trading’s decision 
and ruled that contracting out for nursing care is an economic activity 
simply because it involves a contract. As for the social purposes of the 
Trust’s activity, the tribunal decided that partnerships with the private 
sector are economic not social. It could have ruled that although it was 
an economic activity, application of competition rules to the purchase of 
private nursing would damage trust financial viability. But it rejected 
this option on the grounds that more money could be sought from ‘the 
family concerned or charitable bodies.  
This judgement represents a Competition Commission tribunal’s attempt 
to interpret European competition law in an area on which the European 
Court has yet to rule. Nevertheless, it confirms, albeit provisionally, the 
general conclusion reached above (section, 4.2.3) that contracting-out 
may lead to a service coming under EU jurisdiction irrespective of the 
sectoral classification of the contractor. 
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Section 5  Recommendations for future research  
We set out below a brief rationale and recommendations for future 
research based on our study of nonprofit classification and review of the 
literature on nonprofit performance to date. 
Current government policy to contract out state run public services to 
nonprofit bodies raises the crucial issue of government control and in 
particular how public expenditure is audited and accounted for and how 
services are regulated to ensure that delivery is consistent with health 
policy core values and goals. Our review of the literature on government 
classification systems and contracting policy shows that policy on 
regulation of non-state providers of NHS services is inconsistent so that 
the regulatory structures and regulations which govern audit and 
accountability, access to information, and quality and access to health 
care are far from transparent.  For example, some nonprofit hospitals 
serving the NHS are currently classed as part of government while 
others are classed as private. Similarly, nonprofit organisations eligible 
to participate in the new primary care market can elect to be either 
public or private bodies linked to the NHS either by NHS (public) or 
commercial contracts.  This means that in either case, a different rule of 
law applies with consequences for the public interest. We also note that 
the government’s nonprofit policy is in transition. For example, an 
insolvency regime is still awaited for nonprofit foundation trusts and 
therefore the regulatory framework for essential health services is 
incomplete (Department of Health, 2006b). This variation raises key 
question about relations between the state, the citizen and new 
contracting parties. 
The regulation question is of relevance to our review of ownership and 
performance literature. We find that the performance literature usually 
does not and in most cases cannot address differences in access and 
entitlements in universal health care systems and rarely seeks to 
describe or control for confounding effects of heterogeneous regulatory 
frameworks. Furthermore, the majority of performance literature relates 
to the selective US health care system and involves comparisons 
between nonprofit and for-profit providers. The literature demonstrates 
a paucity of work in the area of public health planning for geographic 
populations. We find therefore that a great deal of the literature on the 
comparative performance of nonprofits omits basic descriptive data 
relating to regulatory context that is necessary to make sense of the 
findings.  
These findings inform our recommendation for research, which are as 
follows: 
1.  A range of  empirical studies  to develop a methodology to describe 
and evaluate  the regulatory frameworks which govern non-
governmental health service providers to the NHS in the following 
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areas of public control: audit and accountability for public 
expenditure and value for money;  access to and availability of 
information and data regarding contract price, value for money, the 
planning and modelling of services, the setting and monitoring of 
service entitlements including the application of the freedom of 
information act; the legal status of non-state providers to the NHS 
under competition law. 
2.  A literature review of studies of regulation with respect to the 
above key principles in public services other than health and in 
other countries. 
3.  An empirical study of the distributional consequences of contracting 
out of state functions to non NHS providers at both the level of the 
geographic population and the provider level for: 
a) workforce planning including training and education. 
b) workforce distribution and changes in workforce terms and  
conditions, with respect to payments to existing staff  and 
payments to new recruits. 
c) geographic population access to services measured by age 
standardised supply and utilisation.  
d) comparative studies of patterns of income and expenditure 
profiles among state, for-profit and nonprofit providers with 
respect to staffing administration, capital, marketing, surplus, 
training and education.      
Special attention will be paid to the data required to conduct evaluative 
research. In the light of the problems we have identified in the literature 
of undertaking robust comparisons between provider populations, there 
is a need to establish geographic-based planning norms that are 
separate from provider-based norms. Such norms will ensure that 
evaluation is not reliant on problematic and non valid measurements 
requiring complex adjustments such as case mix for comparisons 
among different provider populations. They will also recognise that 
admission rates and finished consultant episodes are inadequate proxy 
measures for the population's access to treatment and care because 
they do not take account of repeat admissions (Pollock and Vickers, 
1995). 
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Appendix 1: Algorithm for inclusion of studies 
identified by bibliographical databases and 
internet searches 
Years of literature 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Years of literature: 2001- June 2006 
English language 
Type of study: empirical 
Setting: developed industrialised 
country 
Topic: health and social care 
INCLUDE 
EXCLUDE 
NoNO
NoNO
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
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Appendix 2: Overview of reviewed literature 
 
Ref 
ID 
Author Setting and 
data 
Performance 
Measure 
Methods Results Other 
1 Ettner and 
Hermann  
USA, 1990 
 
All aged 
Medicare 
beneficiaries 
admitted to 
private general 
and psychiatric 
hospitals for a 
primary 
psychiatric 
diagnosis; 
longitudinal, 
patient-level 
data from official 
files, e.g. AHA  
Costs; 
controlling for 
quality of care 
by using 
rehospitalisati
on rates as a 
proxy 
Logistic and 
linear 
regression 
 
 
 
Case mix differences modest: 
populations looked quite similar 
in terms of primary diagnosis or 
prior hospitalisations; FPs 
actually treated poorer patients. 
NFP and FP hospitals had similar 
average total costs of care; 
longer length of stay and lower 
daily costs of NFPs were 
attributable to their other 
characteristics, e.g. medical 
school affiliation; neither were 
NFPs less efficient, nor were they 
more likely to treat a sicker or 
poorer patient population, or 
provide higher quality of care, 
leading to better patient 
outcomes; differences between 
NFP and FP patient populations 
in rehospitalisation rates were 
negligible.  
No support for concerns that FP 
growth leads to declining access 
and quality or contentions that 
NFPs are less efficient. Data are 
for the universe of Medicare 
patients hospitalised during the 
study period, thus results are 
nationally generalisable and 
statistical power is high 
 
Limitations: rehospitalisation rates 
not ideal as a measure of quality, 
since only imperfectly related to 
clinical outcomes; however, 
mortality rates not very 
informative for patients with 
psychiatric disorders 
 
5 Ginn USA, 2000 
 
Sample included 
all not-for-profit 
Integration 
and planning 
(extent to 
which 
hospitals 
Multiple 
regression  
Only a small proportion see for-
profit ownership of hospitals or 
health plans as having net social 
benefits. Respondents who could 
explain NFP ownership were 
Overall the key issue raised was 
the lack of understanding of 
ownership of hospitals and health 
plans – this is important as it 
relates to the public legitimacy of 
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and investor-
owned acute-
care hospitals 
provided 
health 
promotion 
services) 
typically more favourable 
towards NFPs in their 
assessment of performance than 
those who could not offer an 
explanation. These effects were 
most pronounced for perceptions 
of fair treatment and trustworthy 
behaviour, but understanding 
ownership is associated with a 
less favourable perception of the 
relative quality of services 
provided by NFPs. In the case of 
respondents who saw 
themselves as ‘empowered’ 
consumers, there were more 
negative impressions of the 
performance of NFPs relative to 
for-profits. Hence, market-
oriented reforms may be more 
likely to undermine the 
legitimacy of the NFP sector.  
the NFP sector, the implication 
being that if the NFP form were 
better understood, there would be 
less questioning of its legitimacy 
(e.g. fewer people would argue 
against the tax breaks given to 
NFPs) 
9 McKay et al USA, 1986 and 
1991 
 
Interstudy data 
for hospitals. 
Excludes 
conversions and 
mergers 
Efficiency Cost frontiers 
and regression 
analysis 
The results indicate that, in both 
1986 and 1991, mean 
inefficiency was highest for FP 
hospitals and lowest for NFP 
hospitals, with government 
hospitals falling in the middle. 
Moreover, between 1986 and 
1991, both FP and government 
hospitals had significantly less 
improvement in efficiency than 
NFP hospitals, all else equal. 
 
Limitations: Has control variables, 
but quality not addressed. 
Changes depend upon how large 
margins were before. Shows NFPs 
less inefficient than public or FPs 
in both years.  
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12 Harrington et 
al 
USA, 1998 
 
Data from state 
inspections of  
13 693 nursing 
facilities. 
Quality of care Multivariate 
regression 
Investor owned facilities 
averaged nearly 6 deficiencies 
per home, 46.5% higher than 
NFP facilities and 43% higher 
than public facilities. Nurse 
staffing was lower at investor-
owned homes.   
Controlled for case mix, facility 
characteristics and location. The 
finding that nurse staffing is lower 
at investor-owned homes is 
consistent with McGregor’s 
research in Canada [56]. 
15 Thorpe et al USA, 1991-1997 
 
Main data from 
AHA annual 
survey 
Access, 
uncompensate
d care 
OLS regression  Higher HMO penetration is 
associated with lower total 
margins (which may reduce the 
ability of hospitals to cross-
subsidize care for the uninsured) 
and is associated with lower 
levels of uncompensated care. 
Competition is also associated 
with lower margins. 
The authors hypothesise that 
higher HMO enrolment could 
reduce uncompensated care by 
limiting funding for the uninsured 
and by transferring patients from 
a fee-for-service basis (which 
involves high cost sharing) to 
HMOs (where cost sharing is 
relatively low), thereby reducing 
bad debts (one of the categories 
under which charitable care is 
frequently listed). 
16 Landon and 
Epstein 
USA, 1997/98 
Health plans in 
11 randomly 
selected states 
Random survey 
utilising a self-
report 
questionnaires 
to health plan 
representatives 
Quality of 
care/user 
satisfaction 
Bivariate and 
multivariate 
regression 
analyses 
The findings demonstrate that 
for-profit and not-for-profit plans 
appear to be more similar than 
dissimilar in many areas of 
management, although for-profit 
plans are more likely to use 
aggressive utilization review and 
have slightly less developed 
quality management systems.  
The authors suggest that the 
findings should reassure critics of 
for-profit health care 
 
Limitations: possible response 
bias 
17 Born and 
Simon 
USA, 1997 
 
Quality of care Multivariate 
analysis 
The more profitable plans 
achieve higher quality scores in 
later years. Profits may enable a 
Factors other than ownership 
influence performance. HMOs 
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Sample sizes of 
140-240 HMO 
plans; data from 
HEDIS and the 
National 
Association of 
Insurance 
Commissioners 
plan to pursue higher quality of 
care and invest in better 
management systems. Little 
systematic evidence that FP 
plans have different HEDIS 
scores than NFP plans 
need profits to ensure quality. 
 
19 Coid et al Scottish Health 
Boards 
 
In-depth 
interviews with 
health board 
officials in all 15 
Scottish health 
board authorities  
Staff 
perceptions re 
voluntary 
organisations 
in the health 
sector 
Qualitative 
study  
Formal and financial policies 
were viewed as insufficiently 
explicit.  Some health boards 
ensured accountability through 
audited accounts, annual reports 
and site visits while others 
thought this inappropriate for 
small organisations. Authors 
conclude the uncertainties of 
funding may impede the 
contribution of voluntary 
organisations.  Found ambiguous 
attitudes to improving 
accountability in the sector.   
The authors tentatively (though 
not unreasonably) conclude that 
the precarious position of 
voluntary organisations may have 
considerable impacts on patient 
welfare when withdrawn.  The 
view of the interviewees, reflected 
by the authors, is that stable 
funding would improve 
performance and outcomes.   
23 Sellick and 
Howell 
UK 
 
Survey among 
75 fostering 
agencies across 
public, private 
and voluntary 
sectors 
Organisational 
behaviour 
(innovative 
fostering 
practice)  
Interviews with 
agency staff 
and scrutiny of 
agency 
documentation 
4 factors underpin more 
innovative practice: the growth 
of partnership, ICT contribution 
to improved placement provision, 
near absence of independent 
evaluation of the effectiveness of 
fostering practice (exceptions 
were all in the voluntary sector) 
and the role of non governmental 
fostering  
Study may be unrepresentative in 
that it asked for positive feedback 
only, and examples of good 
practice.  The information 
gathered was selective in that it 
came from agency staff keen to 
publicise their work.  
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26 Horwitz  USA, 1988-98 
 
AHA survey data 
1988-98 and 
1990 U.S. 
Census 
 
Sample of non-
rural, acute 
care. Some 
federally-run 
hospitals were 
excluded. 
Medical 
services 
offered; 
regulatory 
tools 
Multivariate 
analyses 
FP, NFP, and government 
hospitals offer different types of 
services. Evidence supports the 
theory that government hospitals 
are hospitals of last resort as 
they are more likely to offer 
unprofitable services that are 
generally needed by poor, 
underinsured patients. FPs seek 
profits and avoid offering 
unprofitable services more than 
the others. FPs exhibited 
dramatic responsiveness to 
financial incentives. NFP 
hospitals are the intermediate 
type, providing more profitable 
services than government 
hospitals and more unprofitable 
services than FP hospitals. 
Private ownership and charitable 
orientation both seem to matter.  
Legal categories of corporate form 
are strongly correlated with 
behavioural differences. Findings 
imply that hospitals have different 
priorities and implement different 
organisational goals. NFPs act 
differently than FPs in providing 
services, likely because they have 
different missions. No hospital 
form can substitute any other. The 
findings provide a new justification 
for the not-for-profit tax 
exemption for hospitals, and also 
suggest new uses for ownership 
categories as regulatory tools. 
 
Study limited to metropolitan 
areas only. 
 
27 Dellana and 
Glascoff  
USA 
 
Random sample 
survey (with 
Patient 
Satisfaction 
Questionnaire); 
581 respondents  
(computer 
owners) 
User 
satisfaction 
(measured as: 
access to 
care, 
availability of 
resources, 
technical 
quality, 
financial 
aspects of 
care, overall 
Chi Square 
analysis and 
ANOVA  
 
Consumer satisfaction with 
health care did vary with profit 
status. Individuals in not-for-
profit HMO plans reported 
greater satisfaction with aspects 
of health care than those in for-
profit HMO plans 
 
Findings support those of other 
studies, namely that for-profit 
HMOs are not providing the same 
level of patient care/satisfaction 
as NFP HMOs (e.g. Himmelstein 
[362]). 
Limitations: Self-report survey 
likely to have subjective bias and 
possible error; 
Likert-type scale not completely 
accurate measure for use in 
interval-level statistical analysis; 
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satisfaction, 
continuity of 
care and 
humaneness) 
sample not representative, but 
cross-section of middle- and upper 
middle-class Americans (computer 
owners); small subgroups in 
sample 
34 McFarland et 
al 
Oregon, 1994-
1997 
 
Data from the 
Oregon Client 
Process 
Monitoring 
System.  
Subjects were 
Medicaid clients 
enrolled in the 
Oregon Health 
Plan before 
substance abuse 
treatment 
managed care, N 
= 1751) or after 
managed care, N 
= 14,813). 
Clinical 
outcomes for 
clients with 
substance 
abuse 
problems 
before and 
after managed 
care 
Regression 
analyses 
(bivariate and 
logistic) 
With the exception of 
readmission, there were no 
notable differences in outcomes 
between the fee-for-service era 
clients versus those in capitated 
chemical dependency treatment. 
There were at most minor 
differences among various 
managed care systems (such as 
for-profit vs not-for-profit). 
However, duration of Medicaid 
eligibility was a powerful 
predictor of positive outcomes. 
Medicaid managed care does not 
appear to have had an adverse 
impact on outcomes for clients 
with substance abuse problems. 
On the other hand, state policies 
influencing Medicaid enrollment 
may have substantial impact on 
chemical dependency treatment 
outcomes. 
 
35 Parrot et al Manchester and 
Newcastle 
 
Two additions 
services 
Quality of care  Users 
completed 
questionnaires 
at admission 
and 6 months 
later.   
Both services delivered a flexible 
needs-based service to very 
disadvantaged population at a 
reasonable cost and were 
associated with statistically 
significant reductions in drinking. 
This study did not set out to 
compare the services and tells us 
little if anything about the 
distinctive value or otherwise of 
NFP. Indicates that both the NFP 
and NHS service were comparable 
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and effective.   
37 Mays et al USA, 1994 
 
Non-random 
sample of 
counties; Cross-
sectional data 
from official 
statistics 
Integration 
and planning 
(public health 
practice, 
forming of co-
operative 
alliances) 
Multivariate 
analysis 
The incentives for co-operation 
vary with health plan ownership 
and market structure. National 
NFP plans and Blue Shield Blue 
Cross NFP plans significantly 
more likely to engage in alliances 
with public health agencies than 
national FP plans. Locally owned 
FP plans also appeared more 
likely than national FP plans to 
engage in alliances. The number 
of competing HMOs in the 
market was negatively 
associated with alliance 
participation whereas HMO 
market penetration had a 
positive effect on alliance 
participation. National NFPs 
appeared significantly more likely 
than FPs to participate in 
alliances with public health 
agencies, but this difference was 
larger for clinical alliances than 
for nonclinical alliances. FP plans 
respond primarily to economic 
incentives for participating in 
local public health activities, and 
such incentives are limited for 
plans that operate on a regional 
or national scale. 
These findings call into question 
the ability of alliances to integrate 
the practice of public health and 
medicine on a broad national 
scale. National FP plans may find 
more efficient ways of acquiring 
needed public health resources 
and expertise, e.g. by employing 
own public health professionals. In 
contrast, national NFP plans may 
have non-economic reasons for 
cooperating that override any 
diseconomies of scale. Recent 
trends such as the for-profit 
conversion of NFP plans and 
acquisition of locally owned health 
plans by national corporations, are 
likely to dampen alliance 
participation further.  
Limitations: No generalisations 
beyond the study population 
possible. Study cannot determine 
the causation of the associations 
(are FPs less interested in public 
health activities or do public 
health agencies prefer NFP and 
locally owned institutions because 
these organisations are assumed 
to be more responsive to 
community priorities and needs?). 
Role of Medicaid programmes 
could not be disentangled. 
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46 Crampton et 
al 
New Zealand 
 
Nationally 
representative 
sample of 
primary care 
practices 
Organisational 
characteristics 
including 
staffing ratios; 
range of 
services and 
management; 
financing and 
governance. 
Statistical 
comparisons of 
sample means 
using t-tests. 
Community-governed NFPs 
employed higher proportions of 
women, Maori and Pacific staff, 
including both doctors and 
nurses. NFPs provided a different 
range of services and although 
there were less likely to have 
specific items of equipment, they 
were more likely to have written 
policies on quality, complaints 
and responses to critical events, 
and to carry out locality service 
planning and assessment of 
community needs. 
 
47 Leone and 
Van Horn 
USA, 1990-2002 
 
Data on 1,204 
hospitals and 
8,179 hospital-
year 
observations. 
Financial data 
from accounts. 
Spending 
behaviour 
Regression 
analysis and 
tests of the 
distribution of 
earnings by 
Burgstahler 
and Dichev 
[Burgstahler, 
D., Dichev, I., 
1997. 
NFPs use discretionary spending 
and accounting accruals to 
manage profits. They use 
discretionary accruals (e.g., 
adjustments to the third-party-
allowance, and allowance for 
doubtful accounts) to meet 
earnings objectives. This means 
that previous evidence that NFPs 
show less variation in income 
may at least partly be explained 
by an accounting phenomenon. 
NFPs deliberately manage profits 
downwards because don't want to 
upset donors. But this means that 
it is not straightforward to use 
accounts to compare NFPs and FP, 
due to incentives to fudge (CEOs, 
tax, donors, etc).  
Limitations: Sample only includes 
hospitals that issue publicly traded 
debt, which rules out many NFPs 
since they are not debt financed. 
49 Crampton et 
al 
New Zealand  
 
Third sector 
primary care 
organisations  
Characteristics 
of practices 
including 
demographics 
of population 
served; 
provision of 
Face-to-face 
interviews with 
managers and 
other key 
informants 
using a semi-
structured 
Practices differed in the extent to 
which they served minority 
ethnic groups, were located in 
deprived areas, or used 
population approaches to the 
organisation and delivery of 
services. Populations were highly 
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services 
including 
targeting of 
high needs 
populations 
and 
geographic 
location 
interview 
schedule 
atypical compared to the NZ 
average being young and largely 
non-European. They were also 
generally located in low-income 
areas with high levels of need, 
and user charges were lower. 
Little evidence on health 
outcomes or the efficiency of 
provision. 
53 Charlesworth Milton Keynes, 
UK 
Integration 
and planning 
(development 
of 
relationships 
between 
statutory and 
voluntary 
organisations)   
Mapping of 
voluntary 
organisations 
within primary 
care. 
Qualitative 
interviews with 
senior 
managers  
Identifies tensions in 
partnerships.  A particular 
problem has been the pace and 
scale of change. Demands for 
monitoring and audit are forcing 
organisations to focus more on 
their own core business while 
also required to collaborate more 
and be more outward looking.   
Through a combination of 
mapping of structures, and 
interviews, highlights tensions 
around ‘partnership’ policy, 
identifies the relatively weak 
position of the voluntary sector in 
the UK, and the threat to any 
distinctive role, in relation to the 
more powerful statutory sector. 
56 McGregor et 
al 
British Colombia 
 
 
Staffing data for 
167 nursing 
homes 
Quality of care 
(staffing 
ratios) 
Comparison of 
the mean 
number of 
hours per 
resident-day 
provided by 
direct-care 
staff in NFP vs 
for-profit 
facilities, after 
adjusting for 
facility size 
(number of 
beds) and level 
The mean number of hours per 
resident-day was higher in the 
not-for-profit facilities than in the 
for-profit facilities for both 
direct-care and support staff and 
for all facility levels of care. Not-
for-profit status was associated 
with an estimated 0.34 more 
hours per resident-day provided 
by direct-care staff and 0.23 
more hours per resident-day 
provided by support staff.  
The authors point out this is 
consistent with US findings and 
suggest that in both countries the 
financial imperatives of for profit 
ownership in nursing homes care 
operate in a similar manner. They 
argue that the care demands of 
residents in both sectors are likely 
to be similar given that managers 
of both have an interest in 
maintaining a volume of more 
dependent clients to ensure 
adequate funding levels, though 
they acknowledge the possibility 
that the care demands of 
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of care. 
 
residents in for profit facilities 
might be lower in ways not 
measurable at the facility level of 
care. 
59 
and 
241 
McPherson  Maryland, 2001-
2003 
 
 
Role of 
responsivenes
s to users and 
mission 
statements; 
governance 
and 
accountability 
Case study of 
one failed 
conversion of a 
NFP into a FP 
based on 
interviews and 
documentary 
review  
Barriers to conversion consisted 
e.g. in the failure to exercise due 
diligence and conflicts of 
interest. Commissioner asserted 
that a NFP board must meet 
higher standards applied by 
insurance commissioner or 
attorney general; inconclusive 
findings on whether the 
proposed conversion and sale 
would have adverse impacts on 
access to, quality or cost of 
health care in the state. 
Case-study character only, but 
lessons could be learnt for other 
states and all types of NFP health 
care organisations 
 
60 Schlesinger 
et al 
USA 
 
Telephone 
survey of 5000 
respondents.  
Public 
perceptions 
Regression 
models  
Only a small proportion of the US 
population see for-profit 
ownership of hospitals or health 
plans as having net social 
benefits. In general, 
respondents, who could explain 
NFP ownership were typically 
more favourable towards NFPs in 
their assessment of performance 
than respondents who could not 
offer an explanation. These 
effects were most pronounced 
for perceptions of fair treatment 
and trustworthy behaviour, but 
understanding ownership is 
associated with a less favourable 
Overall the key issue raised was 
the lack of understanding of 
ownership of hospitals and health 
plans – this is important as it 
relates to the public legitimacy of 
the NFP sector, the implication 
being that if the NFP form were 
better understood, there would be 
less questioning of its legitimacy. 
 
Study population over 
representative of the young, the 
better educated, and high-income 
strata. 
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perception of the relative quality 
of services provided by NFPs. In 
the case of respondents who saw 
themselves as ‘empowered’ 
consumers, there were more 
negative impressions of the 
performance of NFPs. Hence, 
market-oriented reforms may be 
more likely to undermine the 
legitimacy of the NFP sector.  
61 Reeves and 
Ford  
USA 
 
Sample of 57 FP 
and 20 NFP 
health service 
organisations  
 
Financial 
performance 
measures 
(equity 
growth, 
financial 
flexibility, and 
financial 
efficiency) 
Linear 
regression 
analysis  
 
Results indicate that FPs and 
NFPs share a common strategic 
capacity profile. For NFPs, risk 
taking, multiplexity of decision-
making and control were 
strategic capabilities of a higher 
order than for FPs. The model 
with financial efficiency as the 
dependent variable explains the 
most differences in financial 
performance between FP and 
NFP firms. 
Small sample size; Only cross-
sectional data used; Lack of a 
continuous dependent variable 
 
64 Seago California, 1997-
99 
 
Data for acute 
care general 
hospitals from 
California Office 
of Statewide 
Health Planning 
and 
Staffing ratio  Six regression 
models were 
estimated 
using pooled 
data from the 3 
years.  
For-profit hospitals had fewer RN 
productive hours for medical-
surgical nursing, and select 
corporate owners, unrelated to 
profit status, had consistently 
fewer RN productive hours for 
medical-surgical nursing. For-
profit hospitals and systems 
behaved differently in the health 
care market environment of the 
late 1990s. Select NFP systems 
With minimum staffing ratios 
scheduled to be implemented in 
January 2004, this study provided 
baseline data for evaluating the 
impact of minimum staffing ratios 
in California. 
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Development  were also using significantly less 
RN staffing. As discharges go up, 
the need for RN hours increases. 
65 Carlson et al USA, 1998 
 
Data derived 
from the 1998 
National Home 
and Hospice 
Care Survey 
 
Quality of 
care/access 
Regression 
analysis 
Patients of for-profit hospices 
received a significantly narrower 
range of services than patients of 
NFP hospices. This result is 
driven by patients of for-profit 
hospices receiving significantly 
fewer types of hospice services 
that federal regulations term 
"noncore" or more discretionary 
services. 
 
66 Johnson USA, c. 1992- 
2002 
 
Blue Cross data 
for NFP HMOs. 
FP HMO data 
tracked by 
Sherlock 
Company. FP 
cost and profit 
data from CMS 
Financial 
performance, 
access to 
capital 
Comparison of 
NFP and FP 
financial data 
NFP’s lower operating margins 
probably reflect their corporate 
missions to serve their 
communities by minimizing the 
cost of coverage and their ability 
to invest all gains back into the 
company for the future benefit of 
their customers, while FPs must 
generate higher margins for 
shareholders. NFP plans pay out 
more and spend less on 
administration. NFPs have used 
operational and investment gains 
to build and retain a stronger 
capital position than FPs. 
Says profits are not an indicator of 
ability to access funds for capital 
investment as NFPs have other 
sources of finance. Notes normal 
financial measures of performance 
are not appropriate/limited use to 
evaluate NFPs. 
69 Schneider et 
al 
USA, 1997 
 
Standardized 
Medicare HEDIS 
Access to 
care/rates of 
use of 12 
high-cost 
 Contrary to the authors’ 
expectations about the likely 
effects of financial incentives, the 
rates of use of high-cost 
Case mix adjustment 
 
Limitations: the study did not 
examine diagnosis or include data 
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data on 
3,726,065 
Medicare 
beneficiaries 65 
years of age or 
older enrolled in 
254 health plans 
operative 
procedures 
operative procedures were not 
lower among beneficiaries 
enrolled in for-profit health 
plans. After adjustment for 
enrolee case mix and other 
characteristics of the plans, the 
for-profit plans had significantly 
higher rates for 2 of 12 
procedures and had lower rates 
for none. The geographic 
locations of the health plans did 
not explain these findings. 
on whether the rates of procedure 
use were objectively justifiable. 
70 Hall and 
Conover  
California, 
Georgia, 
Missouri, 
Virginia, c.1993-
2002 
Health policy 
impacts (e.g. 
service 
accessibility, 
affordability, 
geographic 
coverage) of 
Blue Cross 
conversions 
from NFP to 
for-profit 
status 
Case studies of 
BC conversions 
based on 
confidential 
interviews and 
a review of the 
published 
literature and 
available 
documents 
Conversion increases pressures 
to generate more profit, which 
may lead to either negative or 
positive changes in operations. 
To date, there is little evidence 
that converted plans have raised 
rates faster than medical cost 
trends or have sharply changed 
medical underwriting policies. 
Instead, the most visible effect 
of conversion is more intense 
efforts to negotiate deeper price 
discounts with providers.  
On balance, Blue Cross 
conversions have so far not 
caused serious harm to statewide 
measures of health care 
affordability and accessibility. 
Even if the historical record is 
clear elsewhere, each state and 
each conversion is different. 
Hence, it is difficult to predict the 
actual effects in a particular state. 
71 O’Neill et al California, 1998-
99 
 
Data on 1098 
nursing homes 
from the 
California Office 
Quality of care Multivariate 
regression  
Proprietary homes in California 
had significantly lower quality of 
care than nonproprietary homes. 
A stratified analysis revealed 
that, controlling for resident, 
facility, and market 
characteristics, profits located 
within the highest 14% of the 
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of Statewide 
Health Planning 
and 
Development 
proprietary sector's profit 
distribution were associated with 
significantly more total 
deficiencies and serious 
deficiencies. This relationship 
was not found in nonproprietary 
facilities. Other factors related to 
deficiencies included the ethnic 
mix of residents and facility size. 
72 Schlesinger 
et al 
USA, 1999 
 
Nationally 
representative 
survey of NFP 
and for-profit 
HMO plans 
Community 
benefits  
Development 
of a conceptual 
framework for 
identifying 
these activities  
NFP plans exceed their for-profit 
counterparts on some, but not 
all, aspects of community benefit 
activity. The most consistent 
ownership-related differences 
involve redistributive programs 
(subsidized services and general 
philanthropy), commitments to 
medical research, and services 
that benefit the entire local 
population, beyond the plan's 
enrolees. Other forms of 
community benefits show mixed 
or modest differences between 
NFP and FP plans. Unexpectedly, 
for-profit plans appear more 
active in helping consumers deal 
with information asymmetries. 
 
75 Grabowski 
and Hirth 
USA, 1995-96 
 
Data collected 
with 16,978 
unique nursing 
Quality of care Multiple 
regression 
This study finds that an increase 
in NFP market share improves 
for-profit and overall nursing 
home quality, supporting an 
asymmetric model.   
Starts from the basis that 
empirical research on this topic 
needs to account for the share of 
NFP nursing homes in the market. 
The findings are consistent with 
the hypothesis that NFPs serve as 
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home surveys.  
Primary source 
was the Online 
Survey, 
Certification and 
Reporting 
system. Four 
other data 
sources used.  
a quality signal for uninformed 
nursing home consumers.   
77 Crawford et 
al 
Philadelphia and 
neighbouring 
hospitals in 
Pennsylvania, 
1997-99  
 
Inpatient data 
set from PHC4; 
Hospital 
discharge 
database: 
1,617,581 
discharges from 
49 acute-care 
medical school 
hospitals 
Quality of care Longitudinal 
analyses using 
time series 
data; trend 
analyses (5 
hospital 
specific 
analyses) 
 
The 2 medical school hospitals 
that became for-profit 
experienced decreases in volume 
and resource intensity, coupled 
at one with an increase in 
severity. However, these 
patterns were produced more by 
the system's financial instability 
than by consolidation or 
conversion. 
Stresses the importance of time 
series vs. point data 
 
Conclusions are important in 
relation to UK Foundation Trusts. 
78 Kessler and 
McClellan 
USA, 1985-1996 
 
Various official 
data sources 
Efficiency  Regression 
analyses in 
three stages 
 
Effects of ownership status are 
quantitatively important. Areas 
with a presence of for-profit 
hospitals have approximately 
2.4% lower levels of hospital 
expenditures, but virtually the 
same patient health outcomes. 
Controls for selection bias/ patient 
population and spill over effects. 
Use of longitudinal data. 
Limitations: complexities of 
Medicare;  could have taken 
advantage of higher prices for 
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Conclude that for-profit hospitals 
have important spillover benefits 
for medical productivity. 
rehab to shift activity mix, only 
heart treatments, only net 
expenditure, could have done less 
charity work. Does show Medicare 
reimbursements systems are 
based on average costs in area so 
if more FPs that pay lower rates 
and employ few staff, this will 
affect reimbursement for whole 
area. Like other studies, it 
indicates the complexity and 
variations in payment 
mechanisms. 
80 Tu and 
Reschovsky 
USA, 1996-98 
 
2 national 
surveys of 
13,271 persons 
under 65 with 
employer-
sponsored 
insurance who 
obtained health 
care through an 
HMO.  
Users’ 
assessment of 
quality of care 
Logistic 
regressions 
Members of NFP plans were more 
likely to be satisfied with their 
care than members of for-profit 
plans,. Members in poor or fair 
health were more likely than 
healthy members to express 
dissatisfaction with the quality of 
for-profit care.  
Limitation: the study did not 
include an objective assessment 
of the quality of care. 
81 Deneffe and 
Mason 
Virginia, 1986-87 
 
All NFP hospitals 
(N = 70 for both 
years data, N = 
144 for pooled 
sample). Uses 
Uncompensat
ed care 
Regression 
methods with 
complex 
models and 
controls 
Latent variable 
estimation 
Rejects the hypothesis that NFP 
hospitals maximize profits (i.e. 
maximize rents for a set of 
agents who ‘control’ the 
hospital). Also rejects pure 
welfare (output) maximization. 
These results, combined with 
They note that there is cost 
shifting from charity cases to 
private cases when charity case 
load rises. Therefore cost 
reductions may be inflated if this 
leads to cost shunting. Any 
attempts to restrict Medicare and 
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revenue reports 
to the state but 
does not explain 
other data 
sources 
other evidence are consistent 
with the hypothesis that these 
hospitals consider both profits 
and output as objectives. 
Mergers due to oversupply but 
more likely to be with FP if NFP 
has no hospital in area. Ability 
and incentives to merge depend 
upon regulations and charter but 
some board directors profit from 
mergers. 
MedicAid and therefore increase 
charity cases will have 
implications for insurance prices. 
Points out that prices not profit 
margins are the important 
variable for understanding NFPs 
since their lower margins may 
reflect their tax free status (i.e. do 
not have to include an element for 
tax). 
Controls for case mix (3 proxy 
variables). 
88 Town et al USA, 1987-2001 
 
HMO level data 
from InterStudy 
publications 
Conversion 
studies 
Regression 
analysis 
Conversions to FP status do not 
significantly impact HMO prices, 
profit margins, use of hospital 
days or ambulatory visits, and 
the provision of Medicare and 
Medicaid products. 
Notes however that Blues offer 
both managed care and other 
indemnity insurance products and 
it is unclear how conversion 
impacts on this and whether the 
two can be separated clearly in 
the data. 
89 Farsi  California, 1990-
1998 
 
Sample of 
private hospitals. 
Uses OSHPD 
Patient Discharge 
Data and 
Hospital 
Disclosure Data 
for hospitals’ 
financial reports.  
Quality of 
care (for 
Acute 
Myocardial 
Infarction 
and 
Congestive 
Heart Failure 
patients) 
after 
conversion in 
ownership 
Regression 
analyses 
Conversion in either direction 
may have adverse health care 
outcomes. But the results 
suggest that converted hospitals 
have experienced quality 
changes before conversion and 
that ignoring these changes may 
bias the estimates of conversion 
effects. Hospitals that converted 
to FP form show an increase in 
AMI mortality rates, while those 
converted to NFP status indicate 
an increase in CHF mortality 
Health outcomes in different 
diagnostic groups may represent 
different dimensions of hospital 
quality. 
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outcomes. 
90 Chakravarty 
et al  
USA, 1984-2000 
 
AHA panel data 
Entry and 
exit rates of 
public, for-
profit, and 
NFP hospitals 
Econometric 
analyses 
For-profits have higher entry 
rates and were more responsive 
to changes in demand than NFPs. 
Both FP and NFP entry are 
negatively related to hospital 
wages. For-profits have higher 
exit rates and are more sensitive 
to demand shifts than NFPs. The 
difference between FP and NFP 
exit rates is greater in mixed 
markets. 
In markets with growing elderly 
populations, the probability that 
an exiting hospital is for-profit is 
dramatically reduced. 
Evidence consistent with the 
theory of for-profit marginality 
95 Silverman 
and Skinner 
USA, 1989-98 
 
Sample from the 
MEDPAR file of 
Medicare claims, 
use of DRG 79, 
14 and 15. Data 
from AHA, Health 
Service Areas 
and Medicare 
Cost Reports 
Use of 
upcoding 
practices 
Trend analysis 
and cross 
tabulation with 
other data for 
incidence of 
upcoding; 
Cross sectional 
analysis for 
impact of 
market 
structure; 
Regression 
analysis 
 
Between 1989 and 1996, the 
percentage point share of the 
most generous DRG for 
pneumonia and respiratory 
infections rose by 10 points 
among NFP hospitals, 23 points 
among FP hospitals, and 37 
points in hospitals converting to 
FP status. NFP upcoding was also 
higher in markets with a larger 
FP hospital share. Upcoding 
appears to reflect both risk-
taking by administrators and a 
closer alignment between the 
goals of the administration and 
the behaviour of the clinical staff. 
While differences in upcoding 
Upcoding cannot be generalised to 
all treatment categories. 
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reflect ownership status, there is 
also strong regional variation. 
98 Beaulieu Delaware, 
Maryland, and 
District of 
Columbia, c. 
1998-2002 
 
Official material 
of CareFirst  
conversion 
application  
Effects of NFP 
conversion  
Single case 
study 
NFP conversion is a managed 
care market phenomenon that 
has frequently occurred as a 
prelude to merger or acquisition 
with a for-profit company. 
Perceived competitive pressures 
have raised questions about the 
long term viability of NFPs and 
also about the justification of tax 
exempt status.  
Finding: Governance structures 
are important for controlling 
social mission. 
Limitations: did not examine 
traditional areas of charitable 
care; insufficient data to examine 
premium and provider 
reimbursement policy. 
99 Gaynor and 
Vogt 
California, 1997 Conversion 
study  
Structural 
model of 
demand and 
pricing in the 
hospital 
industry, then 
simulation of 
the effect of 
the 1997 
merger of two 
hospital chains. 
In the simulation, where the 
merger creates a near monopoly, 
they found that prices rise by up 
to 53%, and the predicted price 
increase would not be 
substantially smaller were the 
chains not-for-profit. 
Their concern is with implications 
for regulation of mergers. External 
factors determine performance as 
reflected in prices and financial 
performance. Conclude that since 
NFPs would also put up prices, 
courts should not necessarily 
reject government requests to 
block mergers. Thus far have 
allowed mergers to go ahead on 
basis that NFPs and won't take 
advantage of oligopolistic 
situation. 
100 Bloom et al Colorado, 1995-
97  
(2-year post-
capitation 
Quality of 
care (use of 
antipsychotic
s) 
Logistic 
regression 
Enrolment in HMOs is associated 
with a lower probability of using 
antipsychotics. Consumers 
enrolled in capitated programs, 
Suggests that capitation can affect 
the use of substitute services not 
in the capitation rate. Since the 
medication benefit was not 
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period) 
 
Random sample 
of 282 Medicaid 
beneficiaries 
over 18 
diagnosed with 
schizophrenia 
from 1994 
Medicaid files 
and 1995-96 
admission files 
from Community 
Mental Health 
Centers (CMHCs) 
both NFP and FP firms, have a 
higher probability of using 
atypical antipsychotics while 
their enrolment in HMOs has no 
impact on their access to atypical 
antipsychotics. In this setting, 
capitation of mental health 
services is the major incentive to 
adopt atypical antipsychotics. 
Capitation of mental health 
services provides incentives for 
more cost-effective treatments. 
HMO enrolment was not a crucial 
factor to determine access to 
atypical antipsychotic 
prescriptions. 
included in the capitation 
programme, there are incentives 
for the capitated systems to 
prescribe atypical antipsychotics 
as they are more effective and 
may actually reduce the rate and 
length of hospitalisations. Did not 
determine whether the increased 
use of atypical antipsychotics 
leads to better outcomes for 
consumers. 
Limitations: socio-demographic 
characteristics of subjects were 
not equivalent across the three 
different programmes (FFS, not-
for-profit DC and for-profit 
MBHO); unobservable 
characteristics that differ among 
the three programmes may also 
be attributed to different use 
patterns of antipsychotics; the 
fact that HMOs were not available 
in every area and that there were 
unobservable consumer 
characteristics associated with 
their preference of HMOs result in 
selection bias. The small number 
of enrolees limits understanding of 
how other characteristics may 
interact with HMO enrolment to 
affect access to atypical 
antipsychotics. 
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101 Rosko USA, 1990-1999.  
 
Data from the 
AHA Annual 
Survey and 
Medicare Cost 
Reports 
(N = 616 
hospitals) 
Financial 
efficiency 
Stochastic 
frontier 
analysis 
Inefficiency decreased with HMO 
penetration. Increases in 
inefficiency were associated with 
for-profit ownership and 
Medicare share of admissions. 
Panel design. The study points to 
difficulties in funding graduate 
medical education under the HMO 
system. Analysis found that the 
results were moderately sensitive 
to the specification of the teaching 
output variable. Thus, although 
the SFA technique can be useful 
for detecting differences in 
inefficiency between groups of 
hospitals (i.e., those with high 
versus those with low Medicare 
shares or for-profit vs NFP 
hospitals), its relatively low 
precision indicates it should not be 
used for exact estimates of the 
magnitude of differences 
associated with inefficiency-effects 
variables. 
Limitations: there is no theoretical 
justification for the basis of the 
inefficiency estimate 
102 Vitaliano  New York State, 
1993 
 
228 NFP nursing 
homes 
Profit 
maximisation
; quality of 
care 
Regression 
model 
(estimation of 
a long-run cost 
function) 
79 % of the homes operate at 
output levels consistent with 
profit maximisation; only 21% 
behave as if they maximize a 
utility function instead of a profit 
function. There is no difference 
in profit-maximising behaviour 
among voluntary, religious or 
government NFPs. Utility 
maximizing homes provide a 
higher level of resident care. 
Findings are consistent with a 
growing suspicion about 
increasing commercialisation in 
the health care sector and the 
view that many NFPs are really 
“for-profits in disguise” (Weisbrod 
1998). It is possible that NFP 
managers and employees can 
appropriate part of the return on 
capital otherwise due to 
shareholders, in addition to the 
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subsidies provided by tax-exempt 
operation. In addition, NFP status 
may signal higher quality and 
reputation to prospective 
residents. One consequence of 
widespread profit-maximising 
behaviour is that efforts to 
constrain the cost of health care 
by reducing reimbursement is 
likely to result in reduced access 
to government provided health 
care as firms adjust the mix of 
patients to include more private-
pay and fewer Medicaid residents. 
Limitations: Left unanswered is 
the question of whether NFP 
managers are duplicitous or are 
reacting to a harsh regulatory 
environment 
Data limitations: only few religious 
and government sponsored homes 
in sample 
103 Duggan  California, 1990-
1996 
 
Data from 
California Office 
of Statewide 
Health Planning 
and 
Development 
(OSHPD). 
Hospital 
response to 
financial 
constraints/c
hanges in 
financial 
incentives or 
reimburseme
nt 
Regression 
analyses 
Shows that NFP hospitals in FP 
intensive areas are significantly 
more responsive to the change 
than where few FPs. Differences 
in financial constraints and other 
observable factors correlated 
with FP hospital penetration do 
not explain the heterogeneous 
response. This suggests that 
NFPs mimic the behavior of 
private FPs when they actively 
Has very useful background data 
on the sector. Changes in 
incentives led FPs taking insured 
low income patients at expense of 
public hospitals. 
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compete with them. 
107 Vita and 
Sacher  
Santa Cruz, 
California, 1986-
96 
 
 
Price increase 
after merger 
Ex post event 
study 
approach; 
comparison of 
pre-and post-
merger prices 
charged by the 
merged entity 
and one 
remaining rival 
(econometric 
analysis) 
Controlling for case mix, input 
prices, and other cost- and 
demand-side characteristics, the 
results suggest strongly that the 
merger was followed by 
significant price increases. 
hypothesis rejected that these 
price increases reflect higher 
post-merger quality. 
 
These price increases suggest that 
mergers involving NFP hospitals 
are a legitimate focus of antitrust 
concern. 
 
110 Harrison and 
Lybecker  
USA 
 
Theoretical 
modelling only 
Prices, 
quantity of 
patients 
served, 
service to the 
uninsured, 
and quality of 
care 
Differentiated 
Bertrand model 
comparing 
equilibrium 
behaviour 
between 
competing 
hospitals (FP 
and NFP) 
The specification of the NFP 
motive greatly impacts the 
results. The impact on prices 
clearly depends not on the firm’s 
NFP status, but on its objective 
function. When the motive is 
maximizing output, prices rise 
for both hospitals as the NFP 
moves away from its NFP 
motive. However, if the NFP 
cares about serving the 
uninsured, prices in the market 
fall. Finally, when hospitals 
compete on price and quality, 
more emphasis on profits results 
in an increase in price at the for-
profit hospital and a decrease in 
price at the NFP hospital.  
Results suggest that previous 
theoretical and empirical work 
may be sensitive to assumptions 
about the NFP motive and that the 
importance of the NFP motive has 
been underestimated. It is 
important to control for the 
percentage of uninsured and 
quality of care, in addition to 
ownership and teaching status. An 
effective analysis must consider 
the specification of the NFP 
motive. 
Limitations: the NFP hospital’s 
weight on profit maximisation is 
taken as given, the question of 
how NFP hospitals choose this 
weight is not addressed here.  
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114 Benz USA and UK 
 
USA National 
longitudinal 
study of youth 
and British 
household panel 
survey. 
Restricted to 
individuals that 
either work in a 
private for-profit 
firm or in a 
private NFP firm. 
Staff 
satisfaction 
Descriptive 
statistical 
analysis  
NFP employees are significantly 
more satisfied with their work 
than FP employees, even when 
allowance is made for a range of 
work-related variables. Analyses 
also exploit the panel structure 
of these surveys to analyse 
circumstances in which people 
move in and out of NFP 
employment.  These effects are 
robust across countries. Bias 
may have arisen from the 
peculiarities of the NFP sector 
because it is highly concentrated 
in one single industry, but when 
attempts are made to control for 
this, statistically-significant 
differences are still found 
between for-profits and NFPs.  
No comparisons are drawn in 
terms of level of satisfaction 
between these respondents and 
those working in the public sector, 
those who are self-employed, and 
those working in a family-owned 
business. 
Alternative explanations could be 
possible but cannot be tested 
using this data set, such as the 
possibility that NFP workers have 
fewer stress-related experience at 
work, or the possibility that 
subjective evaluations of the 
social utility of jobs can explain 
differentials in job satisfaction. 
115 Currie  California, 1989-
99 
 
Data from 
California’s 
Hospital 
Disclosure Data 
(CADD)  
Staff 
conditions 
Multivariate 
regressions 
Nurses experienced few declines 
in wages following takeovers, but 
did see increases in number of 
patients per nurse. The authors 
show that their results are 
consistent with an extended 
version of the monopsony model 
that considers effort and allows 
for revenue shifts following a 
takeover.   The two largest 
chains had much in common with 
each other despite their different 
ownership status.  Finally, they 
find that these changes were 
Concludes nominal ownership 
matters less than fundamental 
economic incentives.   
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similar in the largest for-profit 
and NFP chains, suggesting that 
market forces are more 
important than institutional form 
116 Ballou Wisconsin, 1984-
95 
 
Official data on 
nursing homes 
(3605 
observations for 
12 years) 
User 
perceptions 
Econometric 
modelling 
The study concludes that 
ownership effects exist, with 
consumers indicating the 
greatest preference for NFP 
homes and the least for 
government homes.  Consistent 
with interpretation that market 
share differentials reflect a 
consumer preference for 
ownership types.  Private payers 
prefer private nursing homes to 
government homes, yet the 
latter may still play a social role 
as a safety net for those lacking 
private funds who may find it 
difficult to be admitted 
elsewhere.   
Study makes assumptions about 
people’s behaviour and 
preferences – aggregation 
assumption. Consistent with 
several studies which show that 
private payers prefer NFPs, but 
does not really tell us why. Argues 
government owned sector faces 
soft budget constraints and NFP 
sector as a consequence of the 
nondistribution constraint, lacks 
ability to provide strong incentives 
to management and therefore 
encourage efficient behaviour.   
120 Farsi and 
Filipini 
Switzerland, 
1993-2001 
 
Panel data from 
17 public and 10 
NFP nursing 
homes in one 
canton  
Cost 
efficiency 
Translog 
stochastic cost-
frontier model 
Institutional form influences the 
efficiency of the nursing homes: 
NFPs more cost-efficient than 
public nursing homes. But a 
great majority of the nursing 
homes, irrespective of 
ownership, do not fully benefit 
from scale economies. This 
implies that efficiency gains can 
be obtained with larger 
capacities or joint operations. 
Unusual study in that compares 
government sector and NFP.  
Controls for regulation by looking 
at one canton only. Study includes 
2/3 of all nursing homes in 
canton. 
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121 Friesner and 
Rosenman  
Washington 
State 
 
Data from 
hospitals’ annual 
submissions to 
the Washington 
State 
Department of 
Health 
Quality of 
care/cost 
adjusting 
Econometric 
modelling  
NFP firms that produce multiple 
outputs may lower service 
intensity for one patient group in 
response to lower 
reimbursements for another 
group ("cost-adjusting"). 
Empirical analysis finds that NFP 
hospitals in Washington State do 
practise cost-adjusting. The 
ability of a firm to exploit this 
welfare transfer depends largely 
on the demand conditions 
present in the market. Hospitals 
lower the quality of care in 
response to reductions in 
reimbursement rates. 
Government hospitals reduce the 
quality of care for patients “not 
in the group facing revenue 
reductions” while NFP hospitals 
reduce quality “for government 
patients when government 
revenue is reduced”. 
Cost-adjusting implies a serious 
welfare transfer. 
 
Limitations: 40 % of the sample 
was excluded due to missing or 
unreliable data. Cost and 
utilization variables were not 
defined. Results were not adjusted 
for case mix. 
122 Currie and 
Fahr 
California, 1988-
96 
 
Data on all 
hospital 
discharges in 
California 1988- 
1996 from the 
Group Health 
Association of 
Uncompensat
ed care 
Multivariate 
regression 
Public hospitals in counties with 
higher HMO penetration take a 
larger share of the county's 
charity caseload. However, these 
public hospitals also take larger 
shares of most other types of 
patients. Little evidence that 
either for-profit or NFP private 
hospitals respond to HMO 
penetration by turning away 
Authors note possibility that HMO 
penetration increases the burden 
on public hospitals by encouraging 
exit of private hospitals from the 
market 
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America, 
InterStudy and 
the Office of 
Statewide 
Healthcare 
Planning and 
development.   
uninsured and Medicaid patients. 
On the contrary, in the for-profit 
sector higher HMO penetration is 
linked to reductions in the share 
of privately insured patients in 
the caseload, and corresponding 
increases in the share of 
Medicare patients and Medicaid 
births. Since HMO penetration 
reduces the price paid by 
privately insured patients they 
may be less attractive to for-
profit hospitals relative to the 
publicly insured.   
125 Gruca and 
Nath 
Ontario 
 
168  community 
hospitals  
Technical 
efficiency 
Data 
envelopment 
analysis 
techniques  
Under a single payer system 
there were no significant 
differences in efficiency across 
ownership types for NFP 
hospitals. This is significant since 
prior research from US does not 
generally consider the 
importance of payer mix, 
whereas in Ontario there is a 
single-payer and no opportunity 
for different types of hospitals to 
discriminate between patients 
based on their insurance status.   
Efficiency varies with regulation. 
Methodology is important because 
explains other findings.  
128 Anderson  Florida, 1996  
 
Sample of 487 
nursing homes 
based on various 
Efficiency  Data 
Envelopment 
Analysis 
.   
Without controlling for quality, 
for-profit firms and chain-
affiliated firms are shown to be 
slightly more efficient than 
independent and NFP nursing 
homes. However, in the presence 
Chain affiliation, profit status and 
quality of care are included. 
Baseline assumption that FPs are 
more efficient. 
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official data 
sources 
of the quality control variable, 
there is no evidence to suggest 
that chain affiliation impacts 
efficiency.  
130 Knox et al Texas, 1998 
 
Data on 1,022 
nursing homes 
Medicaid Nursing 
Facility Cost 
Report; 
Data from 
Quality Reporting 
System  
Efficiency  Regression 
models  
Although CEOs of more efficient 
FPs are better paid than NFPs, 
the statistical evidence is not as 
convincing as financial economic-
agency theorists would assert. 
Quality of care has no systematic 
impact on CEO pay.  
 
Controls for quality of care. 
Admit all studies vary in their 
results due to different measures 
for defining quality. 
 
134 Sloan et al  USA, 1982-94 
 
National long 
term care panel 
survey – data 
extract Medicare 
enrolees aged 65 
plus linked to 
Medicare claims 
data. 
Cost and 
quality of 
care 
(mortality in 
four 
conditions) 
  
Regression 
analyses, 
adjusted for 
socio-
demographic 
factors.   
Not for profits more expensive 
than other hospitalisations. No 
difference in outcomes by 
hospital ownership. 
Very complex modelling and 
assumptions which were difficult 
to get behind. Very unconvincing 
paper 
137 Proenca et al USA, 1995 and 
1997 
  
All non-federal 
general hospitals 
that reported 
Provision of 
prevention 
and health 
promotion 
services 
Negative 
binominal 
regression 
FP hospitals offered significantly 
fewer prevention and health 
promotion services than did NFP 
hospitals. 
This finding supports the 
contention that organisations 
find it easier to not conform with 
Limitations: It is likely that other 
factors such as the values and 
experiences of top managers, 
multiplicity and conflict in 
institutional demands, and 
economic fitness will also shape 
the perception and response to 
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complete data to 
the AHA 
(3453 hospitals) 
environmental pressures that are 
perceived to be inconsistent with 
organisational objectives. FP 
hospitals have explicit profit 
objectives and investment 
rationales which make it difficult 
to allocate resources for socially 
oriented community health 
improvement interventions. NFP 
hospitals are predisposed by 
mission and values to engage 
more in activities that benefit the 
community. Economic measures 
of performance may be less 
important to them. By providing 
prevention and health promotion 
services, they are hoping to 
maintain the legitimacy of their 
NFP status. 
While hospitals respond to 
institutional stakeholders to 
secure legitimacy and resources, 
the level of their response is not 
uniform. It is affected by the 
nature of stakeholder demands 
and the manner in which the 
demands manifest. 
environmental issues. They could 
not be examined in this study due 
to the limitations of the secondary 
data set. Also not examined were 
activities that may be undertaken 
by hospital staff on their own. Due 
to the study design and data set 
temporal precedence of the 
independent variables over the 
dependent variable could not be 
established. Longitudinal approach 
and use of panel data to better 
model the process of adaptation 
needed. 
138 Potter USA, 1980-1994 
(at four time 
points) 
 
AHA survey and 
Area Resource 
Efficiency and 
community 
service 
OLS regression 
and latent 
growth curve 
model 
When external factors are taken 
into account, variation in 
efficiency outcomes between NFP 
hospitals and for-profit hospitals 
tend to decrease over the 
research period. On the other 
Benefits from longitudinal 
analysis. Moreover, whereas most 
studies focus on hospitals’ internal 
structures, this study controls for 
external pressures that may 
promote convergence such as 
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Files hand, NFPs are providing more 
community service than their 
for-profit counterparts. 
policy and regulation and 
therefore provides evidence of 
national trends. 
140 Lafferty et al Seattle 
 
3 HMOs ( NFP 
staff-model 
HMO, a FP 
independent 
practice 
association, and 
a NFP alliance of 
community 
clinics). 
N = 1112 
Medicaid 
managed care 
enrollees aged 
14 - 18 years. 
Provision of 
sexual health 
services 
Logistic 
regression 
The NFP staff-model plan 
outperformed the for-profit 
independent practice association 
on most measures. Only HMO of 
enrollment to be a significant 
predictor of both primary care 
provision and well care. There 
was a significant association 
between well care and sexual 
history taking.  Capitated 
managed care is particularly 
unsatisfactory as a mechanism 
for delivery reproductive health 
services to a vulnerable teenage 
male population.   
Staff model HMOs now cover less 
than 3% of people in the US.  At 
least some of the differences in 
product performance may be 
attributable to structural 
differences among the 3 HMOs.  
Staff model HMOs stress clinical 
service protocols, standardized 
charting tools, and centralized 
laboratory testing. HMOs managed 
in this way also have the capacity 
to engage in research efforts that 
focus on service provision, a 
factor that will serve to improve 
service delivery.   
 
150 Parry et al London 
 
Drugs and 
alcohol services; 
survey data, 
case studies and 
interviews with 
four HR 
managers in 
relevant 
organisations 
Organisationa
l behaviour 
(managemen
t); funding   
    Both sectors experienced serious 
recruitment problems. However, 
differences influenced by both 
their relative positions and the 
value-led nature of the voluntary 
sector. Salaries, particularly for 
managers, in the voluntary 
sector, were low. Voluntary 
sector compared well on flexible 
work practices. The voluntary 
sector fared better at retaining 
staff. The public sector offered 
more benefits.  
Authors argue that the differences 
are based on the different 
financial positions of the 
organisations and the value-led 
nature of the voluntary sector.  
Study identifies funding 
constraints in the voluntary 
sector.   
Limitation: lack of interviews with 
staff;   
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152 Schlesinger 
et al 
USA, 1985-2002  
 
representative 
national 
telephone 
surveys in 
several years 
Public 
perceptions 
Descriptive 
statistics 
Earlier surveys revealed a strong 
connection between ownership 
and cost - NFPs costs were 
anticipated to be lower. A strong 
link was perceived between 
ownership and quality. Later 
surveys, however, indicated that 
a clear majority believe that for-
profits were associated with 
better quality of care, but that 
NFPs were strongly associated 
with lower cost. Despite this, 
respondents did not generally 
consider that NFPs were more 
efficient. In a 2002 survey, about 
12% of respondents admitted 
they had no idea what NFP 
meant and a further 20% had 
only a vague idea. Findings 
showed ownership-related 
differences: quality of care is 
seen as a domain of for-profit 
advantage but NFPs were 
perceived as being more 
trustworthy by a substantial 
margin.  
An important finding is that the 
public’s limited understanding of 
differences in ownership forms 
may serve to bias the findings in 
favour of for-profit ownership.  
Among those who have a clear 
understanding of the differences 
between not-for-profit and for-
profit ownership, the former are 
clearly seen as more trustworthy, 
humane providers of health care 
and the gap between NFPs and 
for-profit on quality closed 
substantially.  
153 Schlesinger 
et al 
USA, 1998 
 
Nationally 
representative 
sample of 1621 
physicians who 
responded to 
Trustworthine
ss of NFP 
health plans 
(five 
measures - 
two of these 
related to 
Regression 
analyses 
Compared with the local NFP 
plans, for-profits affiliated with 
multistate corporations are 
consistently reported by their 
affiliated physicians to engage in 
practices associated with 
reduced trustworthiness. The 
Finding is consistent with some 
other studies, e.g. that the 
behaviour of for-profit is 
moderated in circumstances 
where there is a significant NFP 
presence in a locality. However, in 
general trustworthiness of NFP 
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Socioeconomic 
Monitoring 
system Survey 
(SMS) of the 
AMA 
deceptive 
practices, 
and three to 
dimensions of 
quality that 
are largely 
hidden from 
employees). 
magnitude of ownership-related 
differences declines as the 
market share of NFP plans rises. 
For two of the five dependent 
variables, ownership-related 
differences in practices related to 
trustworthiness are entirely 
eliminated when NFPs enrol more 
than 30% of the local market. 
The conclusion is that the 
combination of for-profit 
ownership and multistate 
corporate control appears 
consistently and substantially to 
reduce physician-reported 
measures relating to the 
trustworthiness of health plans. 
Preserving a substantial market 
niche for NFPs appears to reduce 
this erosion of trust. 
plans was unrelated to ownership 
mix.  
They caution against some 
problems of interpretation with 
the results, e.g. ,to the extent 
that there are differences in the 
rates of complaints against for 
profits and not-for-profits, this 
could be because consumers trust 
NFPs more than for-profit, and are 
therefore more likely to excuse 
their failings without blaming 
them for outcomes and voicing 
concerns to the state.  
154 Shen and 
Melnick 
USA, 1989-1998 
 
Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas 
only 
Hospital cost 
and revenue 
growth rates 
Multivariate 
analysis 
 
 
Hospitals in high HMO areas 
experienced revenue and cost 
growth rates substantially lower 
than hospitals in low HMO areas. 
In addition, hospitals in areas 
with high FP HMO penetration 
experienced lower revenue and 
cost growth rates than hospitals 
in areas with low FP penetration 
areas; the difference was 
especially evident within high 
HMO penetration areas. 
Findings suggest the importance 
of market conditions in 
determining financial outcomes. 
 
Limited to metropolitan areas. 
157 Schmid Israel Quality of Longitudinal Some evidence of organisational No clear description of 
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Provision of long-
term care for the 
elderly  
care, 
organisationa
l behaviour 
study of 
implementation 
of the Israeli 
long-term care 
insurance Law 
(1988).   
isomorphism -- providers have 
found that if they conform to 
policy and regulations they 
guarantee the resources they 
need for survival and 
consequently they do not 
innovate, instead becoming 
formal and bureaucratic. Some 
evidence of negative impact on 
workers’ terms and conditions.  
methodology -- study appears to 
be based largely on a review of 
secondary literature including the 
author’s own previous work. Does 
not specifically evaluate the 
relative performance of for-profits 
and NFP organisations. 
158 Tritter et al South West 
England (three 
health 
authorities), 3 
year study 
User 
involvement 
in statutory 
and voluntary 
cancer care 
services 
Case study and 
survey data.  
Questionnaire 
administered to 
cancer care 
organisations 
and voluntary 
organisations.   
Partnership with the voluntary 
sector is meant to increase the 
stake of citizens as the voluntary 
sector is seen as a proxy for the 
general population.  However, 
the absence of any common 
definition of user involvement or 
its purpose underlines the limited 
trust between the different 
actors in the system and 
highlights the potentially 
negative impact of a Third way 
health service.  Attempts to 
include vol orgs as user 
collectives may be undermined 
by institutionalisation and 
professionalisation.  
 
161 Zechmeister UK, Germany 
and Austria 
Health care 
financing 
The article is 
based on 
secondary data 
on mental 
health care 
reform 
Examination of distributional 
effects of systems of mental 
health care financing against the 
backdrop of ongoing reforms and 
broader welfare state 
transformations.  In all of the 
The authors found that the study 
has been limited by the lack of 
precise data on resource allocation 
and expenditure for mental health 
care.  An increasing focus on the 
relationship between financing 
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processes and 
financing 
arrangements.  
three countries, shifts towards 
community care have resulted in 
a new division of financing 
responsibilities with a tendency 
to rising responsibilities for the 
'family' and the 
'voluntary/community sector'. In 
addition, strengthening market 
principles often increases 
financial burdens for affected 
individuals and/or their relatives.  
and service provision is required 
in order to prevent new forms of 
social exclusion of people with 
mental disorders. 
162 Freund Israel  
 
Random 
selection of  
social workers in 
public, for-profit, 
and  third sector 
social services 
Staff 
perceptions  
ANOVA 
Participants 
were asked to 
report their 
work and 
workplace 
attitudes.  
Results showed that type of 
organisation had a strong effect 
on work and workplace attitudes. 
Traditionally, public 
organisations primarily covered 
the existing social services needs 
of the population, with private 
organisations gradually 
developing. Over the past 20 
years NFP organisations (i.e., 
third-sector services) have 
entered the field with the move 
towards privatization. 
 
166 Brown and 
Troutt 
Manitoba 
 
3 agencies 
funded by the 
family violence 
prevention 
programme 
Staff 
perceptions 
of success of 
this program 
Semi-
structured 
interviews, 
telephone 
interviews, and 
e-mail 
correspondenc
e.  
Assessment of the features that 
contributed to the success of this 
program; emphasis on attitudinal 
features such as political will, a 
very strong focus on mission, 
and dedication to a collaborative 
process. 
Study deliberately chose to focus 
on a set of very small 
organisations, frequently with 
fewer than 10 staff, and with very 
close relationships with their 
clients.  Purposive emphasis on a 
programme that was perceived to 
have been successful, and, within 
that, on organisations that were 
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supportive of the programme. 
167 Schmid and 
Nirel 
Israel 
 
Sample of 49  
home care 
provider 
organisations. 
Questionnaire 
with open and 
closed questions.  
Supplementary 
sources: official   
reports and 
statistics 
Performance 
measures 
included 
training 
executives, 
marketing 
effectiveness, 
diversification
, and growth 
in clientele. 
Stepwise 
multiple 
regression 
analysis; where 
appropriate, 
logarithmic 
transformation
s were used to 
linearise 
relationships. 
For-profits scored higher on 
effectiveness of training of home 
care workers, marketing, and on 
diversification of services. NFPs 
scored higher on effectiveness of 
training for social workers as well 
as in growth of clientele. Argues 
that an analysis of similarities 
and differences between 
organisations based on 
ownership, yields inconclusive 
results, because of the 
heterogeneity of funding 
sources, disparate organisational 
goals and varied constituencies. 
Differences within sectors are 
often greater than those between 
them.   
Refers to the possibility of 
coercive isomorphism -- 
organisations that seek to ensure 
a steady flow of resources will 
tend to conform with government 
policy stipulation; another reason 
for this is that professional and 
therapeutic staff will receive 
similar training and role 
socialisation. However, while there 
is some evidence for isomorphism 
results generally are rather mixed. 
 
Does not fully report results of 
regression analyses. 
169 Mano-Negrin  Israel, 1998-
1999 
 
Random samples 
of two data sets 
of NFP and public 
sector 
organisations, 
n= 127 
Organisation- 
al behaviour 
Bivariate 
analysis and 
regression 
analysis 
Because of their different degree 
of dependence on public 
resources, public and NFP 
organisations differ in their 
organisational behaviour and 
outcomes. Public organisations 
are more attentive to 
environmental effects than NFPs 
due to the direct contact with 
institutional agents in political 
positions. This enables an early 
evaluation of prospective 
changes in social policy and 
budgeting. In contrast, the 
Main findings seems to be that 
public sector = bureaucratic 
system, independent sector more 
flexible. Rather trivial. 
Limitations: small sample size; 
results are solely based on 
respondents’ reports; 
sectors included which are neither 
health nor social care 
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operations of independent NFPs 
often lack the bureaucratisation 
of the public sector in providing 
services. NFP adopt organic 
structures that are easy to 
change without formal 
procedures, such as by merely 
reducing the number of 
volunteers. 
182 Cloutier-
Fisher and 
Skinner 
Ontario 
 
Voluntary sector 
providers of 
long-term care in 
small rural 
communities  
Staff 
perceptions 
on service 
restructuring 
impact 
Qualitative 
case study;  
interviews with 
management 
staff and direct 
service workers 
(N = 10). 
Staff reported negative effects 
on organisations, service quality 
and service capacity. 
Limitations: Small-scale study, 
which says nothing about 
potential biases in results arising 
from methods used to recruit 
respondents. 
192 Twombly  US metropolitan 
areas, 1992-96 
 
Data on NFP 
organisations 
from the National 
Center for 
Charitable 
Statistics in 53 
metropolitan 
areas 
Entry and 
exit of NFP 
organisations 
logistic 
regression 
model on exit 
and OLS 
regression 
model on entry 
The degree of entry of human 
service NFPs outpaced their rate 
of exit. Smaller groups are more 
likely to exit than larger ones; 
except for NFPs which are less 
than 5 years in operation, 
younger groups are more likely 
to fail; emergency providers are 
significantly less likely to exit 
than core NFPs, despite the 
congruence between the latter 
group’s mission orientation and 
emerging policy goals. The most 
important determinant of NFP 
entry is the introduction of 
welfare reform initiatives  
The study illustrates that policy 
initiatives such as welfare reform 
can substantially affect the 
composition of local human 
service sectors. The analysis 
supports the argument that 
competition among groups for 
limited resources produces 
barriers to entry for new agencies. 
 
Limitations: Confined to 
metropolitan areas 
 
Not-for-profit health care organisations 
© NCCSDO 2008 116 
194 Miller Ontario, Canada 
 
Three case 
studies 
Accountabilit
y 
mechanisms 
Qualitative 
study involving 
semi-
structured 
interviews with 
employees and 
stakeholders, 
documentary 
analysis, 
undefined 
observational 
data, and 
participant 
observation. 
 
NFP organisations are private 
self-regulating bodies. As their 
social welfare role expands so 
the need for greater public 
transparency and accountability 
increases. A number of pre-
requisites for effective 
accountability were identified, 
e.g. accessibility of the Board; 
diverse mechanisms for critical 
self-appraisal and evaluative 
feedback; staff with a specific 
developmental role; a capacity to 
respond to criticism; clarity 
about organisational mission and 
values; a culture of 
accountability; strong 
organisational leadership. 
The study is unusual in that the 
author recognises a wider public 
duty of accountability. He reports 
a general concern in Canada 
about accountability but notes 
that the emphasis has been on 
state regulation particularly with 
respect to funding. By contrast, 
Miller’s focus is on self-regulation 
or on “how NFP organisations 
might apply their sense of 
responsibility to be accountable to 
those constituencies without 
formal levers of power.” While the 
author generalises inappropriately 
on the basis of three case studies, 
the study is of interest in the 
North American context because 
of its use of the concept of a 
public domain. 
200 Warner et al USA, 1997 
 
Representative 
sample on 
youths (ages 17 
years and under) 
in outpatient 
specialty mental 
health clinics (N 
= 2749)  
Psychotropic 
medication 
receipt 
among young 
people 
Multivariate 
analyses 
Receipt of psychotropic 
medication is a function of 
clients’ illness characteristics. 
However, findings suggest that 
also factors beyond clinical 
profile predict medication 
receipt. Of the organisational 
variables, only ownership status 
statistically significantly predicts 
medication receipt. Compared to 
youths receiving care in public 
organisations, youths who 
receive care in NFP organisations 
The statistical significance of the 
coefficient attached to ownership 
suggests that the variable 
captures treatment philosophies 
or organisation missions that 
factor into decisions to prescribe 
psychotropic medications. One 
implication of the results is that 
equally ill youths are treated 
differently depending on the 
organisational context. 
Limitations: FPs constitute a very 
small group; this may limit the 
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have two-thirds the odds of 
receiving medication. Youths 
treated in publicly owned 
outpatient programmes are 
significantly more likely to 
receive medication than those in 
NFP programmes, and no 
different from youths in 
programmes with private 
ownership.  
statistical power to detect 
differences. Neither data set was 
created for purposes of the study, 
hence some of the organisational 
measures do not have a high 
degree of sensitivity and 
specificity. Further investigation is 
needed to understand the 
mechanisms through which 
payment sources and programme 
ownership influence health care, 
e.g. by interviewing relevant 
administrative and clinical 
personnel. E.g. do pharmaceutical 
marketing strategies differentially 
target physicians who work in FP, 
NFP, and public outpatient 
programmes? 
202 Berta et al Ontario, 1996 - 
2002  
 
Long-term care 
facilities (N=597) 
Staff ratios Tests for 
differences in 
sample means 
between 
different types 
of ownership. 
Nursing staff intensity and direct 
care staff levels were 
significantly higher in 
government-owned facilities, 
compared to all other ownership 
types, whereas proprietary for-
profit private operators had 
significantly lower intensity and 
staffing levels than other 
ownership types. 
 
203 Sikorska-
Simmons 
Maryland 
 
Interviews with 
156 residents of 
Quality of 
care 
 Residents in the sampled NFP 
facilities were more satisfied with 
assisted living than were 
residents in the for-profit 
facilities. In particular, residents 
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assisted living 
facilities, 
including 96 
residents in 8 FP 
facilities and 60 
residents in five 
NFP facilities. 
in NFP facilities were more 
satisfied with health care, 
physical environment, and social 
life/activities in the facility. 
204 Baines 3 Canadian 
provinces over a 
five year period 
Staff 
perceptions 
of working 
environment 
In-depth, semi- 
structured 
interviews with 
83 social 
service workers 
and a ‘small 
number’ of 
managers, 
policymakers 
and advocates. 
Qualitative description of workers 
experience of restructuring, 
residualisation and market 
segmentation, due to changed 
external conditions and 
competition. 
Study does not describe how 
 interviews were selected in any 
depth,  
thus it is not feasible to determine 
whether  
biases were introduced. 
206 Castle  Nursing homes in 
ten states in the 
US 
 
Official data on 
effect of 
regulation on the 
quality of care in 
board and care 
homes 
Quality of 
care   
Regression 
analysis 
The study found one structural 
measure (providing nursing 
care), three process measures 
(food quality, staff treat 
residents with respect, and staff 
verbally abuse residents), and 
two outcomes measures 
(cleanliness of the facility and 
complaints to Ombudsman) to be 
significant. Moreover, the 
directions of these effects are 
consistent, with FP facilities rated 
more poorly. 
Data on 10 states which were split 
between limited and extensive 
regulatory oversight. 
207 Giffords New York 
 
Staff 
commitment  
One way 
ANOVA and 
It was found that both 
organisational and professional 
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Social service 
employees (N = 
207) from  
public, NFP and 
FP rganizations 
multiple 
regression 
analysis of 
completed 
questionnaires 
commitment are related to 
ownership with workers from 
public organisations reporting 
less commitment.  In addition, 
professional commitment 
appears related to employees’ 
ages and position within the 
organisation. 
217 Andrews USA, 1991-1999 
 
General short-
term care 
hospitals, AHA 
data 
 
Concentration 
of 
hospitals/hos
pital size 
Descriptive 
study 
Concentration of hospitals into 
systems increased from 1991 to 
1999. The share of patient care 
in systems as opposed to 
independent hospitals rose from 
39 to 57 %. More of the mergers 
occurred among secular not-for-
profit hospitals than among for-
profit hospitals.  
Systems of hospitals raise the 
concentration ratio in local 
markets dramatically. The change 
in market power challenges 
traditional proposals and 
strategies aiming to achieve a 
national health programme. 
Author speculates that growth of 
health systems made the interests 
of hospital executives more 
important than those of physicians 
in the conduct of health policy. 
Mergers also strengthen private 
control over investment decisions 
and weaken public control.  
Limitations: study did not use 
network data to identify hospitals 
that remain independent but 
make alliances.  
222 Hodgkin et al Michigan, 1998-
2000 
 
Data from 
Medicaid 
Spending and 
utilisation 
after carve-
out 
Multivariate 
regression 
By the second year of the risk-
based carve-out (2000), 
Medicaid payments were 9.1% 
lower than in the last year before 
the carve-out (1998). Reductions 
were largely achieved by serving 
Public and NFP entities, like for-
profit firms, will reduce 
behavioural health costs when 
they are placed at risk. Although 
maximising investor value cannot 
be a motivation for them, they 
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programme 
supplemented by 
interviews with 
officials at the 
state 
Department of 
Community 
Health and the 
coordinating 
agencies (CAs); 
9 public agencies 
and 6 NFP 
agencies 
fewer clients, not by reducing 
payments per client. Controlling 
for NFP ownership, it appears 
that public CAs attach greater 
weight to numbers served, and 
NFP CAs attach more to the 
intensity of treatment per user, 
however, analysis of variance 
indicated that these differences 
were not statistically significant. 
Fiscal pressures is statistically 
significant, but not ownership 
type; hence ownership less 
important than contract design in 
determining the performance of 
Medicaid carve-out contractors. 
may still restrain costs for other 
reasons, e.g. risk aversion or the 
need to build reserves.  
Limitations: A fuller evaluation 
would require better person-level 
utilisation data than are currently 
available, and also measures of 
quality of care and outcomes. 
Lack of a comparison group, since 
the state implemented its carve-
out for all regions simultaneously 
rather than selectively; hence it is 
possible that the observed 
spending and utilisation changes 
reflect other influences that 
coincided with the carve-out.  
223 Schneider et 
al 
USA, 1997 
 
Data derived 
from Medicare 
Health Plan 
Employer Data 
and Information 
Set (HEDIS) 
clinical 
measures. 
Quality of 
care 
(scores on 4 
clinical 
services) 
Observational 
study 
 
Compared with NFP health plans, 
the quality of care was lower in 
for-profit health plans on all 4 of 
the HEDIS clinical measures. 
These differences were reduced 
by socioeconomic adjustment 
and health plan characteristics 
but not eliminated. 
The study was unable to identify 
the effects of a wide range of 
factors other than ownership that 
might have contributed to the 
measured outcomes, for example, 
differences in the selection of 
providers that contract with the 
plan, management priorities and 
performance monitoring. 
Limitations: limited adjustment for 
confounding factors such as case 
mix. 
235 Harrison and 
Sexton 
USA, 2001 
 
Data from AHA 
annual survey, 
Financial 
performance 
Multivariate 
regression 
model 
NFP hospitals’ greater size and 
increased clinical complexity is 
the result of their commitment to 
the organisational mission of 
Takes the perspective that 
organisations can choose their 
strategy to match environment to 
enhance performance, but in case 
Not-for-profit health care organisations 
© NCCSDO 2008 121 
Area Resource 
File, and Centre 
for Medicare and 
Medicaid services 
(3,559 NFP and 
412 FP hospitals) 
providing a full range of services. 
NFPs have aging facilities and 
reduced cash flow due to lower 
profit margins. So many face 
potential bankruptcy and closure, 
which poses a threat to the 
provision of charity care and the 
long-term viability of the NFP 
sector. 
of NFPs means behaving like or 
becoming a FP. Otherwise, they 
will become financially distressed 
and have to merge, close or be 
taken over. This will mean losing 
care for needy, etc.  
236 Trujillo USA, 1998 
 
254 health plans, 
data from HEDIS 
Access to 
high-cost 
procedures 
Regression 
models 
In unadjusted analyses, FP 
health plan beneficiaries had 
higher rates of all high-cost 
procedures than NFP plan 
beneficiaries; the difference was 
significant for 4 out of 12 
procedures. Rates of usage 
remained higher in FP plans after 
adjustment for participants’ 
socio-demographic factors, 
county of residence, and health 
plan characteristics. 
This is a commentary on a cohort 
study by Schneider, Zaslavsky 
and Epstein [69]. 
Introduces control variables. 
 
244 Preyra and 
Pink 
Ontario, Canada, 
1995-96 
 
Sample of 
industrial and 
NFP CEO 
compensation 
schemes 
CEOs’ 
earnings 
Multivariate 
regression 
All hospital CEOs are increasingly 
being rewarded for financial 
performance, however, CEOs in 
publicly traded firms earn twice 
as much on average as those in 
similarly sized NFP hospitals but 
bear roughly eight times the 
income variance. Estimates of 
the associated degree of risk 
aversion are well within 
conventional bounds and are 
consistent with the trade-off 
Limitations: non-random sampling 
methods introduced bias. 
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between insurance and 
incentives predicted by the 
theory. 
251 Gentry USA, 1993-1996 
 
Data on NFP 
hospitals derived 
from tax returns 
and the annual 
AHA survey  
Organisationa
l behaviour 
(tax planning 
in order to 
benefit from 
special tax 
rules for NFP 
hospitals) 
Multivariate 
regression 
NFP hospitals have maximised 
tax exemptions by borrowing 
rather than spending their 
endowments. Controlling for 
hospital size, endowment assets 
are associated with a higher ratio 
of tax-exempt (or total) debt to 
operating assets. In contrast, 
endowment assets are not 
related to taxable debt 
suggesting that the effects of the 
endowment on borrowing are 
motivated by tax incentives.  
Overall, the results are consistent 
with substantial tax planning by 
not-for-profit hospitals. 
252 Shen USA, 1985-1994 
 
Panel of all 
general, acute, 
short-term stay 
hospitals 
Quality of 
care, 
conversion 
study 
Econometric 
model 
comparing 
outcomes 
among 
hospitals that 
converted with 
those without 
changed 
ownership  
For-profit and government 
hospitals have higher incidence 
of adverse outcomes than NFPs. 
Adverse outcomes increase after 
NFPs convert to for-profit 
ownership. 
The limitation of the study to a 
single disease is not uncommon. 
In the Milcent study [313], where 
the same indicator was chosen, 
the explanation was that in-
hospital death due to heart attack 
is relatively frequent and therefore 
easier to study. 
Limitation: no adjustment for case 
mix. 
255 Zhao et al USA, 1999 
 
AHA survey and 
Area Resource 
File 
Health 
promotion 
and disease 
prevention 
(HPDP) 
Bivariate 
analysis and 
multiple 
regression 
For both the non-sole and sole 
hospitals, hospital size, case-mix 
index, HMO contracts, 
membership in a hospital alliance 
or network, and median 
household income have a 
FP hospitals may feel compelled to 
appear as a community-oriented 
institution first then as a profit 
earner. A sole community hospital 
that wants to gain or maintain 
legitimacy has to fully consider 
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positively significant influence on 
HPDP involvement. FP hospitals 
were significantly less likely to 
offer HPDP services than their 
NFP counterparts if the FP 
hospital is not the sole hospital 
in a community. However, for-
profit and NFP hospitals will 
provide similar HPDP services 
when the hospital is the sole 
hospital in the community. 
 
and satisfy the expectations of the 
community stakeholders for 
survival no matter who owns it. 
Limitations: Only cross-sectional 
data; the similarity between the 
sole FP and NFP hospitals may 
also indicate a trend towards 
convergence in goals and 
motivations between the two due 
to regulatory change and the 
implementation of similar 
strategies; such a convergence 
trend could only be discovered by 
longitudinal analysis. 
Chosen HPDP services may not 
fully represent the range of 
community-oriented services for 
individuals.  Direct influence of 
stakeholders not included due to 
data limitations. 
256 Crivelli et al Switzerland, 
1998 
 
886 public, FP 
and NFP nursing 
homes. 
Data from Swiss 
Federal statistical 
Office and Health 
Department 
Nursing home 
efficiency 
Stochastic cost 
frontier 
analysis 
Found no difference in 
performance by ownership or 
regulation. Most operating near 
max efficiency. Size is a factor in 
relation to efficiency with 
implications for planning nursing 
home provisions, up to 88 beds, 
but even this somewhat limited.  
So ownership is not important in 
determining performance.  
Relevant to UK because demand > 
supply, barriers to entry for 
private sector because regulatory 
permission needed due to 
subsidies. Few cantons subsidise 
FPs.  
 
Limitations: Uses cross-section 
data 
259 Hayden  Massachusetts Financial 5 mini-case The viability of NFP organisations 
depends upon the interaction of 
The paper concludes that ad hoc 
regulation can undermine the 
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(1990s) 
 
24 structured 
interviews with 
board members 
and senior 
executives.  
performance  studies  competent management, an 
engaged board, and effective 
regulators. All five of 
Massachusetts’ NFP HMOs have 
faced difficulties over the past 
decade. In each instance, the 
management and boards 
aggressively pursued market 
share in a regulatory 
environment providing minimal 
statutory guidance and 
supervision.  
viability of a NFP health care 
system. 
 
Limitations: qualitative data from 
interested parties. 
263 Olmstead and 
Sindelar 
USA, 2000/2002 
  
2000 National 
survey of 
substance abuse 
treatment 
services and 
2002 Area 
Resource File. 
Data on 10,513 
facilities 
(virtually all).    
Service 
availability  
Multivariate 
regression 
In the absence of MC, FPs offer 
the narrowest range of services, 
publics the widest, and NFPs fall 
in the middle.  MC significantly 
increases the number of services 
offered at private FPs, has no 
significant effect on the number 
of services offered at private 
NFPs and significantly decreases 
the number of services offered at 
public SAT facilities.   
No direct control for case mix due 
to data limitations. Proxies for 
case mix included types of 
payment accepted and whether 
payment assistance was offered. 
One explanation offered for the 
differential impact of MC across 
facility ownership types is that MC 
results in standardisation across 
facilities.  Or it may be that public 
and private SAT facilities have 
contracts with different types of 
MC organisations, which in turn 
my have different goals, e.g. 
publics want to treat as many 
people as possible with reduced 
funds.   
264 Treo 
Solutions  
New York State, 
2001-2002 
 
Differences in 
performance, 
efficiency and 
contributions 
Descriptive 
statistics  
 
NFP insurers offer lower premium 
options for consumers. The NFP 
upstate market has proved its 
viability, while maintaining 
Emergence in NY of health care 
insurance markets that are 
predominantly for-profit raises 
significant public policy issues, 
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Managed care 
data 
to safety net 
programmes 
Comparison of 
upstate and 
downstate 
markets 
commitments to NYS safety net 
and Medicare programmes. NFP 
HMOs participate in state-
sponsored safety net 
programmes to a far greater 
degree than the downstate FP 
managed care organisations.  
especially with reference to 
community benefits and services. 
Likely that there will be 
diminished access to care for the 
at-risk population and premium as 
well as administrative costs will be 
higher. 
Limitations: one state only; no 
longitudinal data, highly 
aggregated data, no case mix etc. 
265 Younis and 
Forgione 
USA, 1996 and 
1998 
 
Medicare Cost 
Report data. 
3240 hospitals in 
1996 and 3461 
in 1998 
Hospital 
profitability  
Nonlinear 
Regression 
model 
Since most hospitals in sample 
were NFP, IPM was a better 
measure of profitability than 
ROE, and profitability was mainly 
influenced by location, size, 
occupancy rate, volume of 
Medicare and Medicaid patients, 
and teaching status. 
Examines potential effects of the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997. By 
implication, ownership status and 
conversion were not important 
factors determining profitability. 
 
268 Crampton et 
al 
New Zealand  
 
Representative 
national cross-
sectional survey 
of GPs  
Staff ratios 
and working 
conditions 
according to 
funding 
arrangement
s 
Statistical 
comparisons of 
proportions of 
practices 
exhibiting 
various 
characteristics 
and of 
differences in 
sample means 
using t-tests. 
Primary care teams were largest 
and most heterogeneous in 
community-governed NFP 
practices. In contrast, 
independent practices (mainly 
FP) had the most parsimonious 
practice teams. Few practices 
other than the small minority 
that were community-governed 
NFPs employ community workers 
or midwives. 
Possible bias due to the overall GP 
response rate with significant 
differences between for-profit and 
NFPs.  Non-responders tended to 
be male and restored a greater 
than average patient loads, and if 
these GPs differ in some 
systematic way in characteristics 
of activities, this may bias the 
results. 
270 Dickens et al England 
 
Staff 
perception re 
working 
One-way 
ANOVA 
The results are discussed in the 
context of previous research. 
This sample of nurses scored 
This tells us little about the 
voluntary sector in the absence of 
a comparator. It is unclear 
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161 reg. nurses 
working in five 
specialist 
divisions of a 
large charitable 
hospital 
surveyed (Work 
Environment 
Scale) 
environment 
in the 
voluntary 
sector 
differently on a number of 
subscales, with the working 
environment characterised by 
relatively high levels of support, 
cohesion and managerial control 
and slightly lower levels of 
autonomy.  
whether the differences reflect the 
organisational context (i.e. non-
NHS context) or a secure 
environment effect.   
Cross-sectional data only. 
272 Aronson et al Ontario (one 
city), 2002 
 
Home care 
sector 
 
 
Staff 
commitment  
Qualitative 
study 
Includes 
survey of 
workers who 
were employed 
by a NFP, 
which was 
forced to shut 
due to 
introduction of 
managed 
competition.   
Of 317 support workers who 
were laid off only 38% stayed in 
the home-care sector; most were 
absorbed by FP non-unionised 
agencies where employment 
conditions deteriorated. For 69 
ex-employees who remained in 
the sector, pay and benefits 
deteriorated. Also reported loss 
and dislocation.   
Illustrates the impacts of Ontario’s 
contractual approach to home 
care.   
The emphasis on policy context 
usefully explains the impact of 
managed competition in Ontario, 
which is described as the most  
‘market-mimicking’ province in 
Canada.  The impacts on staff 
terms and conditions is important 
given concerns about the quality 
and stability of home care staff.   
277 Alexander et 
al 
USA, 1989 and 
1997 
 
Two national 
surveys; 
response rates to 
these surveys 
were 57 percent 
and 42 percent 
respectively.  
Hospital 
governance  
Comparison of 
governance 
characteristics 
in two survey 
years 
Findings suggest that hospital 
boards are engaging in selective 
rather than wholesale change to 
meet the simultaneous demands 
of a competitive market and 
traditional institutional 
orientations to community and 
philanthropic service. The study 
found a tendency for board size 
to increase with the size of the 
hospital. Public and investor-
Through reorganisation and 
consolidation into vertical and 
horizontal systems, hospitals are 
often enmeshed in multiple layers 
of governance and managed by 
those concerned with the health 
care operations of multiple 
provider organisations. The 
practical question is which entity 
is accountable for meeting 
Not-for-profit health care organisations 
© NCCSDO 2008 127 
owned hospitals were more likely 
to have become answerable to 
larger, system-affiliated, urban 
organisations in the study 
period. Overall the survey 
suggests continuity, closer links 
between hospital management 
and hospital governance, and 
more complex governance 
arrangements. 
community needs. 
Limitations: both survey samples 
were biased by an under-
representation of investor-owned 
hospitals. The survey does not 
evaluate “governing styles” so 
variation is not associated with 
patient-based performance 
standards when larger corporate 
policy-making processes 
supersede those of local policy 
makers. 
280 Bertrand et al USA, 1992-1996 
 
Based on IR 
data, AHA annual 
survey, and 
using database 
created from 
Group Health 
Association of 
America’s 
National 
Directory of 
HMOs 
Impact of 
HMO 
penetration 
on the 
management 
of NFP 
hospitals, 
focusing on 
the executive 
labour 
market 
Regression 
analysis 
Top executive turnover increased 
following  increased HMO 
penetration. This was 
concentrated among the less 
profitable hospitals. The link 
between top executive pay and 
F{ performance measures was 
very weak, but as HMO 
penetration increased, top 
executives were compensated 
more for improving the 
profitability of their hospitals. 
These results, while of limited 
economic magnitude, are 
qualitatively consistent with the 
view that HMO penetration has 
increased the weight assigned to 
FP performance in managing NFP 
hospitals. 
This shows that performance is a 
function of external factors rather 
than ownership per se. Also notes 
behaviour change in run up to 
conversion. Following HMO 
penetration, the NFPs mimicked 
the FP sector. 
281 Horwitz USA, 1988-2000 Availability of 
profitable and 
Econometric FPs are most likely to offer 
relatively profitable medical 
Activity mix crucial to financial 
performance and the three types 
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AHA data for 
every urban, 
acute hospital 
unprofitable 
services 
analysis services; government hospitals 
are most likely to offer relatively 
unprofitable services; NFPs often 
fall in the middle. FPs also more 
responsive to changes in service 
profitability. 
vary in this respect. 
282 Reed et al UK, 2001-02 
 
Services for 
older people; 
data from a 
range of users 
and voluntary 
providers 
Public, user 
and staff 
perceptions  
Appreciative 
Inquiry (AI)    
Highlighted ‘unexpected impacts’ 
which arose in all the schemes. 
Also emphasises that there was a 
lack of barriers between 
providers and users of the 
services.   
Data suggests that these services 
were flexible and responsive. 
However, the extent to which 
these factors are attributable to 
their voluntary status is difficult to 
determine in the absence of a 
control, e.g. public sector 
comparator. AI has an explicit 
focus on examining positive 
aspects of a situation. 
283 Gross and 
Harrison 
Israel  
 
Semi-structured 
in-depth 
interviews with 
145 senior 
managers; 
documents from 
HMO and 
government 
archives; 
Parliamentary 
committee 
meetings, other 
official sources  
Description of 
divergent 
organisationa
l responses 
to national 
policy 
initiatives 
Comparative 
study of two 
Israeli Health 
Maintenance 
Organisations 
and their 
responses to 
the enactment 
of the National 
Health 
Insurance Law 
of 1995 
Study demonstrates the efforts 
made by the two HMOs to 
safeguard their membership 
profile through selective 
recruitment of a disproportionate 
number of the young and 
healthy. It also shows how 
managers deliberately adopted 
certain strategies in response to 
specific environmental 
developments, consistent with 
the argument that regulation and 
external competitive pressures, 
rather than ownership, are 
dominant in this area. However, 
there were some evidence of 
divergence in institutional 
A qualitative study which 
highlights the possibility of 
divergence in organisational 
responses to change in the 
external environment, and which 
shows that the response of NFPs 
is in some senses path-
dependent.  However, the extent 
to which it is so will also depend 
on other external pressures. 
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strategies reflecting path 
dependency in the form of their 
organisations’ distinctive 
experiences and history. 
286 Howell New Zealand and 
England 
 Description of 
organisational 
and 
governance 
structures 
introduced in 
hospital 
reforms in New 
Zealand and 
England. 
Argues that the introduction of 
NHS foundation trusts solves 
some of the questions of 
governance associated with the 
New Zealand health care 
reforms, but suggests that the 
extent to which the full range of 
potential improvements will 
result remains contingent on 
specification of members’ duties, 
accountability requirements, and 
the degree of autonomy that the 
new trusts will actually possess. 
 
287 Cutler and 
Horwitz 
Kansas and 
Colorado 
 
Data from 
Medicare and 
Medicaid cost 
reports 
Conversion 
studies 
(effects on 
costs, 
quality, 
access, etc.) 
Detailed case 
studies of two 
hospitals using 
interviews and 
documentary 
analysis  
 
Conversions due to financial 
pressures and board culture and 
perceived mission. Effects are 
mixed: after conversion there 
was some cost cutting, debt 
relief, with no evidence on 
reduced quality or access for the 
poor  
 
Makes useful points such as FPs 
raised income via exploiting 
reimbursement loopholes at the 
expense of the tax payer. NFPs 
mimic FPs in this. 
Also leads to fragmentation of 
hospitals between rich and poor, 
in part at least due to physician 
actions. 
289 McCue et al USA, 2001 
 
Interstudy data 
for 228 licensed 
HMOs; financial 
Financial 
performance 
Descriptive 
analysis 
FP and NFP plans had similar 
profit margins; however, FP 
plans incurred higher 
administrative costs ratios and 
lower medical benefits ratio. 
Plans with higher Medicaid 
Does list various limitations to the 
study. 
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data 
SEC 10-K 
financial filings 
for two publicly 
traded FP HMOs 
enrolment had higher medical 
benefits ratios, while both 
provider-sponsored and non-
provider sponsored plans had 
similar profit margins. Finally, 
publicly traded Medicaid focused 
plans achieved profit margins 
considerably higher than other 
Medicaid-focused plans. 
291 Mukamel et al California, 1982 
and 1989 
 
Sample of 318 
acute care 
hospitals from 
Hospital Annual 
Disclosure 
Report; risk 
adjusted 
mortality data 
from Medicare 
Hospital 
Information 
Report 
Quality of 
care 
(mortality 
rates) 
Multivariate 
regression  
In 1989 higher competition was 
associated with lower clinical 
expenditures levels compared 
with 1982. The trend was 
stronger for NFP (public) 
hospitals. Lower expenditure was 
associated with worse mortality 
outcomes, suggesting that 
competition and prospective 
payment led to cost containment 
at the expense of quality. 
Attempts to identify the strategies 
by hospitals in response to cost 
control polices. Focus was not on 
ownership, but on competition. 
Useful, because by focusing on 
one state, controls for regulation 
and variation in payment 
mechanisms, and shows 
importance of competition rather 
than ownership 
Limitations: Case mix adjustment 
was based on the DRG-index. NFP 
private hospitals are not included 
in the study.  The study is unusual 
in defining public hospitals as 
NFPs. It is therefore essentially a 
comparison of public and for-profit 
hospitals. 
292 Cleverley and 
Baserman 
USA 
 
Annual accounts 
of 5 largest FP 
hospital systems 
Capital 
investment 
financing 
Descriptive 
statistical 
comparison of 
the two sectors 
FPs had more debt financing. 
NFPs and FPs had larger debt 
than average, because sample 
captured the largest chains. NFPs 
had more variable interest rate 
financing which could be a 
Straightforward and useful 
descriptive comparison of NFPs’ 
and FPs’ financing methods 
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and 5 largest 
voluntary 
hospital systems. 
problem when interest rates rise, 
although cheap now. FPs had 
tiny levels of cash or reserves 
(2% debt) while NFPs had 
98.6%, because must 
accumulate cash to fund 
investment and get little from 
charity for investment. So must 
generate a cash surplus. There is 
little leasing. 
293 McBean et al  USA, 1999 and 
2001  
 
Medicare claims 
data linked with 
HEDIS quality 
data; Health care 
plan data linked 
to Medicare 
denominator file 
(N = 95,515) 
Outcomes: 
six process 
measures of 
diabetes 
care; 
including 
blood tests 
for diabetes 
control, 
cholesterol, 
and renal 
function. 
Ecological 
study; analysis 
according to 
diabetes 
outcome 
measures, by 
demographic 
variables, 
income race, 
plan model and 
profit status.   
Improvements in all 6 measures 
across the board, but for profit 
plans performed significantly less 
well than for profit in 4 of the 6 
measures and poorer care 
experienced more frequently in 
black and IPA plans.   
Generalisability of finding to other 
plans, exclusions, case mix in for 
profit plans not examined. 
 
294 Kaissi Minnesota 
 
Survey of 
medical group 
practices. Survey 
among 157 
practices 
(response rate 
72 %). 
Staff costs  Regression 
analysis   
The findings suggest that 
employment of midlevel 
practitioners (MLPs) and their 
ratios to primary care physicians 
(PCPs) in practices are influenced 
by the organisational 
characteristics of the group 
practice but not by the degree of 
financial risk sharing for patient 
care.  Consequently, risk-sharing 
financial incentives imposed by 
Authors suggest the findings in 
relation to NFPs could reflect the 
influence of hospital and health 
plan ownership of the NFP 
practices, their orientation 
towards improving efficiency and 
their organisational capacity to do 
so.  FP practices are physician 
owned – while NFPs are owned by 
larger non-clinic entities with 
more leverage to employ MLPs.   
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health insurance plans by 
themselves do not motivate 
medical groups to restructure 
their patient care practices to 
achieve higher levels of 
efficiency.  NFPs less likely to 
employ MLPs,   
295 Rosko Pennsylvania, 
1995-98 
 
Data  on 179 
private NFP 
hospitals from 
PHC4, AHA 
annual survey, 
Medicare 
Hospital Cost 
Report Minimum 
Data Set, Area 
Resource File 
Uncompensat
ed care 
Regression 
analysis 
The provision of uncompensated 
care is positively associated with 
financial surpluses, the provision 
of uncompensated care by 
neighbouring hospitals, bed 
capacity, proportion of outpatient 
visits that are emergency, and 
the unemployment rate (a proxy 
for need for uncompensated 
care). Other analysis found that 
the provision of uncompensated 
care was not associated with 
operating surplus, except in 
hospitals that provide very large 
amounts of uncompensated care. 
Provision of services to Medicaid 
patients and HMO penetration 
had a negative impact on 
profitability. 
Panel design 
296 Johnson et al Florida, 1997-
2001 
 
478 nursing 
homes in 30 
counties   
Quality of 
care 
(measured by 
number of 
lawsuits) 
Negative 
binomial 
regression 
Higher registered nurse and 
certified nursing assistant 
staffing levels associated with 
fewer lawsuits. More deficiencies 
on the licensing survey and 
larger and FP nursing homes 
were positively related with 
This study suggests nursing 
homes that meet staffing 
standards and minimum quality 
measures, are not for profit and 
smaller.   
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higher numbers of lawsuits.  
298 Konetzka et al USA, 1996 
 
Nationally 
representative 
sample of 5899 
nursing home 
residents in 815 
facilities.   
Quality of 
care (decision 
to 
hospitalise) 
Logistic 
regression 
Residents with suspected 
pneumonia in NFP facilities are 
hospitalised at a rate half that of 
for-profit facilities. The difference 
is most pronounced for residents 
who are older and more 
cognitively impaired and those 
who are covered by Medicare or 
private funds.  Medicaid 
residents are most likely overall 
to be hospitalised, with higher 
rates in not-for-profit than for-
profit facilities. 
Consistent with the hypothesis 
that greater emphasis placed in 
NFPs on the potential risks of 
transfer to frail residents.  
Medicaid residents have highest 
hospitalisation rates for suspected 
pneumonia, consistent with 
financial incentives to hospitalise. 
Higher Medicaid hospitalisation in 
NFP facilities is consistent with 
heterogeneity in the NFP sector, 
where Medicaid residents are 
sorted into lower quality facilities. 
299 Catalano et al  Colorado, 1994-
96 
 
Colorado 
Medicaid 
Agency’s 
administrative 
databases 
Quality of 
care 
(utilisation of 
psychiatric 
emergency 
services) 
Interrupted 
time-series 
quasi-
experiment 
(counties with 
capitation 
compared with 
counties with 
fee-for-service 
before and 
after capitation 
started in 
1995) 
The number of psychiatric 
emergencies treated in capitated 
areas declined by 28 % below 
the number of psychiatric 
emergencies expected from 
trends, cycles, and levels in fee-
for-service areas. Findings were 
similar for for-profit and not-for-
profit areas. The decrease 
persisted through the end of the 
first year after capitation. 
Not very conclusive findings: may 
not generalise to other states, e.g. 
Colorado seemed to have 
implemented capitation better 
than other states and may have 
reimbursed capitated providers 
more generously than other states 
which may have reduced 
providers’ incentives to restrict 
access to services that might 
prevent psychiatric emergencies 
300 Jha et al  USA 
 
1,537 hospitals 
HQA national 
reporting data 
Quality of 
care (10 
indicators) 
Comparison of’ 
performance in 
three clinical 
areas by 
number of 
Characteristics associated with 
small but significant increases in 
performance included being an 
academic hospital, being in the 
Northeast or Midwest, and being 
Problems of provider based data, 
non universal process measures. 
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derived from 
HEDIS. 
beds, region, 
specialisation 
and investor 
status. 
a not-for-profit hospital.  
304 Clement et al California, 1996 
 
Hospital data 
Access/unco
mpensated 
care 
Multivariate 
regression 
The results indicate that in mixed 
ownership markets, for-profit 
hospitals provide significantly 
less charity care as not-for-profit 
hospitals in the market provide 
more. Unexpectedly, for-profit 
hospitals were not more 
influenced by price competition 
than other hospitals with respect 
to charity care.  
Having a unique role in providing 
charity care may justify continuing 
tax exemption for NFP hospitals 
and enhance interest in payment 
and other policies with regard to 
conversions to ensure that not-
for-profit hospitals continue to be 
represented in market areas. 
Limitations: cross-section study 
only 
305 Rosko  USA, 1997 
 
Data from the 
AHA Annual 
Survey and 
Medicare Cost 
Reports 
(N = 1966 urban 
hospitals) 
Efficiency Stochastic 
frontier 
regression 
model 
Increases in managed care 
penetration, dependence on 
Medicare and Medicaid, 
membership in a multihospital 
system, and location in areas 
where competitive pressures and 
the pool of uncompensated care 
are greater were associated with 
less inefficiency. NFP ownership 
was associated with increased 
inefficiency. The findings for 
multihospital systems and NFP 
ownership suggest that 
inefficiency is also affected by 
the hospitals’ internal 
environment as well as by 
external pressures. 
Policy implications: results provide 
support for advocated of market-
oriented approaches for hospital 
cost containment; Hospitals can 
improve efficiency through 
consolidation; also support for 
regulatory approaches, such as 
PPS, that provide financial 
incentives for improved hospital 
efficiency.  
Limitations: Cross-sectional data 
only; restricted to large 
metropolitan areas; omitted 
variables problem: no measure of 
quality or direct measures of 
outpatient case mix were used 
306 Lorenz et al California, 1997 Access Multivariate For profit status was Comparing the results 
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All 176 licensed 
California 
hospices in 1997 
included. 
 
California OSHPD 
annual home 
care and hospice 
survey. 
(patient 
selection and 
service 
delivery) 
analysis independently associated with 
providing care to certain types of 
patients including those from 
long-term care facilities, persons 
with noncancer diagnoses, and 
persons with government 
insurance. For profits provided 
more total nursing visits but les 
skilled visits, and a higher 
percentage of for-profit patients 
had stays exceeding 90 days.  
Differences in patterns of nursing 
services among hospices were 
related to patient characteristics. 
The potential availability of 
complex palliative services did 
not differ by profit status. 
demonstrated that FPs appear to 
be selecting patients which in turn 
explains much of the difference in 
the way FPs and NFPs deliver 
care. Hospice care is shaped by 
current reimbursement policy. A 
capitated per-diem payment 
creates strong incentives for cost 
control because hospices cannot 
influence reimbursement rates.  
They may respond to the 
incentives created by 
reimbursement mechanisms 
dissimilarly depending on 
additional motivations.   
Demonstrates financial incentives 
influence patient selection.   
307 McCue and 
Thompson 
USA,  
2000-2003 
 
Data on hospices 
from Centres for 
Medicare and 
Medicaid 
Services Cost 
Report Data   
Operational 
and financial 
performance 
of hospices in 
three areas: 
utilization, 
services, and 
financial 
performance 
Descriptive 
analysis 
Small hospices owned by publicly 
traded companies incurred a 
longer length of stay, lower 
operating expenses, generated 
higher revenue per day and 
profit margin, and served a 
greater proportion of Medicare 
patients compared to NFP 
counterparts. Large hospices 
owned by publicly traded 
hospices served a greater 
proportion of Medicare patients, 
offered fewer noncore services, 
had higher revenue per day and 
profit margin and incurred lower 
salary and benefit expense per 
Results suggest publicly traded 
for-profit hospices, in comparison 
to for-profit and NFP hospices, are 
able to earn substantially higher 
profits. 
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day.  
311 Reiter et al Michigan, 2003-
2004 
 
Data from 
interviews and 
survey among 
hospitals 
participating in a 
pay-for-
performance 
system (N = 66) 
Quality of 
care 
Univariate 
analyses 
Hospitals respond to incentive 
payments; however, findings 
also reveal that hospital 
responses are not universal. 
Rather, involvement by boards of 
trustees, willingness to exert 
leverage with physicians, and 
financial and competitive 
motivations are all associated 
with hospitals’ behavioural 
responses to incentives.  
Limitations: findings not very 
conclusive; use of Likert-scales, 
relatively low case number; this 
study is not sensitive to ownership 
312 White et al USA 
metropolitan 
areas, 2001 
 
AHA survey, CMS 
files, and Area 
Resource File 
Hospital 
service 
offerings (3 
services) 
Descriptive 
analysis, 
comparison 
and Poisson 
regression 
models 
Catholic hospitals rank first on all 
three services whereas FP 
hospitals provided fewer services 
in all three categories, relatively 
smaller differences exist between 
Catholic hospitals and public and 
other NFP hospitals. Controlling 
for market and organisational 
characteristics, hospitals of other 
types are similar to Catholic 
hospitals in the provision of 
access services. But compared to 
Catholic hospitals, FP hospitals 
provided fewer stigmatised and 
compassionate services. Public 
hospitals also provided fewer 
stigmatised services than 
Catholic hospitals. No differences 
between Catholic hospitals and 
other NFP hospitals in the 
The distinctiveness of Catholic 
hospitals and other NFPs is 
consistent with their tax-exempt 
status, and provides some 
justification for public policy 
support of the NFP hospital sector. 
Initially controlled for case mix 
but deleted this from the 
regression models as case mix 
index was highly correlated with 
hospital size. 
Limitations: Study examines 
service offerings rather than the 
actual volume of services 
delivered; sample is limited to 
metropolitan areas; specialty 
hospitals were omitted from the 
sample, i.e. psychiatric and 
addiction treatment services are 
not captured; possible selection 
Not-for-profit health care organisations 
© NCCSDO 2008 137 
provisions of the three types of 
services. Since 1993 public 
hospitals and other NFPs have 
been adding compassionate 
cares services at a higher rate 
than Catholic hospitals; 
suggesting isomorphism in 
response to stronger market 
forces. 
bias since only hospitals were 
studied that responded to both 
AHA surveys in 1993 and 2001; 
sample hospitals offered more 
services than omitted hospitals in 
all three categories, hence, 
findings are not generalisable 
beyond the study sample 
 
313 Milcent France, 1997 
 
National 
database with 
records on all 
patients 
discharged from 
any acute-care 
hospital (N = 
28410) 
Quality of 
care (patient 
mortality); 
reimburseme
nt 
Proportional 
hazard model 
The incentive created by fee-for-
service reimbursement of for-
profit hospital yields a 4 % 
reduction in the mortality rate. 
However, this ranking of hospital 
quality is completely dependent 
on the characteristics and illness 
severity of patients. For-profit 
hospitals have the lowest 
mortality rates overall but the 
highest mortality rates for males 
aged between 50 and 60. They 
also vary more widely in quality 
than other ownership types. The 
capacity to perform innovative 
procedures has more effect on 
the mortality than the system of 
reimbursement and/or 
ownership. As such, private 
sector hospitals that perform 
more innovative procedures 
provide a better quality of care. 
Nevertheless, heterogeneity 
within hospitals is greater in for-
This suggests that, by choosing a 
for-profit hospital, patients have 
on average a lower instantaneous 
probability of dying but are less 
sure about the quality of the 
hospital. 
Limitations: effects of ownership 
and reimbursement could have 
been due to unobserved variation 
in patient characteristics. 
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profit hospitals than in other 
types of hospital.  
315 Brown USA 
 
Nationally 
representative 
sample of 300 
NFP and 300 FP 
facilities. 
 
 
Quality of 
care 
Multiple 
regression 
analysis 
NFP providers provided a higher 
level of quality than for-profit 
facilities when organisational size 
and facility-mix were controlled. 
NFP providers offered smaller 
facilities, on average. Higher 
level of professional and support 
staff more likely to be provided 
by NFPs; more likely to service 
more severely disabled people 
and more likely to be small. 
Highlights complex nature of 
relationship between quality, 
indicators and resident outcomes 
and suggests NFPs and FPs 
coexist in harmony.    
Controls for case-mix. 
Although acknowledges 
environmental context plays a role 
in shaping organisational 
behaviour, did not attempt to 
account for this in the research.   
317 Landon et al USA 
 
82583 Medicare 
beneficiaries 
from 182 health 
plans 
User 
assessments 
of care 
Regression 
analysis 
For-profit and nationally affiliated 
health plans received much 
worse scores on the outcomes of 
interest, particularly for overall 
ratings of the health plan and 
composite measures of customer 
service and access to care. 
Health plans accredited by the 
National Committee for Quality 
Assurance did not receive higher 
scores. 
Described as the first study to 
report health plan characteristics 
associated with performance 
based on a uniform national 
survey. Authors say the findings 
are consistent with other studies 
which have found lower 
performance among for-profits. 
However, there is also a tendency 
in the literature to summarise 
empirical findings as contradictory 
or mixed. 
318 Chou USA, 1984-94 
 
Quality of 
care 
Econometric 
modelling   
The results on two of four quality 
indicators suggest that the effect 
Longitudinal study 
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Data from 3 
National Long 
term care 
surveys and 
Medicare claims 
data.  N = 2992  
(measured by 
mortality and 
several 
adverse 
health 
outcomes) 
of ownership on quality of care is 
larger when asymmetric info 
exists between nursing homes 
and residents.  No significant 
differences when family 
members involved. So for-profits 
have more incentive to 
compromise on quality of care 
which are hard to monitor.   
321 Harrison and 
Sexton 
USA, 1998 and 
2001 
 
National cross-
sectional data for 
these two years 
(based on annual 
AHA surveys) on 
religious NFP 
hospitals 
Efficiency  Data 
envelopment 
analysis 
Average efficiency score of 
religious NFP hospitals increased 
by 2.7% from 1998 to 2001. 
Increases in admissions (9%) 
and outpatient visits (14.8%) 
during the study period have 
contributed to improved 
organisational performance. 
Number of beds cause religious 
NFP hospital inefficiency. Authors 
argue that the decline in 
community support for NFP 
activities through fewer 
donations is an indication that 
religious NFP hospitals are not 
clearly documenting their 
contributions to the community. 
Limitations: Study rather 
meaningless as no real 
explanation why efficiency may 
have changed. Not really a 
longitudinal analysis since data 
was only collected cross-
sectionally in two years, so trend 
is not clear. No comparison made 
with other sectors or other NFP 
hospitals. It is noted that NFP 
hospitals are being challenged to 
increase efficiency in order to gain 
greater access to capital and 
remain competitive in the 
changing health care market, but 
hospital environment (market 
penetration etc.) was not taken 
into account. Case mix not 
included. 
323 Younis USA, 1991-95 
 
Data from post-
prospective 
Financial and 
economic 
performance 
Regression 
analysis 
The size of hospitals, occupancy 
rate of hospital beds, ownership 
status, degree of competition 
faced in the market, teaching 
status, and measure of financial 
Ownership was not focus of study, 
but just one variable among 
others 
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payment system, 
Medicare Cost 
Report with 
support from 
HCIA Inc.  
521 FP and 
3,406 NFP 
hospitals 
indebtedness of hospitals are 
significant determinants of 
hospital performance holding 
location constant. Also suggests 
that the relationship between 
hospital efficiency measure and 
its various determinants is non-
linear in nature and therefore, it 
is important to adopt appropriate 
non-linear econometric models 
for empirical estimation of the 
performance function. Findings 
show that rural and small 
hospitals face significant factors 
that hinder performance 
compared to urban and larger 
hospitals such as lack of (DSH) 
payments and economy of scale 
due to their smaller size and 
lower proportion of Medicaid 
patients. 
324 Picone et al USA, 1984-1995 
 
73,503 Medicare 
patients; 
sample from 
panel data of 
National Long 
Term Care 
Survey 
Quality of 
care; 
conversion 
study 
Interviews; 
multivariate 
regression 
analysis 
l-2 years after conversion to FP 
status, mortality of patients, 
which is difficult for outsiders to 
monitor, increases while hospital 
profitability rises markedly and 
staffing decreases. Thereafter, 
the decline in quality is much 
lower. A similar decline in quality 
is not observed after hospitals 
switch from FP to government or 
private NFP status. 
 
Concludes that conversions are 
harmful. 
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325 Gillies et al  USA, 2003 
 
Data on 272 
health plans 
from InterStudy, 
HEDIS, and 
CAHPS survey  
Responsivene
ss to users; 
clinical 
quality 
Multivariate 
regression 
 
 
Health plans that rely more on 
organised physician groups or 
staff groups perform at a higher 
level on many clinical measures 
than other plans 
Other variables significantly 
associated with performance 
were being geographically 
located in the Northeast, having 
NFP status, and not being part of 
a larger insurance company. For-
profit status is frequently 
negatively related to 
performance, especially 
satisfaction with the health plan. 
Only plans consenting to public 
release of their HEDIS results 
were included, i.e. selection bias. 
No case-mix adjustment made; 
however, some of the measures, 
e.g. screening and immunisation, 
apply regardless of health status 
and studies of the impact of case-
mix adjustment on HEDIS and 
CAPHS results have shown a very 
small effect. Only cross-sectional 
associations shown, but no 
causality; other unmeasured 
factors may have impact.  
326 Barro USA, 1993, 1996 
and 1999 
 
Data on cardiac 
speciality 
hospitals from 
various official 
sources, e.g. 
AHA annual 
survey 
Cost and 
quality of 
care 
Regression 
analysis 
Patients from hospital referral 
regions (HRRs) with speciality 
hospital entry experience 
statistically slower growth in 
expenditure than control HRRs.  
However, there was also 
statistically significant data to 
show that specialty entry for-
profit hospitals reduced quality of 
care, decreased readmissions but 
may improve overall mortality. 
The final result showed non-
comparability of the data 
because specialty hospitals were 
more likely to admit significantly 
younger, healthier, white male 
patients, even controlling for 
DRGs.  
Extremely complex modelling 
which was designed to take 
account of patient mix, different 
ownership status, size, teaching, 
status of hospitals. The results 
and the conclusions are 
ambiguous.  The technical detail 
and modelling makes it very 
difficult to examine any of the 
assumptions.  What is most 
striking is that there is no attempt 
to just look at the population’s 
geographic access to health care 
and adjusted for age and sex.  
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327 Szczech et al  USA 
 
Dialysis units - 
renal data 
system. 
Risk of death 
in NFPs vs 
FPs 
Risk of death 
and survival 
adjusted for 
socio-
demographic 
factors and 
analysed by 
investor status. 
Equivocal and interpretable Study demonstrates all the 
problems of even trying to 
attempt this type of analysis. 
328 McKay and 
Deily 
Florida 
 
Data from the 
Shands which 
purchases 
patient discharge 
data from the 
State, then risk 
adjusts each 
discharge.   
Quality of 
care and 
efficiency 
Multivariate 
regression 
Hospitals in the high-performing 
group were more likely to be for-
profit, had higher occupancy 
rates, had proportionately more 
Medicare and proportionately 
fewer Medicaid and self-pay 
patients, used fewer patient-care 
personnel per admission, and 
had higher operating margins 
than all other hospitals. Managed 
care presence, measured by 
proportion of HMO-PPO 
admissions, was not found to be 
a significant factor in 
differentiating hospital 
performance groups. 
One limitation is the use of risk-
adjusted excess mortality as the 
single measure of hospital patient 
health outcomes.  It only 
measures patient-care labour at 
admission and does not take into 
account personnel quality. The 
authors acknowledge therefore 
that findings on the effect of 
patient-care staffing on 
performance must be interpreted 
cautiously.   
329 Green  California, 2000 
 
California Office 
of Statewide 
Health Planning 
and 
Development 
discharge 
Access: 
number of 
poor payer 
transfers 
admitted by 
different 
hospital 
groups (2 of 
descriptive and 
multivariate 
analyses 
(linear 
regression) 
Transfer patients were more 
costly. All hospital groups 
admitted a higher percentage of 
good payer than poor payer 
transfer patients. Likelihood of a 
hospital admitting a transfer 
patient affected by both the 
patient’s insurance status and 
the hospital’s ownership as well 
Not clear who decides about 
transfers. Hospitals may be forced 
to transfer patients within a 
managed care network. Receiving 
hospitals may have protocols to 
be selective about the insurance 
status of potential transfers to 
increase their proportion of 
profitable patients. Hospitals may 
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abstract 
database; 
exclusion of 
Kaiser 
Permanente 
hospitals since 
there is no 
variation in 
payer status 
 
them NFP)  
 
as teaching status. Public-owned 
most likely to admit poorer 
transfer patients compared to 
not-for-profits and for-profits, 
not-for-profits more likely to 
admit poorer transfer patients 
than for-profits. 
  
 
also be building programmes to 
attract good-payer patients, 
especially for highly reimbursed 
services. Alternatively, the 
selection process may occur at the 
sending hospital where referrals 
are made differentially to public 
hospitals for poorly insured 
patients and to private hospitals 
for patients whose insurance is 
known to reimburse well. 
Limitations: transfer patterns in 
California may not be 
generalisable to other states with 
less managed care and/or fewer 
publicly owned hospitals. Data do 
not allow linking of transferring 
and receiving hospitals or tracking 
of individual patients. No attempt 
to address geographic 
considerations such as 
transportation time. 
330 Crampton et 
al 
New Zealand 
 
Representative 
survey of visits 
to GPs. Study of 
10,506 records 
from 48 NFP and 
198 for-profit GP 
practices. 
 Observational 
study  
Compared with FP practices, 
community-governed NFPs 
served a younger and largely 
non-European population, the 
majority of whom lived in the 
most deprived quintiles of areas 
in NZ. Patients visiting NFPs 
were diagnosed with more 
problems and duration of visit 
was significantly longer. When 
confounding variables were 
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controlled for, the odds of 
specialist referral were higher for 
patients treated in FP practices. 
331 Hodgkin et al  USA, 1999 
 
60 US market 
areas;  
nationally 
representative 
sample of 
commercial MCO 
products; 
surveys 
completed by 
interviewing a 
senior 
administrator of 
an MCO (92% 
response rate) 
 
Use of quality 
standards, 
e.g. provider 
satisfaction 
Bivariate tests 
and logistic 
regression 
analysis 
Use of standards differs 
markedly by product type for 
every standard considered, with 
Preferred Provider Organisations 
(PPOs) being consistently much 
less likely than HMOs and point 
of service (POS) plans to use 
each standard. 
Fully capitated products with no 
limits are less likely to have any 
standards and less likely to use 
four specific standards. Those 
fully capitated products that did 
have limits showed no significant 
difference from no-capitated 
products in their use of 
standards. 
For-profits were less likely than 
NFPs to use a provider 
satisfaction standard. 
Finding could emerge for several 
reasons. MCOs that transfer full 
risk may be using mechanisms 
other than quality standards to 
prevent skimping; may be less 
concerned about quality; or may 
be more sceptical about the value 
of existing standards. The fact 
that FP plans are equally or more 
likely to use these standards may 
reveal that their objectives are not 
different from those of NFPs, or 
that competition is constraining 
them to adopt standards anyway. 
Limitations: lack of more detailed 
data on the nature of financial 
risk-sharing, and on the types of 
financial penalties associated with 
each standard. MCOs might have 
been using other quality-related 
standards that were not included 
in study. Not known whether 
standards are enforced. 
332 Longest and 
Lin  
Massachusetts, 
c. 2001-2003  
 
Sample of NFP 
hospitals (n= 
48); data from 
Financial 
performance 
and 
“corporate 
citizenship” 
(i.e. 
community 
Linear 
regressions 
This study demonstrates a 
significantly positive association 
between corporate citizenship 
and financial performance. 
Without demonstrating causation 
in either direction, the analysis 
shows that the NFP hospitals in 
This finding may reflect the same 
relationship found in numerous 
studies of corporate citizenship 
and financial performance in 
business firms. Namely, that 
business advantages accrue to 
firms through their practice of 
Not-for-profit health care organisations 
© NCCSDO 2008 145 
the Office of the 
attorney general, 
Medicare cost 
reports, and the 
AHA.  
benefits)  this study can simultaneously do 
well for themselves financially, 
and good in terms of the benefits 
provided to communities. That 
is, they perform better financially 
as they spend relatively more on 
their community benefits 
initiatives.  
good corporate citizenship. 
Limitations: problems of defining 
community benefit not addressed.  
336 Shen  USA, 1987-98 
 
 
Effects of 
ownership 
conversion on 
hospital 
performance; 
staffing, 
capacity, 
financial 
performance, 
unprofitable 
care 
Insufficient 
information 
(abstract only) 
Conversions to government and 
for-profit ownership both 
increased the profit margin: the 
former due to rising revenue, 
and the latter due to reduced 
operating costs and rising 
revenue. Hospitals that 
converted to FP ownership had 
the greatest reduction in staffing 
relative to other converted 
hospitals. There was little change 
in bed capacity after conversion 
to FP status, but reductions in 
bed capacity after conversion to 
government or NFP status. No 
conversion led to a reduced 
unprofitable care, but conversion 
to private ownership (NFP and 
for-profit) increased trauma 
centre closures. 
Any attempt to isolate the effect 
of ownership on performance 
must address the confounding 
effects of market structure. 
338 Carter and 
Porell 
Massachusetts 
1991-94 
 
Quarterly 
Quality of 
care 
(hospitalisati
on rates) 
Logistic 
regressions  
Multivariate findings suggest that 
resident heterogeneity alone 
does not account for the wide 
variations in hospitalization rates 
across nursing homes. Instead, 
Implications: Variations in 
hospitalization rates may reflect 
underutilization, as well as 
overutilization. Continued efforts 
toward identifying medically 
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Medicaid case-
mix 
reimbursement 
data from 527 
nursing homes 
linked with 
Medicare 
Provider Analysis 
and Review 
hospital claims 
and nursing 
facility attribute 
data  
facility characteristics such as 
profit status, nurse staffing 
patterns, NH size, chain 
affiliation, and percentage of 
Medicaid and Medicare 
reimbursed days significantly 
influence NH residents' risk of 
hospitalization. Broader area 
market factors also appear to 
contribute to variations in 
hospitalization rates. 
necessary hospitalizations are 
needed. 
 
Longitudinal design; controlling for 
individual-level resident 
attributes, including: NH 
diagnoses, resident-level quality 
of care indicators, and diagnostic 
cost grouping classification from 
previous hospital stays 
339 Safran et al USA 
 
Data from cross-
sectional survey 
of Medicare 
beneficiaries in 
13 states with 
substantial 
Medicare HMO 
markets (64 % 
response rate) 
Quality of 
care; 
variables: 
access, 
continuity, 
integration, 
comprehensiv
eness, “whole 
person” 
orientation, 
clinical 
interaction, 
sustained 
clinician-
patient 
partnership 
Regression 
analyses 
Performance was better in fee-
for service Medicare than it was 
in HMOs. Few differences were 
associated with HMO profit 
status. 
 
341 Helmig and 
Lapsley  
Germany, 1992-
96 
 
Relative 
(technical) 
efficiency 
Data 
envelopment 
analysis 
At an aggregate level, public and 
welfare sector relatively more 
efficient than private hospitals; 
public and welfare hospitals use 
A lot of teaching (one of two 
output variables) is carried out in 
public sector hospitals and in 
public universities; this might 
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German 
statistical 
yearbooks and 
one national 
hospital report 
 
Measured by:  
Input: plant 
size, labour 
expenses, 
supplies  
Output: 
treated 
cases, 
teaching  
relatively fewer resources than 
private hospitals; suggests 
differences in quality of care 
arising from ownership. 
cause the inefficiency with respect 
to teaching. In addition, because 
educational possibilities in private 
hospitals are worse than those in 
public hospitals, private hospitals 
often pay higher salaries in order 
to recruit personnel. Other factors 
likely to have influenced result. 
Limitations: The only measures of 
efficiency available do not provide 
a clear picture. DEA cannot assess 
the maximum level of efficiency, 
which is theoretically possible 
beyond the level of performance 
found empirically in the hospital 
sectors under study; deriving 
statistics of precision is 
problematic with DEA; data is only 
on aggregate level. 
342 Ginn and 
Moseley 
USA, 2000 
 
Acute care 
hospitals, data 
from AHA survey 
and Area 
Resource File 
Integration 
and planning 
(extent to 
which 
hospitals 
provided 
health 
promotion 
services) 
Cross-sectional 
multiple 
regression 
analysis.   
Community health and 
community-based quality 
orientations were positively and 
significantly related to the direct 
provision of health promotion 
services by hospitals, and the 
collaborative provision of health 
promotion services to systems, 
joint ventures, and networks. 
Results suggested that NFP 
ownership was less significant on 
the provision of health promotion 
services than factors such as 
hospital size and the degree of 
It is unprising that health 
promotion and community 
orientation appear to be related, 
but the study relies upon self-
reported assessments of whether 
or not an institution possessed a 
community orientation; this is 
highly likely to impart bias since 
hospitals are likely to exaggerate 
the extent to which they provide 
such activities. Study is based on 
simplistic multiple regression 
analysis, with little comment on 
the relative significance of various 
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market competition. coefficients in the regression 
equation. 
343 Gibelman and 
Gelman 
Cross-national 
(USA, Australia, 
England, France, 
Germany, Israel, 
cotland, South 
Africa), 1998-
2000 
 
Health care and 
human service 
NFPs 
Trust Qualitative 
content 
analysis of 
publicized 
incidents of 
alleged 
wrongdoing on 
the part of 
NFPs (data 
from 
newspapers 
identified 
through Lexis-
Nexis and 
ProQuest). 
The purpose of the research was 
to identify problems created for 
NGO credibility and public trust. 
The author speculates that part 
of the public perception problem 
is that NFPs have a vaulted 
status based on ideas of 
“inherent purity” which exposes 
them to the danger of fall from 
grace. 
Limitations: Choice of one medium 
only; wrongdoing was limited to 
behaviour of staff or directors. No 
outcomes of allegations were 
reported. Cases from a wide range 
of NFP organisations and countries 
(hence limited comparability). 
Finally, no comparison is 
undertaken. Thus, while a 
problem of governance (lack of 
accountability) is identified it is 
not possible to say whether this is 
due to ownership. 
344 Brickley and 
Van Horn 
USA, 1991-95 
 
Sample of 7301 
pooled 
observations 
from 2134 NFP 
hospitals and 
499 pooled 
observations 
from 220 FP 
hospitals, data 
from AHA 
Financial 
performance; 
public 
purpose 
Descriptive 
statistics and 
logistic 
regressions 
This paper examines the 
incentives of CEOs. The evidence 
indicates that both turnover and 
compensation of these CEOs are 
significantly related to financial 
performance (return on assets). 
Finds no evidence that NFP 
hospitals provide explicit 
incentives for their CEOs to focus 
on altruistic activities. The 
turnover/performance relation 
appears stronger in NFP hospitals 
than in for-profit hospitals and 
other for-profit corporations (our 
data do not allow us to compare 
compensation incentives). 
Study tests “competition 
hypothesis”: Competition has 
forced many NFPs to focus on 
profits and survival so that there 
is little available surplus for 
charity care. This hypothesis 
suggests that CEOs in competitive 
markets have incentives to focus 
primarily on financial 
performance, while CEOs in 
concentrated, less competitive 
markets will have greater 
incentives to focus on altruism. 
Overall, the results do not support 
this hypothesis as similar 
incentives are observed in both 
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concentrated and unconcentrated 
markets. Results are generally 
consistent with the “for-profits in 
disguise” hypothesis that NFP and 
FP hospital boards have similar 
objective functions (i.e. financial 
performance) although statistical 
tests have low power because of 
the crudeness of altruism 
variables and the relatively low 
level of for-profit presence in most 
US counties.  
345 Eldenburg et 
al 
California 
 
Data derived 
from California 
hospitals’ annual 
hospital 
accounting 
reports.  
Hospital 
governance 
in relation to 
composition 
of the board, 
board 
turnover, 
CEO turnover 
Regression 
analysis 
The study tests the hypothesis 
that different objectives lead to 
different governing structures. 
The composition of boards of 
directors differs across ownership 
types. Director turnover 
increases with poor performance. 
Poor performance, high 
administrative costs, and high 
uncompensated care lead to 
higher CEO turnover. 
The interest of this study is that it 
is motivated by the absence of 
theoretical predictions about the 
objectives of NFP organisations, 
and therefore of the objective 
function of the governing system. 
Writing in 2001, the authors 
suggest that little attention had 
been paid to NFP governance. 
Limitations: federal and HMO 
hospitals excluded. Bias arising 
from missing data. 
346  Kendall et al England Motivations 
of domiciliary 
care 
providers 
Postal 
questionnaire 
and interviews 
with providers 
Core motivations revolve round 
combining a desire to meet the 
needs of clients with seeking 
‘reasonable’ financial reward. 
Local authority purchasers 
viewed by the authors as 
exercising exceptional power in 
social care markets in England. 
The regulatory system, 
Relies on the self-reports of 
providers  
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influenced by the National Care 
Standards Act 2000, is viewed as 
embryonic and limited (as of 
2003).   
348 Zimmermann 
and Stevens 
South Carolina, 
2002 
 
Surveys mailed 
to 577 NFP 
organisations, 
return rate only 
26.5% (n = 149) 
Use of 
performance 
measurement 
Exploratory 
case study; 
descriptive 
statistics, 
content 
analysis 
65% of NFP organisations use 
performance or outcome 
measures as a part of their 
evaluation process. There was a 
significant relationship between 
agencies using performance 
measurement and those required 
to do so by some outside source, 
mainly in order to meet 
requirements of grants or 
contracts for service (52.6%) 
while another 23.6% listed 
accountability or effectiveness as 
their primary motivation. 
Limitations: Small sample size; 
“Performance measure” not 
defined in detail; Question not 
answered whether performance 
measurements have resulted in 
improved services being provided 
 
350 Hodge and 
Piccolo 
Florida 
 
Survey among 
CEOs; sample of 
NFP human 
service 
organisations 
affiliated to a 
single Florida 
provider 
Governance 
in relation to 
source of 
funding and 
board 
involvement 
in decision-
making 
Regression 
analysis 
Funding source is significantly 
related to board involvement 
techniques: funding source in 
NFPs appears to be an important 
and consistent predictor of 
strategy and performance. 
Insufficient information about the 
calculation of financial 
vulnerability. Many likely biases: 
survey is based on a relatively 
small sample; all the agencies in 
the study are affiliated to a single 
organisation the influence of 
which was not considered; use of 
CEO self-reports. 
351 Lorenz et al USA, 1998 
 
Data on hospices 
Uncompensat
ed care 
Multivariate 
analysis 
Only 3% of hospice patients 
received unreimbursed care. 
Because 98% of older adults are 
eligible for Medicare, they 
Recipients of unreimbursed 
hospice care are demographically 
similar to the uninsured, and 
whether uninsured persons 
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from National 
Home and 
Hospice Care 
Survey (NHHCS) 
discharge 
dataset 
stratified multivariate analysis on 
age greater or less than 65 
years. Among persons less than 
65 years of age, younger, 
nonwhite persons were more 
likely to receive unreimbursed 
care, and persons with cancer. 
Providers of unreimbursed care 
to persons over 65 years were 
more likely to be NFP and 
freestanding. 
receive unreimbursed hospice care 
depends on clinical and agency 
organisational factors related to 
the motivation to provide 
unreimbursed care. 
352 Guo  USA, 2000 
 
Web-based 
survey data; 
sample of 155 
human service 
NFPs (analysis 
limited to those 
which operated 
ventures at the 
time of interview 
(N = 67) 
 
Effects of 
commercialis
ation on NFPs 
(commercialis
ation 
measured as 
percentage of 
income from 
commercial 
activities) 
Path analysis 
(as an 
extension of 
regression 
analysis) 
Commercialisation does not 
make a significant contribution to 
an organisation’s ability to 
attract and retain donors and 
volunteers, mission, and 
programme and/or service 
delivery. However, 
commercialisation has a 
significant positive impact on the 
organisation’s self-sufficiency, 
reputation, and ability to attract 
and retain staff. Path analysis 
suggests that higher levels of 
commercial income can lead to 
higher assessments of the 
organisation’s reputation, and 
these, in turn, can lead to higher 
levels of commercial income. 
Higher levels of commercial 
income do not appear to affect 
the relationship between the 
organisation and donors. 
Reliance on participants’ replies: 
bias likely as managers with 
vested interests were interviewed. 
Use of Likert-type scale reduced 
the availability of information; 
framing of the questions about 
organisation outcomes likely to 
solicit positive responses, hence 
the positive effects of 
commercialisation yielded not 
unexpected. Small sample size; 
sample’s representativeness not 
known. No comparison of 
venturing with non-venturing 
NFPs. Measurement of 
commercialisation on a 
percentage basis yields problems 
when interpreting it in relation to 
donations in correlation-based 
statistics. Cross-sectional data 
used, difficult to assess causation. 
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355 Matosevic et 
al 
England, 1995 
and 1999 
 
261 postal 
surveys and 111 
interviews 
among 
independent 
sector 
domiciliary care 
providers 
Funding 
mechanisms/
reimburseme
nt  
Two surveys of 
independent 
domiciliary 
care providers  
A developing domiciliary care 
market dominated by small but 
growing businesses.  Common 
perception among independent 
providers that in-house services 
receive favourable treatment and 
conditions.  Spot contracts 
continue to be the most common 
form of contract although there 
are moves toward guaranteed 
service and more sophisticated 
patterns of contracting 
arrangements.  Information 
sharing limited.   
Based on the same study referred 
to in 346.  Similar reliance on self-
reports from providers. 
356 Milligan and 
Fyfe 
Glasgow  
 
Questionnaires 
and interviews 
with voluntary 
organisations 
and government.  
Service 
availability; 
access to 
capital  
Qualitative 
study.   
 
Shifts in territorial boundaries for 
accessing funding, creates 
complex patterns of inclusion 
and exclusion. Devolution has 
resulted in lobbying of the 
parliament by voluntary 
organisations – the three sectors 
considered here have accessed 
this opportunity to varying 
extents, raising questions about 
the extent to which voluntary 
partnerships in delivery of 
welfare may contribute to an 
increase in the democratic 
deficit.   
This study offered a unique 
(geographical) perspective on 
voluntary sector activity in one UK 
city. The implications are relevant 
to the question of access.   
357 Gurewich et 
al 
USA, 1998-2001 
 
Including cases 
Conversion 
study 
Case study 
approach, Used 
semi-
structured 
In all five cases at least some 
respondents described the 
hospitals’ relationship with the 
nonacute care delivery system 
Has some relevance to 
partnership literature in the UK. 
Concern that conversion to 
investor ownership imposes new 
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of the sale of all 
of part of any 
urban NFP 
hospital to a 
national 
investor-owned 
organisation 
between 1994 
and 1998.   
interviews with 
key informants 
on resource 
gains and 
losses following 
conversion.  
Also reviewed 
published and 
unpublished 
materials on 
the hospitals. 
following conversion as providing 
fewer resources. Largely because 
fewer material resources flowed 
from the hospital to community 
organisations or the hospital was 
a less active participant in 
community planning efforts. 
Conversions affected 
communities and stakeholders 
differently. Affected by the 
degree of political organisation in 
the community, the dispensation 
of the hospital’s charitable 
resources and the importance of 
shared mission. 
fiduciary responsibilities that may 
undermine a hospital’s social 
contract to meet the needs of the 
community, regardless of 
profitability (uncompensated 
care).  Restructuring of the health 
care environment, with providers 
pulled in two directions: 
competition through the premium 
placed on cost-efficient care, while 
also expected to cooperate with 
others.   
358 Deily  USA, 1986-91 
4739 hospitals 
from the AHA 
and Area 
Resource File 
 
Exit of 
hospitals 
from market 
in relation to 
inefficiency 
Stochastic 
frontier cost 
approach 
Hospitals’ exit decisions differed 
systematically among different 
ownership types. Less efficient 
hospitals were more likely to exit 
when ownership was FP or NFP 
rather than public. The relative 
inefficiency residual was the 
primary determinant of exit for 
for-profit hospitals. NFP hospitals 
with higher relative inefficiency 
were significantly more likely to 
close, but community need also 
had a significant effect on exit. 
The only variables having a 
significant effect on the exit 
decision of government hospitals 
were county population and 
depreciation and interest 
Among privately funded hospitals 
ownership did not have a 
significant effect on closure when 
both ownership and relative 
inefficiency were controlled for, in 
contrast to earlier studies that 
found FP hospitals were more 
likely to close. Overall, results 
suggest that NFP hospitals are 
influenced both by economic 
factors and community need when 
deciding whether or not to close. 
The variables included in the 
study were poor predictors of exit 
by government hospitals, 
suggesting that political factors 
may be the key determinants of 
exit for public hospitals. The cost 
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expense per bed. function included variables to 
control for quality. 
359 Hansmann et 
al  
USA, 1985-94 
 
AHA surveys, 
excluding certain 
hospital types; 
several other 
official sources 
(data on virtually 
all elderly 
Medicare 
beneficiaries with 
heart attack in 
1985) 
Service 
availability 
Regression 
analysis 
 
 
FPs are the most responsive to 
reductions in demand, followed 
by public and religiously affiliated 
NFPs, while secular NFPs are the 
least responsive. FP and public 
hospitals adjust to demand 
increases significantly more 
rapidly in concentrated markets, 
whereas religious NFPs adjust to 
demand increases significantly 
less rapidly, reflecting the 
conflicting incentives for, and 
constraints on, expansion of 
hospitals of different ownership 
types. Both secular and religious 
NFP hospitals use reductions in 
bed capacity more than closure 
of facilities in response to 
decreasing demand, consistent 
with managerialist bias against 
complete exit that theory 
suggests among NFPs. 
Managers of FP hospitals, and to a 
lesser degree managers of public 
or religiously affiliated NFP 
hospitals, have an incentive to 
minimise costs of service, and 
hence to eliminate unused or 
underused capacity. Managers of 
unaffiliated NFP institutions, in 
contrast, may not feel such an 
incentive so long as net cash flow 
does not become negative. Even if 
cash flow is negative, NFP 
managers are free to maintain 
capacity by drawing down on 
accumulated net assets. Indeed, 
they may feel it is their duty to 
behave in this fashion, believing 
that all of the firm’s revenues and 
net assets must be dedicated to 
providing the maximum care 
possible.  
Limited to metropolitan areas. 
360 Becker and 
Potter  
USA, 1994 
 
AHA survey 1994 
(4705 hospitals); 
population data 
from Area 
Resource File 
Hospital 
efficiency and 
social 
responsibility 
OLS regression Results confirm hypotheses that 
FP hospitals and hospitals lacking 
local ties are managing 
stakeholder relationships in ways 
that increase the efficiency of 
these hospitals but decreases 
their social responsiveness. 
There appears to be an inverse 
relationship between hospital 
Instead of assuming that both 
efficiency and social responsibility 
can be or should be maximised, 
we may want to consider what a 
change in one is likely to do to the 
other. Instead of optimising, we 
may need to think in terms of 
balancing and making tradeoffs.  
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efficiency and social 
responsibility. NFP community 
hospitals, while appearing to be 
the most likely to provide social 
responsive services, are the least 
efficient and probably the most 
vulnerable to economic 
problems. 
 
Limitations: Hospital social 
responsibility measures best 
indicators? 
Cross-section analysis only 
 
361 Melnick et al 
1999 
California, 1986-
94 
 
Data on General 
short-term acute 
care hospitals 
from Californian 
Office of 
Statewide Health 
Planning and 
Development; 
Medicare 
prospective 
payment system 
impact file; Area 
Resource File 
Price increase 
after mergers 
Multiple 
regression; 
Series of 
simulation 
models of 
hypothetical 
merger 
scenarios in 
four different 
years 
After 1986 all hospitals, 
regardless of ownership type, 
raised their prices in response to 
a merger. The amount of 
expected price increase from two 
merging hospitals depended on 
ownership and the market share 
of the merging hospitals. FP 
hospital pricing is more affected 
by market concentration, so FPs 
will tend to raise prices more 
after a merger. Data suggests 
that hospital conversions from 
NFP to FP status could lead to 
price increases, as it appears 
that FP charge about 10 % 
higher prices given the same 
level of market concentration. 
When monopolies are formed, 
the findings show large price 
increases, regardless of 
ownership. Also indirect effect on 
prices of other competitors in the 
market, whether FP or NFP. 
 
Implications for antitrust 
regulators and agencies that must 
approve NFP conversions. The 
observed changes in pricing 
behaviour over time are 
consistent with the trend of 
increased price competition and 
more aggressive, market-based 
pricing by all hospitals. The 
increase in the number of NFP 
systems may contribute to the 
increase in prices among NFPs. 
NFP hospitals with boards 
consisting of local community 
members are being superseded by 
NFPs that are part of large 
regional or multi-state systems, 
governed and controlled from 
remote corporate headquarters, 
which presumably have different 
objectives.  
 
Limitations: partly only modelling; 
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362 Himmelstein 
et al 
USA, 1996 
 
HEDIS data for 
329 HMO plans 
(248 FP and 81 
NFP), 
representing 
56% of the total 
HMO enrolment 
Quality of 
care 
Multivariate 
regression 
Investor-owned HMOs deliver 
lower quality of care than NFP 
plans for all 14 quality-of-care 
indicators. In multivariate 
analyses, FP was consistently 
associated with lower quality 
after controlling for model type, 
geographic region, and the 
method each HMO used to collect 
data. 
Abstract only 
 
14 HEDIS quality-of-care 
indicators employed 
 
Sample not very representative 
363 Harris et al UK 
 
HIV/AIDS 
voluntary sector 
agencies 
Co-operation 
and merger 
between 
voluntary 
agencies 
Literature 
review of 
organisational 
cooperation in 
the UK and US 
voluntary 
sectors, policy 
analysis and 
semi-
structured 
interviews with 
agency CEOs 
and external 
stakeholders 
Researchers found that all the 
key drivers identified were 
present in this case study, 
except immediate organisational 
crisis. Public expenditure 
constraints were a consideration. 
Also evidence of a search to find 
a niche for the HIV/AIDS 
voluntary sector in a competitive 
policy environment in which 
evidence of need for their 
services was diminishing. 
Resource dependency was a 
factor as well as the ambitions of 
some managers to see their 
agencies become bigger players  
The research was commissioned 
by the agencies. The analysis was 
based on interviews with CEOs 
and external stakeholders only.  
While all the CEOs emphasised 
their commitment to their users, 
there were specific drivers related 
to status within the agencies. The 
study focuses almost entirely on 
drivers towards cooperation, 
tending to ignore barriers which 
emerged from interviews.   
364 Vincent and 
Harrow 
England and 
Scotland 
 
Data on funding 
to voluntary 
organisations in 
Funding in 
the health 
sector/public 
purpose   
Documentary 
analysis of the 
Deakin and 
Kemp reports; 
survey and 
interviews with 
voluntary 
Scottish organisations more 
likely to rely on central 
government funding for more 
than 60% of income.  Cross-
national unanimity concerning 
problems posed by government 
funding on projects rather than 
The focus on CEOs as informants 
gave a predominantly professional 
account.  There was no distinction 
made between organisations ‘of’ 
and ‘for’ people with health 
concerns and needs which may 
influence views of government 
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the health sector 
by Central 
government  (N 
=155 in England 
and 36 in 
Scotland)  
organisation 
CEOs.   
core funding though over 3/5 of 
organisations received funding 
for core purposes. In Scotland 
core funding predominated, 
making services more reliant on 
central government funding.  
91% Scottish organisations 
compared to 45% English 
organisations had to submit 
performance measures.   
relations. Implications of free 
personal care, etc remains to be 
examined.  
366 Schramm  USA, 1997-2002 
 
21 independent 
Blue plans, 7 
consolidated NFP 
Blue plans, 5 
investor-owned 
Blue plans, and 
10 commercial 
health insurance 
carriers 
Financial 
performance  
Descriptive 
statistics 
Conversion of Blue plans does 
not result in demonstrable 
economic efficiencies. Most NFP 
Blue plans continue to operate 
with sound margins and can be 
expected to compete with other 
firms, in part because of their 
special ties to various customer 
segments, their geographic 
market share, their relationships 
with state governments, and the 
particular brand identity enjoyed 
by local Blue plans. Operating 
margins in health insurance 
companies are highly tied to 
local market knowledge, which 
becomes attenuated in larger, 
geographically dispersed 
insurance companies. 
Half of the US Blue Cross plans 
have been consolidated and 
converted to for-profit companies. 
This process has gone on without 
informed debate and with minimal 
interest or comment from the 
public policy establishment whose 
principal interest is expanding 
coverage to all Americans. A form 
of corporate organisation has 
been lost that has provided lower-
cost coverage and embraced a 
corporate identity infused with 
service to the public. 
 
Limitations: Case study character 
only. 
367 McCue et al USA (11 states), 
1990-1995 
 
Nursing staff, 
quality of 
care (risk 
adjusted 
Dynamic 
econometric 
model 
It found that an increase in 
nursing staff led to a statistically 
significant increase in operating 
expenses but no significant 
The study addressed the central 
policy issue that cost containment 
and increased competition from 
managed care organisations erode 
Not-for-profit health care organisations 
© NCCSDO 2008 158 
Sample of 422 
hospitals for 
which data was 
available in the 
Healthcare Cost 
and Utilization 
Project. 
mortality), 
financial 
performance 
(operating 
margin and 
natural log of 
operating 
expenses) 
decrease in profits. profit margins or quality, and that 
improved financial performance is 
often achieved at the expense of 
hospital size and staffing ratios. 
The study was limited by 
availability of cost data and 
possibly inconsistencies in 
financial reporting of operating 
margins. The study did not control 
for possible confounding variables, 
such as variations in discharge 
policy, outpatient visits, and 
investment. 
369 David  USA, 1960-2000 Change in 
hospital size; 
convergence 
between for-
profit and 
NFP hospitals 
Econometric 
modelling 
Changes in economic 
environment (entry, exit, 
acquisitions and divestitures) 
encourages some firms to 
change ownership type. In 1969 
NFPs maintained on average 
three times as many beds per 
hospital as their FP counterparts. 
By 2000 the NFPs were only 
about 30% larger than the 
typical for-profit and there is 
evidence of growing similarity in 
capacity of for-profit and NFP 
hospitals following the 
introduction of prospective 
payments in 1983.  
The author focuses on the 
possibility that hospitals choose 
their ownership type and 
attendant regulatory 
environments strategically. The 
literature represents the choice as 
a result of different organisational 
objectives or as the result of 
“balancing the benefits and 
drawbacks of each status under 
uncertainty and incomplete 
markets for risk.” But little 
empirical work has focused on the 
impact of ownership form on 
hospitals’ capacity choice. 
370 Campbell and 
Jeffrey 
USA, 1995 and 
2000 
 
Service 
availability 
(implementat
ion of health 
Regression 
analysis 
 
Private NFP units were more 
likely to adopt some services, 
while FP units were less so. 
However, in general, neither FP 
Limitations: no descriptive 
account of financial incentives in 
different sectors. 
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National Drug 
Abuse Treatment 
System Survey 
of outpatient 
substance abuse 
treatment units 
services for 
women) 
nor NFP units significantly 
implemented women’s services. 
371 Kovner New York City 
 
4 NFP hospitals 
and health 
systems 
Accountabilit
y and 
performance 
of boards 
Unstructured 
interviews and 
participant 
observation at 
board meetings 
Boards get too much data in 
general and too little 
comparative data. 
Limitations: small sample and 
selection bias (interviews with 
board members and senior 
managers); no objective tests of 
the reliability of responses. 
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Appendix 3  Historical perspectives on British 
nonprofits and on charitable fundraising for 
NHS services 
Can lessons be learnt from history which are relevant to the present 
day?  In this chapter we summarise evidence on the performance of 
nonprofits in British health care. Our primary focus is on the pre-NHS 
era, but we also refer to studies of nonprofit provision of health care 
since the establishment of the NHS which are relevant. This is not 
merely of antiquarian interest. Taking a long-term view, nonprofits 
have been around since the middle ages, and have been the dominant 
providers of health care for most of that time. If the aim of the 
government is realised (that is, to establish a plurality of provision in 
which the dominant organisational form is the nonprofit kind) then we 
may come to see the NHS as the historical aberration, if by that we 
mean health care that is both funded and provided by the state.  
With this in mind an evaluation of the British nonprofit experience is 
highly relevant. Of course, proposals for reform of the welfare state 
often draw on historical evidence and precedent to defend an 
extension of the role of nonprofits. Good examples are to be found in 
the work of David Green, Robert Whelan and the think tank Civitas, or 
politicians such as Hazel Blears (2002), who argued that the pre-NHS 
system embodied real opportunities for ordinary people to get 
involved in the governance of hospitals. Academics have countered 
such arguments with "back-to-the-future" scenarios in which the 
reintroduction of voluntarism reproduces the failings of the pre-NHS 
system of health care (e.g. Webster, 1988, 1995). Given that the NHS 
will remain funded substantially from direct taxation it is unlikely that 
the inequalities of the pre-1948 system will be re-established, but we 
believe that there are several relevant lessons which can be learnt 
from that period.  
If we begin by considering the rationale for the establishment of 
nonprofit organisations, the first point to note is that British voluntary 
hospitals were not established in response to "state failure" (in 
Weisbrod’s terms, understood as the absence of democratic 
endorsement of public provision); they were in practice the principal 
means by which health services were established, although in 
numerical terms they were eventually superseded, firstly by the Poor 
Law medical service and subsequently by the development of 
municipal services following the 1929 Local Government Act.  What 
did the term “voluntary hospital” signify in the pre-NHS era? It 
generally denoted an independent institution characterised by the 
following: income was not drawn from the public purse but from 
philanthropy (later in the lifespan of voluntary hospitals, direct patient 
payments began to play a greater part, and income was also derived 
from hospital contributory schemes, i.e. small weekly payments often 
through payroll deduction which were channelled to a specific hospital 
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or a centralised hospital fund); management was governed by a 
volunteer governing body, which was accountable only to the hospital 
subscribers (these were wealthy patrons who pledged an annual sum 
to the hospital, which gave them certain privileges, notably the ability 
to grant admission tickets to those in need of the hospital services); 
and hospital medical staff gave their services on a voluntary basis, 
deriving their income from private practice. The great majority of 
these hospitals were nationalised in 1948 but a small private hospital 
sector continued to exist, mainly consisting of nonprofit hospitals, 
though funds were generated principally through patient payments 
(mostly through private medical insurance) and staff were by now 
paid for their services.  
We have separated this historical work from the rest of our literature 
review, on two grounds: firstly, it could be argued that the purpose of 
the authors of the historical literature on this topic was not explicitly 
and formally to assess the "performance" of the pre-NHS hospitals. In 
contrast to many of the studies reviewed elsewhere, this literature 
does not generally develop formal statistical procedures to evaluate 
how successful, efficient or otherwise the hospitals were although 
there are some basic and descriptive studies of variations in 
comparative costs which can be dated to the work of Braun (1909). 
Secondly, the literature reviewed in this section is not derived from 
systematic searches of the same databases as used elsewhere; it 
results from Mohan's work over some 20 years on contemporary and 
historical aspects of British health policy.  We are confident that the 
work reviewed here includes all the major studies of relevance to an 
assessment of the pre-NHS hospitals.  
On what basis might we assess the performance of these hospitals 
and of the hospital system as a whole?  It may be unfair to apply 
post-hoc collectivist criteria to the evaluation of an essentially 
individualist and localist system of hospital provision.  Our position is 
different: we argue it is legitimate to apply tests of 
comprehensiveness, public purpose, and consumer responsiveness to 
the evidence on the distribution and success of previous nonprofits in 
the health sector.  We need to do so in order to determine whether or 
not the deficiencies identified by Salamon (1995) – namely 
philanthropic insufficiency, particularism, amateurism and paternalism 
– are valid.  
Capital investment arrangements 
The availability of capital for investment in nonprofit hospitals in 
Britain was highly variable. The circumstances leading to the 
establishment of a hospital were idiosyncratic and place-specific. They 
might include: the desire to provide a valued social service for the 
benefit of the poor; the wishes of medical professionals to establish a 
niche in a competitive and overcrowded medical marketplace (hence 
the foundation of many small specialist institutions); and social 
pressures on the very wealthy to display their sense of social 
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obligation in a very visible form (Abel-Smith, 1964; Gorsky, Mohan 
and Powell, 2002a; Wilson, 2002). Given this complex set of motives, 
it might be thought unrealistic to expect that the pattern of hospital 
provision reflected a serious assessment of need.  In the NHS second 
reading debate, Aneurin Bevan commented about the "caprice of 
charity" which had delivered a patchwork quilt of services. The 
academic literature certainly reflects this. Brian Abel-Smith (1964) 
famously argued that the distribution of voluntary hospital resources 
reflected "the donations of the living and the legacies of the dead, 
rather than any ascertained need for services". Subsequent research 
has tested this claim. Gorsky, Mohan and Powell (1999) showed that 
geographical variations in provision were a feature of the voluntary 
hospital system from its earliest days, and that in the six decades 
prior to the establishment of the NHS there was no reduction in the 
degree of variability in hospital provision.  Powell (1992) assessed 
variations in the distribution of hospital provision (mainly beds and 
staffing indicators) and related them to patterns of need for services 
in a basic way (unweighted correlation coefficients). He concluded that 
substantial inequalities existed, although these were not 
systematically related to patterns of need.   
Arrangements for capital investment therefore generated an uneven 
pattern of provision. We might also ask whether the asset base of the 
British voluntary hospitals was sufficient both to insulate them against 
financial risk and to provide adequate capital for investment. There is 
some work on the capital assets of the voluntary hospitals in the 
1930s (Cherry, 1997; Gorsky, Mohan, and Powell, 2002a; Gorsky and 
Mohan, 2001). Hospital finances had been squeezed by the expansion 
of provision, the burgeoning staffing budget, the modernisation of the 
institutional fabric and the need to exploit new medical technologies. 
Traditional modes of hierarchical charity were insufficient to sustain 
these demands. Hospitals therefore increased charges for their 
services and the period saw the emergence of mass contributory 
arrangements, whose success was founded upon the local loyalties 
which voluntary hospitals inspired. However, the late 1930s saw 
financial crisis looming, as current account deficits multiplied and 
some institutions sank seriously into debt, surviving only by running 
overdrafts which were very high relative to their income, or selling off 
assets in order to continue treating patients.  Those hospitals with 
sufficient capital assets could ride out this storm, but few were in such 
a fortunate position and many institutions plunged into persistent 
deficits (Gorsky, Mohan and Powell, 2002b). Hospitals were unable 
simultaneously to accumulate investment funds and modernise their 
capital stock (Cherry, 1997, 322). Some recognition of the extent of 
voluntary failure is evident from the willingness of the government to 
make grants to hospitals towards the cost of capital projects, though 
such assistance was limited to the most disadvantaged parts of the 
country where raising large sums for capital investment was 
impossible (Mohan, 1997).  
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The post-war history of the residual private health sector in the UK 
provides further historical illustrations of nonprofit performance. Most 
hospitals were nationalised in 1948 but a small private sector 
remained. This was principally in not for profit ownership until the 
1970s. The efforts of the then Labour government to eliminate private 
practice from NHS hospitals stimulated investment in private hospitals 
and competitive pressures in American and European health care 
markets led multinational companies to invest in for-profit hospital 
provision in the UK. The limited regulatory controls on this process (to 
do with the size of hospitals) were abolished by the Conservative 
government in 1980. The result was a steady increase in overseas 
commercial investment in British health care, led initially by American 
companies and subsequently by various European companies. The 
existing nonprofits were unable to respond – most of them were 
undercapitalised and had therefore no means of raising funds to 
modernise their facilities.  This process is described by a number of 
authors: Berliner and Regan, 1987; Griffith, Iliffe, and Rayner, 1987; 
Griffith, Rayner, and Mohan, 1985; Mohan, 1984, 1985; Rayner, 
1986, 1987). It is part of the wider process of corporatisation of 
health care, described by Salamon (1995), in which commercial 
entities take a dominant place in the health care market, at the 
expense of nonprofits. The policy lesson is clearly that nonprofits are 
vulnerable when large international corporations perceive a country as 
a profitable location for investment, and this is consistent with the 
emphasis elsewhere in this literature review on the crucial role of 
competitive pressures and the external regulatory environment. 
Public purpose, organisational behaviour, and asset 
protection 
How might we consider the issues of public purpose, organisational 
behaviour and asset protection in an historical context?  Strictly 
speaking, voluntary hospitals were private institutions (in the sense 
that they were differentiated from public or state-provided 
institutions) but on the other hand their mission was to provide health 
care for those otherwise unable to afford it.  Having said that, they 
varied in terms of their interpretation of this mission, for example in 
terms of the extent to which patients were charged while in hospital 
(Gorsky, Mohan and Powell, 2002b) (for accuracy, we should point out 
that patients typically received treatment free, but they were expected 
to contribute towards their maintenance while in hospital). They were 
also independent – and this independence was often jealously 
guarded. It could therefore plausibly be argued that they should be 
judged as individual institutions. On the other hand, and certainly by 
the 1930s, there was awareness of variations in availability of and 
access to hospital services, and of the varying performance of the 
components of the hospital system. It is therefore relevant to consider 
the literature which has evaluated the comprehensiveness of the pre-
NHS hospital system. 
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Some commentators are highly optimistic about this. Writers such as 
Green (1993; 1996), Seldon (1991), and Jewkes and Jewkes (1962) 
have all argued for the comprehensiveness of the pre--NHS system. 
They have suggested that nationalisation stifled a grass-roots wave of 
innovation which reflected consumer preferences. Certainly, the 
establishment of some 1200 voluntary hospitals represented a 
considerable achievement, and other statistics presented by Gray 
(1991) indicate continued expansion -- for example, hospitals were 
still being founded into the 1930s. But this does not mean that 
voluntaries and nonprofits provided a comprehensive service. 
Although Green (1993) argued that various forms of public, nonprofit 
and private provision of services gave the population access to a 
comprehensive system of health care in the 1930s, Morris (2000) has 
ably criticised his estimates, demonstrating that he can only arrive at 
this conclusion through double counting.  
We can explore the issue of public purpose by looking at evidence 
concerning the pattern of hospital utilisation. Mohan (2003) has 
reconstructed the pattern of hospital use in 1938.  This work shows 
that for county boroughs, utilisation rates ranged from 10 to 58 
patients per thousand population, and although there are signs of a 
north-south split, one can also identify boroughs in the North of 
England where utilisation rates were comparable with any of their 
southern counterparts. Utilisation was negatively associated with 
need, and an inverse care situation clearly existed. Broadly similar 
patterns were evident for counties. On this evidence, there were 
major gaps in the availability of services, no systematic relationship 
between provision and need and no mechanism by which the two 
could be matched. There is also much evidence from the wartime 
hospital surveys of variations in waiting lists between hospitals, and 
although interpretation of these is problematic (it is likely that supply 
constraints operated to dissuade potential patients from applying for 
admission as was observed by some inter-war reports) in some cities 
waiting lists equated to between 10 and 20% of the annual caseload 
treated at hospitals (Mohan, 2002; 2003).  
In comparison with post-war standards the variability in the provision 
and use of services is substantial. It could be argued that this is to 
apply post-hoc collectivist criteria to the evaluation of hospital services 
and that this is inappropriate since the provision of a comprehensive 
service was not in the minds of those who founded the voluntary 
hospitals. Hence the pro-voluntarist case is that we should be 
prepared to "take the risk of under-government" (Green, 1993) and 
accept such variations in provision because of the role of the voluntary 
sector in providing opportunities for participation and user control. On 
the other hand a sober assessment of the achievements of nonprofits 
has to take account of changed social expectations. 
To what extent were voluntary hospitals able to provide high-quality 
medical care?  Firstly, the large number of small or single-specialty 
institutions was not conducive to good medical practice, as was amply 
demonstrated by the wartime Hospital Surveys (Nuffield Provincial 
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Hospitals Trust, 1946) and a criticism of surviving post-war nonprofits 
was also the absence of resident medical staff (Griffith, Iliffe and 
Rayner, 1987). Secondly, the pre-NHS voluntaries practised careful 
patient selection, to the point where the municipal hospitals were 
viewed as dumping grounds for the chaff of the voluntary system 
(Eckstein, 1964). In a detailed analysis of inpatient registers for a 
voluntary hospital and its Poor Law neighbour, Edwards (1999) 
demonstrated that age-based rationing was practised; the voluntary 
hospitals gave priority to young adults and the middle-aged rather 
than children or the elderly. Standards were very variable -- the 
availability of medical staff, who gave their services gratis, depended 
on the prospects for private practice in the immediate locality, and so 
outside the major cities, few hospitals had resident medical staff. The 
same is true of nursing staff and of the availability of advanced 
medical technology. The analysis by Hollingsworth and Hollingsworth 
(1985) of differences in the quality and quantity of staffing and other 
inputs, and in average expenditures per inpatient, suggests that the 
nonprofit sector offered a higher quality of provision than that 
provided in the public sector, but that has less to do with the inherent 
qualities of the nonprofit sector than with the fact that the two served 
a very different clientele, with the public sector being dominated by 
provision for chronic conditions and infectious diseases. Moreover, the 
conditions in which the public sector services provided by local 
authorities were established during the 1930s were not propitious. 
Many local authorities could not develop high-quality services due to 
financial stringency; this means that direct comparisons with the 
nonprofit sector are inappropriate (for further literature on these 
points see Pinker, 1966; Powell, 1992; Gray, 1991; Levene, Powell 
and Stewart, 2004, 2006). As in the present day comparisons are 
rendered difficult by the problems of agreeing on appropriate 
indicators of quality, although some key indicators leave little room for 
dispute, such as the proportion of hospitals without resident medical 
staff (Gray, 1991, 253).  
This evidence challenges arguments that advocate nonprofit 
ownership on the grounds of its ability to meet social needs. There 
was great variability in access to voluntary hospital services and in the 
quality of the services on offer. Superficial comparisons suggest that 
the existing nonprofits (the voluntary hospitals) offered higher-quality 
provision than the existing public sector alternative, but this is to 
ignore the public sector’s obligation to treat chronic conditions and 
infectious disease and also the very significant financial constraints 
under which local government services laboured in the 1930s.  
Funding sources and payment mechanisms 
Pro-voluntarists have frequently drawn attention to the steady growth 
in expenditure on the voluntary hospitals prior to 1938 (Prochaska, 
1992), and argued that this provides testimony to the continued 
success of the nonprofit tradition. Others are more sceptical, drawing 
attention to variations in absolute levels of resources available to the 
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hospitals, variations in the funding mix (sources of income) between 
hospitals, and problems to do with the stability of income sources 
which might fluctuate considerably from year to year. 
Green (1993) and Seldon (1991) relied on Pinker's compilation of 
English hospital statistics which presented a snapshot of data for 
several years at different points in time (1861, 1891, 1911, 1921 and 
1938) and on a 1937 report by the independent think tank, Political 
and Economic Planning.  In contrast, Abel-Smith (1964), Gray (1991) 
and Webster (1988; 1995) have all pointed to the financial difficulties 
of the voluntary system by the late 1930s. The most recent defender 
of voluntarism is Frank Prochaska (1992, 104), who has argued that 
charitable sources of income remained vibrant.  However, a weakness 
of those analyses is that they rely upon the annual Burdett’s Hospitals 
and Charities and its successor, the Hospitals Yearbook, which in turn 
were based upon voluntary reporting of financial statistics by 
hospitals.  As shown by recent reanalyses of this data, variations in 
the numbers and type of hospitals reporting in any given year mean 
that it is impossible to distinguish genuine trends from changes due to 
the composition of the hospitals reporting to the compilers of these 
annual volumes.  (Gorsky, Mohan and Powell, 2002b; Mohan, 2006 
and forthcoming).  Analyses of data for consistent sets of hospitals 
which present financial statistics at constant prices show a less 
positive picture than that presented by Prochaska.  They demonstrate 
that regional variations in the availability of resources remained a 
persistent feature of the system -- if anything, the wealthy London 
hospitals pulled away from the rest over time - and that deficits on 
ordinary income were a growing problem in the 1930s (Gorsky, Mohan 
and Powell, 2002a).  Hospitals did not go out of business, but if they 
failed to develop new sources of income it impacted on their ability to 
treat patients. Regional disparities in the resources available to 
hospitals were endemic and persistent over time (Mohan, 2007).  
The most successful new source of income which was developed in the 
inter-war period was hospital contributory schemes, whereby 
employed workers would contribute a regular weekly sum to a fund 
which was either associated with an individual hospital or with a group 
of hospitals covering one city (Gorsky, Mohan and Willis, 2006).  The 
largest such fund, the Hospital Saving Association, had 2 million 
members and there were similar large funds in the other major cities; 
total membership was probably around 11 million, which meant that, 
once dependants are allowed for, approximately half the population 
was covered. These schemes represented an impressive achievement, 
but the resources which they generated depended heavily on local 
labour market conditions, which could pose problems for hospitals for 
which they were the principal source of income (in some industrial 
areas they could provide up to 80 per cent of the annual income of the 
hospitals).  There were particular problems in coalmining areas around 
the time of the General strike for example (Mohan, 2002, 1997; 
Gorsky, Mohan and Willis, 2006, chapter 4; Cherry, 1997). Again 
there are some contradictory interpretations of success: Doyle (2006), 
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for example, claims that the voluntary hospitals on Teesside were able 
to sustain their activities largely through reliance on contributory 
schemes, but this does not mean that the services provided were 
adequate, since although the hospitals derived impressive proportions 
of the income from these schemes, expenditure per bed on Teesside 
remained relatively low. The general lesson to be drawn is that the 
schemes were a kind of social insurance which was dependent very 
heavily on local labour market conditions; therefore the resources 
they generated could vary considerably, as did their impact on 
hospital activity. 
Nonprofit sources of funds could not, therefore, deliver sufficient 
resources to underpin a comprehensive and equitable service. The 
finances of the voluntary hospitals were inherently uneven (depending 
as they did on local economic circumstances) and there was no 
mechanism for pooling resources to achieve redistribution. A verdict of 
philanthropic insufficiency can therefore be defended.  
Integration and planning 
Not-for-profits raise important issues about vertical integration in the 
NHS and therefore about implementation of centrally determined NHS 
plans. The autonomy of nonprofits raises questions about the extent 
to which they can be persuaded to act in the public interest and to 
coordinate their activities with other providers of public health care. 
We can illustrate the potential problems from the pre-NHS era.  
Some authors have argued that there was an emerging consensus in 
the 1930s and 40s within government circles and the medical 
profession in favour of greater co-ordination of health services (Fox, 
1986, ix; Klein, 1989, 2-7; Eckstein, 1964, 101-32). The implication is 
that the gradual evolution of a mixed economy of health care would 
eventually have settled differences and made services accessible to 
all. Other assessments are less certain even if they do not all 
subscribe to the trenchant views of the former civil servant, John 
Pater (1981), who suggested that the voluntary hospitals were 
autocratic, resentful of any interference, and reluctant to entertain 
proposals for collaboration, or the strictures of the Nuffield Hospital 
Surveyors, who pronounced in 1946 that 'there is no hospital system 
now' and deplored 'the results of unco-ordinated development in the 
past' (Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust, 1946, 4).   
Recent scholarship has re-evaluated these verdicts drawing on new 
research in several major cities including Bristol, Aberdeen and 
Newcastle, but in general it confirms the variability in the extent of 
cooperation.  In a few localities joint planning between the local 
authority, the voluntary sector and private practitioners was 
enthusiastically developed.  Aberdeen provides a good example: plans 
were made for public and charitable funds to combine in the removal 
of the voluntary and public hospitals and the University Medical School 
to a dedicated greenfield site. This example indicates the difficulties of 
generalising such solutions – Aberdeen's remoteness meant that it 
Not-for-profit health care organisations 
© NCCSDO 2008 168 
was de facto the medical centre for a very large region, with natural 
links to a hierarchy of medical providers.(Gorsky, 2004). There is 
evidence that in other cities such as Sheffield, Manchester and 
Birmingham, medical school leadership could lead to progressive 
reforms (Pickstone, 1986; Sturdy, 1992; Gorsky, Mohan, and Willis, 
forthcoming) but one could equally quote examples such as Newcastle 
or Bristol where, although the advantages of cooperation might have 
appeared equally obvious, hospital vested interests mitigated against 
it (Mohan, 2002; Gorsky, 2004). Cooperation and integration were 
therefore the exception rather than the norm. 
In locations where medical school leadership was absent, the picture 
was highly variable.  Mohan’s work on the North East of England and 
on the "Special Areas" (locations eligible for regional policy assistance 
in the inter-war period by virtue of the parlous state of their local 
economy) has shown that even where one might have thought that 
economic necessity would have been the mother of invention, 
institutions jealously guarded their independence and refused to 
collaborate (Mohan, 1997, 2002).  
Nor were voluntary hospitals always well-disposed towards 
cooperation with their municipal counterparts,   although to some 
extent there were faults on both sides  (Levene, Powell and Stewart, 
2004, 2006). Mutual suspicion, based on ideological distrust and social 
differences, coupled with institutional stasis and a habit of 
independence, were powerful forces inhibiting change.   
On the other hand, recent work on hospital contributory schemes, 
which became a key source of voluntary hospital finances in the 
interwar years, has shown that the multi-hospital schemes could act 
as a valuable source for integration by virtue of the effective 
purchasing power at their command (Cherry, 1996). The original 
principle of restricting treatment of contributors to the hospital with 
which a scheme was associated soon proved inadequate: what if 
specialist treatment was needed, or a patient fell sick away from 
home, or was moved to a public hospital or a convalescent home?  
Mutual agreements to treat members of other schemes were therefore 
made between public and voluntary hospitals, and between large and 
small voluntaries.  This in turn created pressure for more 
standardisation of contribution and benefit levels from place to place. 
While they cannot be regarded as purchasers of health care in the 
sense in which we understand that term today, they did force 
hospitals to confront obstacles to "money following the patient" – for 
example, situations in which a hospital refused to acknowledge and 
admit a member of another hospital contributory scheme. At the same 
time we should also recognise that these schemes did not always 
espouse an ethos of mutualism – there is evidence of competitive 
recruitment and territorial disputes (Gorsky, Mohan and Willis, 2006, 
chapter 4). 
To summarise, despite government encouragement and some 
promising initiatives, the inter-war period saw relatively few good 
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examples of cases in which nonprofits co-operated either with each 
other or with municipal services in pursuance of the broader public 
good. The requirement for consultation contained in the 1929 Local 
Government Act gave an impetus for change, and joint authorities 
made some progress, especially in towns where university medical 
schools worked with progressive municipal authorities.  Public/third 
sector co-operation might have been more actively enforced by the 
state, but the traditionally permissive approach to local government 
legislation prevented this. Self-interest and particularism were the 
order of the day and although there was widespread recognition of 
this, only in unusual circumstances were such problems overcome. 
This does raise difficulties for those advocating a greater role for 
nonprofit provision of services.  It can be suggested that the context is 
now very different, in that provision of services is now underwritten by 
the state, but the lesson of the inter-war period is surely that effective 
levers are necessary to overcome vested interests.   
Governance and accountability 
To whom and where are not-for-profits accountable, and how 
representative are their arrangements for governance? In general the 
British voluntary hospitals were accountable to their subscribers. 
These were people who pledged an annual sum of a few guineas to 
the hospital, in return for which they were granted admission 
privileges in the form of tickets which could be given to those deemed 
to be deserving of hospital treatment.  Given the cost of subscriptions, 
this imparted an inherent middle-class bias to the composition of the 
subscriber body, but it can hardly be said that there was enormous 
enthusiasm among the middle classes, since typically the number of 
subscribers was only a small proportion of the population who could 
afford to do so (Gorsky, Mohan and Powell, 2002b). The rise of the 
contributory schemes was not associated with a significant broadening 
of the social basis of participation nor with an extension of consumer 
power over the decisions of professionals. Although Cherry (1996) and 
Doyle and Nixon (2001) argue that the development of contributory 
schemes could lead to significant working-class influence on hospital 
policy and admission decisions, the literature shows that even where 
there was a strong community presence on governing bodies, the 
representatives of contributory schemes tended to defer to 
professionals and to middle-class subscribers (Gorsky, Mohan and 
Willis, 2006, chapter 5; Trainor, 1993; Waddington, 2003; Thompson, 
2003).   
There are contrasting verdicts as to whether this system allowed 
provision and need to be matched. Croxson (2006) has argued that 
while on the face of it the subscriber ticket system might have allowed 
subscribers to take a rather capricious approach to the distribution of 
tickets, in practice their rights to admission privileges were attenuated 
by professional interests and the existence of hospital governing 
bodies, who supervised patient admissions.  On the other hand 
Reinarz (2006) takes the view that hospitals were not in a position to 
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contact systematic investigations into the real needs of those on their 
waiting lists, nor were they able to work out a rational order of 
priorities. Such studies indicate the dangers of philanthropic 
amateurism and paternalism highlighted by Salamon's work. Having 
said that, it can also be argued that competition for donations and 
legacies forced hospitals to attend to the question of performance; if 
they failed to cure patients, they would not attract benefactions.  
The evidence that the voluntary hospitals in Britain provided strong 
channels for the representation of consumer interests is therefore not 
very strong. Although there were elements of openness, subscriber 
democracy and accountability in voluntary hospitals from their 
inception, participation was initially limited to middle-class 
contributors.  The role of private subscribers subsequently diminished 
and the decision-making roles of medical professionals and lay 
governing bodies were enhanced.  The transition to mass contribution 
strengthened popular support for the institutions.  However, 
management remained in the hands of traditional elites who were 
reluctant to adopt constitutions which radically enhanced democratic 
participation.   
Users and carers 
There is relatively little material concerning what people thought of 
their care or about their experiences as users of services. There is a 
small number of oral histories which cover limited numbers of people 
and although suggestive, these do not permit definitive conclusions to 
be drawn. Jacobs’ (1993) study of public opinion and state welfare 
contains some limited work on this, drawing on testimony to Mass 
Observation, which indicates considerable ambivalence about the 
merits of continuing with the voluntary tradition (Jacobs, p. 219).  
Conclusions 
Returning to the points made by Salamon, to what extent is it valid to 
level the charges identified by him – namely philanthropic 
insufficiency, particularism, amateurism and paternalism – at 
nonprofit health care in Britain before the NHS? And what lessons 
does this experience of nonprofits before the NHS hold for the future 
development of the service?  
It could certainly be argued that philanthropic insufficiency is a 
defensible verdict.  The pre-NHS hospital system was certainly not 
comprehensive, as is clearly demonstrated by the pattern of hospital 
utilisation, but a more important criticism is the failure to achieve any 
degree of matching between provision and need: there was no 
systematic relationship between utilisation rates, other indicators of 
provision, and indicators of need for health care.  Insufficiency is also 
evident in the financial and asset base of the hospitals – hospital could 
not generate the sums needed for new investment, and the evidence 
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suggests that in the 1930s some were running down their assets in 
order to balance the books. 
Philanthropic particularism is also a valid charge to lay against the 
voluntary hospitals.  Processes of competitive medical specialisation, 
motivated by a desire to obtain a niche in a competitive medical 
marketplace, resulted in large numbers of small and specialist 
institutions, the quality of which was highly variable, and there is 
ample evidence of patient selection on the part of the voluntary 
hospitals.  What we have therefore is a system in which there were no 
incentives for institutions to do anything other than pursue their own 
interests; the only exceptions to this were at a small number of cities 
in which the need to reorganise medical education led several 
institutions to collaborate rather than compete. 
Amateurism is also evident. We can infer this from the inability of the 
system to match provision of need, the absence of any strategic 
direction of investment, tolerance of variations in standards, and the 
influence of hospital subscribers over admission systems. Finally, 
although strictly charitable finance was on the wane by the 1930s, 
strong residues of paternalism pervaded the voluntary hospitals. By 
extension, therefore, if tests of comprehensiveness, public purpose, 
and responsiveness are applied to the pre-NHS nonprofit sector, it 
largely fails them.  
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Appendix 4: Government financial reporting 
and its relationship with the system of 
national accounts 
Government guidance on financial reporting, set out in the manual 
‘Government Accounting’, covers the proper handling and reporting of 
the income, expenditure, assets and liabilities of public entities. This 
guidance is based on the UK’s private sector accounting standards 
known collectively as Generally Accepted Accounting Practice or UK 
GAAP. GAAP consists of “the accounting and disclosure requirements 
of the Companies Act 1985 and pronouncements by the Accounting 
Standards Board (principally accounting standards and Urgent Issues 
Task Force abstracts), supplemented by accumulated professional 
judgement.” (HM Treasury 2000b, glossary) 
The guidance, which consists of mandatory controls and advice, 
covers three main categories: parliamentary requirements; Treasury 
administrative controls; and best practice. Parliamentary requirements 
may by statutory, customary, or set out in specific agreements 
between parliament and the Treasury. Treasury administrative 
controls deal with propriety, value for money, and accountability in 
public spending, are also concerned with regulating public spending. 
Best practice refers to the promotion of procedures contributing to 
“good administration.” (HM Treasury 2000b, summary)  
National accounting and government accounting overlap. National and 
government financial accounts are both derived from individual 
financial accounts of public sector entities. However, because the 
functions of the two systems differ, different criteria are occasionally 
involved in determining sectoral classification. Ownership is one area 
in which differences arise. We illustrate this, using the example of 
public private partnerships (PPPs). 
The concept of ‘economic ownership’ in public 
private partnerships 
Both the government’s financial reporting regime and the system of 
national accounts are concerned with the question as to whether a 
public private partnership (PPP) is a financing arrangement for the 
procurement of public sector infrastructure, in which case the asset 
and the liability should be accounted for as a finance lease on the 
public sector balance sheet, or whether the PPP primarily represents 
the procurement of infrastructure-based services, in which the 
contract is treated as an operating lease and the asset and liability are 
not recognised on the public sector’s balance sheet. However the 
definition is not straightforward, as the PPP may contain elements of 
both. Eurostat provides a Private Finance Initiative (PFI) example: “a 
PFI contract for “school building services” in which the operator 
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provides a building and agrees to clean the building might be analyzed 
as containing a lease and contract for cleaning services.” Here 
guidance differs between the views of the British regulator, the 
Accounting Standards Board (ASB), the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) and Eurostat. 
Due to the complexity of the issue, and following substantial debate 
between the Accounting Standards Board (ASB), the British regulator, 
and the UK government, the ASB issued an Application Note (AN) in 
an attempt to clarify accounting for PPPs. Essentially the accounting 
treatment follows the concept of substance over form, whereby there 
is careful consideration as to which party benefits from the risks and 
rewards of ownership, and has effective ‘economic ownership’ of the 
underlying asset, regardless of which party retains legal ownership. 
The AN states that after separable service elements, which are treated 
as operating leases, are removed, if the only remaining payments 
relate to property payments then the provisions of SSAP 21 
Accounting for Leases are applied because the nature of the 
transaction is a stand-alone lease. However, if the remaining 
payments relate both to property and some non-separable service 
elements then FRS 5 Reporting the Substance of Transactions should 
be applied because these involve a lease within a larger arrangement. 
The Application Note requires consideration as to whether all the risks 
and rewards of ownership have been transferred, and the spirit of the 
regulation appears to be that PPP infrastructure is likely to be a 
finance lease, implying that it would be recognised as an asset on the 
public sector balance sheet, together with the long-term liability to 
pay for it. In practice the complexity of the PPP context makes it very 
difficult to judge where the risks and rewards lie as those that relate 
to the property are often bound up with the risks and rewards of 
providing the service (Cearns 1998), thus giving rise to uncertainty 
about the accounting treatment that will be adopted.  
International accounting regulation has focused on control over and 
definition of PPP assets, rather than on the substance of the 
transaction, and is contained in IAS 17 Leases, which classifies leases 
as either finance or operating leases dependent on the level of 
transfer of the risks and rewards of ownership. However the 
complexity of PPP contracts is such that the International Financial 
Reporting Interpretations Committee has recently issued IFRIC 12 
Service Concession Agreements which states that operators should not 
recognise infrastructure, falling within the definition of a service 
concession agreement, as a tangible asset, since the arrangement 
does not transfer the right to control the use of the public service 
infrastructure to operators. IFRIC 12, unlike FRS 5 note F, makes a 
distinction between accounting for these assets depending on whether 
the primary responsibility for payments rests with the public sector, in 
which case the operator shall recognise a financial asset, or whether 
payment comes primarily from users, in which case the operator shall 
recognise an intangible asset. This distinction between financial and 
intangible assets in relation to the PPP infrastructure, based on the 
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formal criterion of ‘who is the payer?’ is insufficient since it does not 
take into account the economic substance of the transaction. Similar 
contracts may be accounted for differently, giving rise to a different 
impact on financial statements through timing differences in the 
recognition of revenues and expenses. There may be cases where the 
difference between the models is finely balanced, for example, where 
payments are made by users, but there are additional payments from 
the grantor if those fall below a minimum guarantee income.  
The IFRIC preference to define assets based on control is consistent 
with the IASB’s Framework and IAS16, but by way of contrast, the 
Committee on Monetary, Financial and Balance of Payments Statistics 
(Eurostat, 2004) adopts a risk- based approach, when it argues that 
assets in a PPP can only be considered non-governmental assets if 
there is strong evidence that the partner bears most of the risk 
(Heald, 2003). This is clarified as meaning that the private sector 
should bear the construction risk and either the availability or demand 
risk. However, this risk-based policy may indeed lead to complexity 
and inconsistency. Despite the wording that seems to indicate that 
PPP assets would be government assets, Hall (2005) has argued that 
in practice these guidelines will facilitate off public sector balance 
sheet accounting and that this is intentional because in principle the 
EU authorities are in favour of PPPs and see them as a route to enable 
investment by governments constrained by the EU’s own fiscal rules.  
Furthermore, as PWC (2004) point out, ESA 95 only covers 
government accounting from an EU statistical standpoint and so there 
is no requirement that accounting rules for other purposes should 
follow suit. For example, auditors acting for the private partner in a 
PFI deal may assess the risks and rewards differently from the public 
sector’s auditors. As a result, PFI assets can appear in both public and 
private sectors simultaneously (on-on balance sheet treatment, as in 
the case of roads) or in no sector at all (off-off balance sheet 
treatment, as in the case of most hospitals) (Edwards, Shaoul, 
Stafford and Arblaster 2004).  “Since decisions regarding whether or 
not a body is exposed to the risks and rewards of a PFI project are 
monitored independently by the private partner’s auditors and the 
public partner’s auditors, it is possible that both the public and private 
sector partners record the capital formation on their own balance 
sheets (on-on) or for a project to appear on neither balance sheet 
(off-off).”  
While the ASB view is that there is a ‘rebuttable presumption’ (ASB 
2005) that assets should be recognised on the public sector balance 
sheet, the Financial Reporting Advisory Board to HM Treasury (2005) 
in its response to the IFRIC has indicated its belief that at least one or 
other entity ought to hold the assets on balance sheet. The 
International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB) is 
now looking at the whole issue of service concession arrangements, 
from the perspective of public sector entities.  The net result of all this 
is that until IPSASB makes a decision on this, which at best is unlikely 
to become operational for at least 5years years, there are 
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considerable uncertainties and discrepancies in how these transactions 
should be reported. 
 These matters of judgement as opposed to a clear cut classification 
are important because third sector policy provides a mechanism for 
the substitution of private for public asset ownership and balance 
sheet treatment has significant implications for the cost base of 
organisations. Assets that are on the public balance sheet are required 
by the government’s financial regime to show a return on public sector 
capital of a certain amount, to show an annual cost of depreciation at 
a rate determined by the Treasury, and to be revalued at intervals 
determined by the Treasury. These arrangements affect the cost of 
capital and will mean that the cost of capital differs between NHS 
entities dependent upon how the assets have been reported.  
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http://proquest.umi.com/login 
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BIOETHICSLINE now included in PubMed (see below) 
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EconLit http://www.econlit.org/ 
IBSS and GLOBAL HEALTH accessed via Ovid 
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http://www.pssru.ac.uk/ 
UK Department of Health http://www.dh.gov.uk/Home/fs/en 
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